



A STUDY
OF THE
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

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THIS BOOK

IS

Gratefully Dedicated

To

*Dr. Prabhakar Ramkrishna
Bhāṇḍārkar*

a mere dream, I may mention that I have already prepared the manuscript of nearly three-fourths of the other volume, which will deal with such topics as these :—Western thinkers on the Hindu Religion and Hindu philosophy.—What is Pantheism?—Is Shankar's Vedanta Pantheistic?—Shankar and Ramanuja,—Ramanuja *vs.* Shankar.—Defence of Shankar against Ramanuja.—What is Asceticism?—Is the teaching of the Gita as interpreted by Shankar Asceticism?—&c.

The only thing that now remains for me to do is to perform the pleasant duty of expressing my sincere gratefulness to Dr. Prabhakar Ramkrishna Bhandarkar, --whom I feel and shall ever feel proud to call my friend, --for his having urged and encouraged me to undertake and carry on this study, to Principal Cholmondeley of this college for his having kindly gone through certain portions of the manuscript of this essay and made some linguistic corrections, and to Rao Bahadur Achyut Bhaskar Desai for his having generously helped me to get the book through the press.

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A Study

OF THE

Indian Philosophy.

Chapter I.

The Teaching of the Gita.

I.

That, which peculiarly distinguishes the Gita, is what is known as Karma-yoga-bhakti. Let us collect a few passages in the Gita in order to understand the meaning of this phrase, Karma-yoga-bhakti :—do¹ not be inclined to inaction : Perform² works : perform³ necessary works : the renunciation⁴ of necessary works is not proper : do⁵ not be attached to works : always⁶ perform

(¹) मा तेष्वाभस्तुभकर्मणि ॥ II. 47. (²) कुरु कर्मणि ॥ II. 48. (³) नियतं कुरु कर्मसंख्यं ॥ III. 8. (⁴) तस्य युगं व्यासः कर्मणः न उपपद्यते ॥ XVIII. 7. (⁵) न तु भगवन्नेह ॥ VI. 4. (⁶) अस्तुतः यातव्यं कर्मसमाचरतः

works, which ought to be done, without being attached to them : entertain⁷ no desire for the results of works (which you do) : forsaking⁸ all attachment to the results of works : he who,⁹ regardless of the results of works, performs the works which ought to be done : the necessary work which¹⁰ is performed, without attachment and without expectation of any results, simply because it ought to be done : that work¹¹ which is necessary, and which is performed by one without being attached to it, without loving or hating it, and without the expectation of any results : perform¹² works, being equal in success or ill-success : looking¹³ alike on pleasure and pain, on gain and loss, on victory and defeat : whose¹⁴ mind is fixed on knowledge : constant¹⁵ in (contemplating)

III. 19. (7) मा कर्मफलहेतुःभूः ॥ II. 47. (8) त्यक्त्वा कर्मफलासंगं ॥ IV. 20. (9) अनाश्रितःकर्मफलंकार्यकर्मकरो-
 तियः VI. 1. (10) कार्येइत्येवयत्कर्मनियतंक्रियते संगंत्य-
 क्त्वाफलंचैव ॥ XVIII. 9. (11) नियतंसंगरहितं अरागद्वे-
 षतःकृतंअफलप्रेप्सुनाकर्म ॥ XVIII. 23. (12) सिद्धि-
 असिद्धयोःसमःभूत्वाकुरुकर्माणि ॥ II. 48. (13) सुखदुःखे-
 समेकृत्वालाभालाभौजयाजयौ ॥ II. 38. (14) ज्ञानावस्थित-
 चेतसः ॥ IV. 23. (15) अध्यात्मनित्याः ॥ XV. 5 ;
 यस्यसर्वेसमारंभाःकामसंकल्पवर्जिताः IV. 19.

the relation between the supreme and the individual spirit ; whose efforts are all free from desires and fancies.

All these and similar passages can be summed up by saying :—

Without¹ entertaining any desire for any results, without being attached, being equable in success and ill-success, and constant in (contemplating) the relation between Atma and Brahma, — with this state of mind, always do your duty simply because it is your duty.

This, then, is the meaning of Karma-yoga, sometimes also called बुद्धियोग. In order to understand what Karma-yoga-bhakti is, we must add to the above idea of Karma-yoga the thought contained in passages like the following² :—

(¹) अकलेषु : मुक्तमंग : मिथ्याभिः योगमः अध्यात्मनि-
त्यः चभूत्वा, नियतं कर्म पापं इत्येष उक्तं कुरु ॥

(²) यः करोषि यत् भक्षसि यत् नृदोषि ददासि यत् ।
यत् तपस्यसि योतेय तत् कुरुष्व न दपयेत् ॥ IX. 27.

What you do, what you eat, what you sacrifice, what you give, the penance you perform, do that as offered to me *i. e.* to God³.

It must be noticed that, according to the Gitakar, in order that the dedication of our acts to God may be proper and complete, we must have the knowledge of God ; we have also seen that Karma-yoga requires **अध्यात्मनित्यत्व**. Thus it follows that, in order to practise this Karma-yoga-bhakti, we must know what God is, what the soul is, and what the relation between the two is.

How, then, are we to understand God, according to the Gitakar ?

II

In the Gita, we find God described under three forms :—In some passages God is said

(³) There are many other passages in the Gita in which the same point is insisted upon: *e.g.*—ब्रह्मणि आधाय कर्माणि संगंत्यक्त्वा करोति यः ॥ V. 10 ; ये तु सर्वाणि कर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य मत्पराः ॥ XII 6 ; चेतसा सर्वकर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य मत्परः ॥ XVIII. 57 ; मयि सर्वाणि कर्माणि संन्यस्य अध्यात्मचेतसा ॥ III. 30.

to be अव्यक्त, अक्षर, कृद्रम्य, निर्गुण, अनन्त, सर्व-
प्रग, अनिर्देय, and अनित्य.~I shall not translate
these words into English ; for those, who do
not understand Sanskrit, cannot get an idea
of this description when translated into any
other language. This, then, is one form of
God according to the Gita. And God under
this form is to be known by the अभ्यासयोग
described in the sixth chapter of the Gita.

Under another form, God is described as
the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the
whole universe, every particle of which
exists in God, and in every particle of which
God exists. Thus we read :—I am¹ the
source of all, and all moves on through me.
There² is nothing movable or immovable
which can exist without me. Know³ me
to be the eternal seed of all beings. I am,⁴
in every way, the origin of the gods and
the great sages. The fourfold⁵ division of
castes was created by me. It (Brahma⁶)

(¹) अहं सर्वप्रभवः सत्त्वमयः सर्वगतः ॥ X. 8. (²)
नमो भूमिनिवासिभ्यः सर्वेभ्यो नमः ॥ X. 39. (³)
वीजं मां सर्वभूतानां विद्धि सत्त्वमयम् ॥ VII. 10. (⁴)
अहं आदिः हि देवानां महर्षीणां च सर्वतः ॥ X. 2. (⁵)
चातुर्वर्ण्यं मया सृष्टं ॥ IV. 13. (⁶) उच्यते विष्णुः अवि तम् ;

is the radiance of the radiant bodies. Know⁷ that glory to be mine which, dwelling in the sun, lights up the whole world, or is in the moon or fire. Whatever⁸ thing there is of power, or glorious, or splendid, know all that to be produced from portions of my energy. Intelligence,⁹ knowledge, freedom from delusion, forgiveness, truth, restraint of the senses, tranquillity, pleasure, pain, birth, death, fear, and also security, harmlessness, equability, contentment, penance, (making) gifts, glory, disgrace,—all these different states of beings are from me alone. All entities,¹⁰ which are of the quality of goodness, and those which are of the quality of passion and of darkness, know that they are, indeed, all from me. I cause¹¹ heat and I send forth and stop showers.

ज्योतिः ॥ XIII. 17. (7) यत् आदित्यगतं तेजः जगत्
भासयते अखिलं । यत् चंद्रमसि यत् च अग्नौ तत् तेजः विद्धि
मामकम् ॥ XV. 12. (8) यत् यत् विभूतिमत् सत्त्वं श्रीमत्
ऊर्जितं एव वा । तत् तत् एव अवगच्छ त्वं मम तेजः-अंश-संभवम् ॥
X. 41. (9) बुद्धिः ज्ञानं असंमोहः क्षमा सत्यं दमः शमः सुखं
दुःखं भवः भावः भयं च अभयं एव च ॥ अहिंसा समता तुष्टिः तपः दानं
यशः अयशः भवंति भावाः भूतानां मत्तः एव पृथग्विधाः ॥ X. 4, 5.
(10) ये च एव सात्त्विका भावाः राजसाः तामसाः च ये । मत्तः
एव इति तान् विद्धि ॥ VII. 12. (11) तपामि अहं
अहं वर्षं निगृह्णामि उत्सृजामि च ॥ IX. 19.

Not only is God, under this second form, the creator of every thing and being, every state and quality, that exists, but God is also present, in every thing that exists. Thus we read in the Gita :—That Supreme¹ Being...in whom all entities dwell, and by whom all this is permeated. This² whole universe is pervaded by me in an unperceived form. He who³ sees me in every thing and every thing in me. Me, abiding⁴ in all beings. He sees⁵ (truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities. Not different⁶ in (different) things, but standing as though different. I am⁷ the self seated in the hearts of all beings. This space⁸ between heaven and earth, and all the quarters, are pervaded by you alone.

- (¹) यस्य अंतस्थानि भूतानि येन सर्वं इदं ततम् ॥ VIII. 22.
 (²) मया तत्र इदं सर्वं जगत् अव्यक्तमूर्तिना ॥ IX. 4.
 (³) यः मां पश्यति सर्वत्र सर्वं च मयि पश्यति ॥ VI. 30. (⁴) सर्वभूतस्थितं माम् ॥ VI. 31. (⁵) समं सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्तं परमेश्वरं ।...यः पश्यति सः पश्यति ॥ XIII. 27. (⁶) अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तं इव च स्थितम् ॥ XIII. 16.
 (⁷) अहं आत्मा...सर्वभूताशयस्थितः ॥ X. 20. (⁸) आवा-
 पृथिव्योः इदं अन्तरं हि व्याप्तं त्वया एकेन दिशः च सर्वाः ॥

O God ! I see" within your body the gods, as also all the groups of various beings.

This universe, which God, under this form, creates and which is permeated by Him, consists of (a) the so-called mental faculties,—*i. e.*, the power of decision or judgment (*bulhi*), the consciousness of one's self as an individual (*ahankar*), the power of pondering over objects (*manas*), the five senses of knowledge, and the five senses of action ; (b) all the so-called mental states, such as desire, pleasure, pain, &c. ; (c) the five objects of the senses of knowledge, *i. e.*, form, taste, smell, touch, and sound ; and (d) all the material world formed out of these, constituted by earth, water, light, wind, and space. All this created universe, taken as a whole, is called the Prakriti or Kshetra, *i. e.*, the body, of God.

Besides Prakriti, in this sense, there is another Prakriti, which belongs to God under this form, and which is also called Avyakta, Mahat-brahma, Mahat-yoni, Mula-Prakriti, or Pradhana. The necessity of assuming

XI. 20. (१) पद्म्यामि देवान् तव देव देहे सर्वान् तवा
भूतविशेषसंघान् ॥ XI. 15.

the existence of this Prakṛiti is that, according to the Gītakar, God or Brahma by itself is Nirguṇa (निर्गुण), and, therefore, can be neither the creator, sustainer, nor the destroyer of the universe. But Brahma becomes the creator when in conjunction with this Mula-Prakṛiti. Thus we are told :— 'Taking' the control of my Prakṛiti, I bring forth again and again this whole collection of entities. Elsewhere the same fact is expressed by saying :—Prakṛit² gives birth to movables and immovables through me, the supervisor. Or thus :— Mahat-brahma is a womb for me, in which I cast the seed ; from that is the birth of all things. Also thus :—of the³ bodies, which are born from all wombs, the (man) womb is Mahat-brahma, and I (am) the father, the giver of the seed.

Similarly, though God, under this form, is said to be the cause of all destruction,

(¹) प्रवृत्तिं स्वा अवष्टन्य विगज्जामि पुन. पुनः । भूत-
प्राम इम वृत्तन्म् ॥ IX. 8 (²) मया 'अध्यक्षेण प्रवृत्तिः
मृयते मत्तत्तन्म् ॥ IX. 10' (³) मम योनि मद्गत् प्रदा
तस्मिन् गर्भं दधामि भद्र । संभवं सर्वभूताना ततः भवति... ॥
XIV. 3. (⁴) सर्वयोनिषु...मृत्युः समर्पयन्त्याः । तासां
प्रदा मद्गत्योनिः भद्र योजप्रदः पिता ॥ XIV. 4.

O C destruction is simply absorption of the
as a things, said to be destroyed, into the Mula-
Prakriti. Thus we read :—On the ⁵advent
of night they (i.e., all perceptible things)
dissolve in that same, called the Avyakta.
Hi At⁶ the expiration of a kalpa, all entities
fac enter my Prakriti.

jud Thus, destruction as well as creation
our would be impossible to God in the absence
po of this Mula-Prakriti.

th That God sustains every thing is clear
se from the fact that nothing can exist which
st is not in God, or in which there is no God.
th And hence it is said :—It (the⁷ highest
i Brahma) supports all. Entering the earth,
a I, by my power,⁸ support all things ; and
tl becoming the juicy moon, I nourish all herbs.
w I, becoming⁹ the fire, and dwelling in the
t bodies of (all) creatures,...cause digestion
I of the four-fold food.

God, under this form, is also the friend¹⁰

(⁵) रात्र्यागमे प्रलीयन्ते तत्र एव अव्यक्तसंज्ञके॥ VIII. 18.

(⁶) सर्वभूतानि...प्रकृतिं यांति मामिकाम् कल्पक्षये॥ IX. 7.

(⁷) सर्वभृत् च एव ॥ XIII. 14. (⁸) गां आविश्य
च भूतानि धारयामि अहं ओजसा । पुष्णामि च भोषधीः सर्वाः
सोमः भूत्वा रसात्मकः ॥ XV. 13. (⁹) अहं वैश्वानरः
भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहं आश्रितः । ...पचामि अन्नं चतुर्विधम् ॥
XV. 14. (¹⁰) सुहृदं सर्वभूतानां ॥ V. 29.

of all creatures, or, as it is put in another place, He is equally¹ disposed towards all, neither does He hate any body nor love any body. God, under this second form, is also the enjoyer² of all sacrifices and penances. He is, moreover, the Lord³ of all beings and of all worlds. In short, God is all-pervading in numerous forms : He is the⁴ Kratu, the Yajna, the Svadha, the product of the herbs ; the sacred verse, the sacrificial butter, the fire, the offering : the father of this universe, the mother, the creator, the grand-ire, the thing to be known, the means of sanctification, the syllable Om, the Rik, Saman, and Yajus also ; the goal, the sustainer, the lord, the supervisor, the residence, the asylum, the friend, the source, and that in which it merges, the support, the receptacle, and the inexhaustible seed ;

(¹) ममः अहं सर्वभूतेषु न मेद्वेष्यः अस्ति न प्रियः ॥ IX. 29. (²) भोजहारं यज्ञतपसा ॥ V. 29. (³) भूतानां ईश्वरः ॥ IV. 6. सर्वलोकमेदभरम् ॥ V. 29. (⁴) अहं क्रतुः अहं यज्ञः स्वधा अहं अहं आर्यम् । मंत्रः अहं अहं एव आज्यं अहं अग्निः अहं द्रुतम् ॥ पिता अहं अस्य जगत् : माता धाता पितामहः । वेद्यं पवित्रं ओङ्कारः ऋक् साम यजुः एव च ॥ गतिः भर्ता प्रभुः माक्षी निवासः शरणं सुहृत् । प्रभवः प्रलयः स्थानं निधानं बीजं अन्नयम् ॥ अमृतं च एव मृत्युः च सत्

immortality and also death. that which is and that which is not.

Besides these two forms, God, as we learn from the Gita, has a third form ;—namely, God, sometimes manifests Himself as an individual : *e. g.*, as a human being. Thus we read:—Even⁵ though I am unborn, and inexhaustible in my essence, and the lord of all beings, still. I take up the control of my own Prakriti, and am born by means of my Maya. The reason for assuming this form is explained thus :—Whenever⁶ piety languishes, and impiety is in the ascendant, I create myself. I am born age after age, for the protection of the good, for the destruction of the evil-doers, and the establishment of piety.

From the passage, quoted just now (IV.7), we also learn that, according to the Gitakar,

असन् च अहम् ॥ IX. 16-9. (१) अजः अपिसन् अव्य-
याहना भूतानां ईश्वरः अपि सन् । प्रकृतिं स्वां अधिष्ठाय संभवामि
आत्ममायया ॥ IV. 6. (२) यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिः
भवति...। अभ्युत्थानं धर्मस्य तदा आत्मानं सृजामि अहम् ॥
परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् । धर्मसंस्थाप-
नार्थाय संभवामि युगेयुगे ॥ IV. 7, 8,

God possesses, besides Prakriti, what is expressed by the word Maya. So far as this passage is concerned, Maya means that in God which enables him to be born, though essentially unborn. i. e., to look something different from what He really and essentially is. In another passage, the word yoga is used to express the same fact:—This whole universe is pervaded by me in an unperceived form. All entities live in me, but I do not live in them. Nor yet do all entities live in me. See my divine yoga. Elsewhere, God is said to be veiled, as it were, with what the Gītākar calls Yoga-Maya,² and, therefore, He is not knowable to all.

Lastly, God is all-knowing or omniscient; and, therefore, knows everything³ that is, everything that has been, and everything that is to be.

We may close this section by quoting a few passages from the Gita, which may

(¹) मया ततं इदं सर्वं जगत् अव्यक्तमात्मना । मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि न च अहं तेभ्य अवस्थितः ॥ ग च मत्स्थानि भूतानि परं मे योगं ज्ञेयम् ॥ IX. 1, 5. (²) न अहं प्रकृतः सर्वस्य योगमायासमावृतः ॥ VII. 25. (³) वेद अहं सर्व-
ज्ञातमीदं सर्वपापानि...। भविष्यानि च भूतानि ॥ VII. 26.

help the reader further to understand the Gitakar's view about God :---There is nothing¹ else higher than God ; all this is woven upon God, like a row of pearls upon a thread. God is² the taste in water, ...the light of the sun and in on : He is "Om " in all the Vedas, sound in space, and manliness in human beings. God is³ the fragrant smell in the earth, refulgence in the fire ; He is life in all beings, and penance in those who perform penance. Know Him... to be⁴ the eternal seed of all beings ; He is the discernment of the discerning ones, and the glory of the glorious. He is⁵ also the strength, unaccompanied by fondness or desire, of the strong. And...He is love unopposed to piety among all beings. And all⁶ entities, which are of the quality of

- (¹) मत्तः परतरं न अन्यत् किञ्चित् अस्ति । मयि सर्वं इदं प्रोक्तं सूत्रे मणिगणाः इव॥VII. 7. (²) रसः अहं अप्सु... प्रभा अस्मि शशिसूर्ययोः । प्रणवःसर्ववेदेषु शब्दः खे पौरुषं नृपु ॥ VII. 8. (³) पुण्यःगन्धः पृथिव्यां च तेजःच अस्मि विभावसौ । जीवनं सर्वभूतेषु तपःच अस्मि तपस्विषु ॥ VII. 9. (⁴) बीजं मां सर्वभूतानां विद्धि...सगातनं । बुद्धिः बुद्धिमतां अस्मि तेजःतेजस्विनां अहं॥VII. 10. (⁵) बलं बलवतां आस्मि कामरागविवर्जितं । धर्माविरुद्धःभूतेषु कानःअस्मि...॥VII. 11. (⁶) ये च एव सात्त्विकाः भावाःराजसाःतामसाः च ये । मत्तःएव

and indefinable. You are¹ the indestructible, the supreme one to be known. You are the highest support of this universe. You are the inexhaustible protector of ever-lasting piety. I believe you to be the eternal being. I see you void of beginning, middle, end,—of infinite power, of unnumbered arms, having the sun and moon for eyes, having a mouth like a blazing fire, and heating the universe with your radiance. For this space between heaven and earth and all the quarters are pervaded by you alone. Looking at this wonderful and terrible form of yours, O high-souled One ! the three worlds are affrightened.

It is quite² proper that the universe is delighted and charmed by your renown, that the demons run away affrightened in

(¹) त्वं अक्षरं परमं वेदितव्यं त्वं अस्य विश्वस्य परं निधानं । त्वं अव्ययः शाश्वतधर्मगोप्ता सनातनः त्वं पुण्यः मतः मे ॥ अनादिमध्य-अन्तं अनंतवर्त्यं अनंतबाहुं शशिसूर्यनेत्रं । पश्यामि त्वां दीप्तहुताशवक्त्रं स्वनेजसा विश्वं इदं तपंतम् ॥ द्यावापृथिव्योः इदं अन्तरं हि व्याप्तं त्वया एकेन दिशःचसर्वाः । दृष्ट्वा अद्भुतं रूपं उग्रं तव इदं लोकत्रयं प्रव्यथितं महात्मन् ॥ XI. 18-20. (²) स्थाने...तव प्रकीर्त्या जगत् प्रहृष्यति अनुरज्यते च । रक्षांसि भीतानि दिशः ब्रवन्ति...॥ XI. 36.

all directions. O infinite¹ lord of gods !
O you pervading the universe ! you are the
indestructible, that which is, that which is
not, and what is beyond them. You are
the primal god, the ancient being, you are
the highest support of this universe. You
are that which has knowledge, that which is
the object of knowledge, you are the highest
goal. By you is this universe pervaded,
O you of infinite form. Obeisance be to
you a thousand times, and again and again
obeisance to you ! In front and from behind
obeisance to you. Obeisance be to you from
all sides, O you who are all ! You are of
infinite power, of unmeasured glory ; you
pervade all, and, therefore, you are all. You
are the father of the world—movable and
immovable—you its great and venerable

(¹) अनंत देवेश जगन्निवास तं अक्षरं सत्त्वमत् सत्त्वरं यत्सारं
आदिदेवः पुरुषः पुराणः त्वं अस्य विश्वस्य परं निधानं । वेत्ता असि
वेद्यं च परं च धाम त्वया तत् विश्वं अनंतरूपा ॥ XI. 37-8. नमः
नमः ते अस्तु सदस्य-कृत्यः पुनः च भूयः अपि नमः नमः ते ॥ नमः
पुरस्तान् अयं पृष्ठतः ते नमः अस्तु ते सर्वतः एव नमः । अनंतवीर्य-
अमित-विक्रमः त्वं सर्वं समाप्नोषि ततः अपि सर्वः ॥ XI. 39, 40.
विश्वं अस्मि लोकस्य चराचरस्य त्वं अस्य पूज्यः च मुदः नरीणाम् ।
न त्वत्समः अस्ति अभ्यधिकः कुतः अन्यः लोकत्रये अपि अंप्रतिम-

master ; there is none equal to you, whence can there be one greater, O you whose power is unparalleled in all the three worlds ? Therefore, I bow and prostrate myself ; and would propitiate you, the praise-worthy lord. Be pleased, O god ! to pardon (me) as a father his son, a friend his friend, or a husband his beloved.

The highest Brahman¹, having no beginning nor end, which cannot be said to be existent or non-existent. It has hands and feet on all sides, it has eyes, heads, and faces on all sides, it has ears on all sides, it stands pervading everything in the world. Possessed of the qualities of all the senses, (but) devoid of all senses ; unattached, yet it supports all ; is devoid of qualities, yet is the enjoyer of qualities. It is within all things and without them ; it is movable and also

प्रभाव ॥ तस्मात् प्रणम्य प्रणिधाय कायं प्रवादये त्वां अहं ईशं ईड्यं । पिता इव पुत्रस्य सखा इव सख्युः प्रियः प्रियायाः अर्हसि देव सोढुम् ॥ XI. 43-4.

(¹) अनादिमत् परं ब्रह्म न सत् तत् न असत् उच्यते ॥ सर्वतः प्राणिनां तत् सर्वतः अक्षिशिरोमुखम् । सर्वतः श्रुतिमत् लोके सर्वं आब्रूयतिष्ठति ॥ सर्व-इन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्व-इन्द्रियविवर्जितं ।

immovable : it is unknowable through its subtlety ; it stands afar and near. Not different in (different) things, but standing as though different, it should be known to be the supporter of (all) things, and that which creates and absorbs them. It is the radiance even of the radiant (bodies) ; it is said to be beyond darkness. It is knowledge, the object of knowledge, that which is to be attained by knowledge, and is placed in the heart of all.

Know God² also to be the Kshetrajna in all Kshetras (bodies). The Supreme³ Spirit in this body is called supervisor, adviser, supporter, enjoyer, the great lord, and the supreme self also. This inexhaustible⁴ Supreme Self, being without beginning and without qualities (Nirguna), does not act,

अनक्तं सर्वभूतेषु एव निपुणं गुणभोक्तृ च ॥ बहिःअंतः च
भूतानां अचरं चरं एव च । गूढत्वात् तन् अविज्ञेयं दूरस्थं च अंति-
के च तत् ॥ अविनक्तं च भूतेषु विनक्तं इव च स्थितं । भूत-
भर्तृ च तत् ज्ञेयं प्रसिद्धं प्रभावेषु च ॥ उपोतिषां अपि तत् उपोतिः
तमगः परं उच्यते । अ नं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानगम्यं हृदि सर्वस्य सिद्धिभम् ॥
XIII 12-—7. (2) क्षेत्रज्ञं च अपि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु...॥
XIII. 2. (1) उग्रदृष्टा अनुमेता च भर्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः ।
परमात्मा इति च अपि टक्तेः हे हे अस्मिन् पुरुषः परः ॥ XIII. 22.

and is not tainted, though stationed in the body. As by reason of its subtlety the all-pervading space is not tainted, so the self, stationed in every body, is not tainted. As the sun singly lights up all this world, so the Kshetrajna. lights up the whole Kṣ'etra. The lord is seated⁵ in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his Maya.

There are⁶ these two beings in the world, the destructible and the indestructible. The destructible (includes) all things. The unconcerned one is (what is) called the indestructible. But the Being supreme is yet another, called the highest self, who, as

(⁴) अनादित्वात् निर्गुणत्वात् परमात्मा अयं अक्षयः । शरीरस्थः अपि...न करोति न लिप्यते ॥ यथा सर्वगतं सौक्ष्म्यात् आकाशं न उपलिप्यते । सर्वत्र अवस्थितः देहे तथा आत्मा न उपलिप्यते ॥ यथा प्रकाशयति एकः कृत्स्नं लोके इमं रविः । क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति ॥ XIII. 31-3. (⁵) ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशे... तिष्ठति । आमयन् सर्वभूतानि यंत्रारूढानि मायया ॥ XVIII, 61. (⁶) द्वौ इमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरः च अक्षरः एव च । क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थः अक्षरः उच्यते ॥ उत्तमः पुरुषः अन्यः परमात्मा इति उदाहृतः । यः लोकत्रयं आविश्य विभक्तिं अव्ययः ईश्वरः ॥ XV. 16-7.

the inexhaustible lord, pervading the three worlds, supports (them).

III.

Having studied the Gītākar's view about God, let us now turn to his view about the Atma of every human being. As regards the Gītākar's view about Atma, the first thing, which we notice, is that Atma is not created by God, as everything else is, but the Atma of every human being is a part (of course, the word "part" must be here taken metaphorically) of God. Thus we read:—An eternal¹ portion of me it is, which, becoming an individual soul in the mortal world, draws (to itself) the senses with the mind as the sixth out of Prakriti. From this passage it is also clear that Atma becomes Jiva, i. e., is to be called by the name Jiva, when, and during the time in which, it is possessed of the body and the senses. This is also expressed by calling Atma, under these circumstances, Ishvar, i. e., the Lord, or the ruler of the body and the senses:—When the² ruler (of the body)

(¹) मम एव अंशः जीवलोके जीवमृतः गन्तव्यः । मनःपद्मानि इन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥ XV. 7. (²) शरीरं यन् भवाप्नोति यत् च अपि उत्क्षामति ईश्वरः । गृहीत्वा एतानि संयानि मायुः गन्धान् इव आशयात् ॥ XV. 8.

obtains or quits the body, he goes, taking these (the senses and the mind) with him, as the wind takes fragrance from its seat. It is also called Shariri³ or Dehi,⁴ *i. e.*, the owner or possessor of the body. Thus, Jiva, Shariri, Dehi, Ishvar,—these terms are used to express the embodied state of Atma, which is used to express the disembodied, original, true, or essential nature of the human soul. It should also be noticed that the term Purusha⁵ is sometimes used synonymously with Atma,—the distinction between the two sets of terms, however, is not always observed in the Gita.

So far, all that we have learnt about the essential nature of the human soul is that it is a portion of God. But since God, as we saw, has, according to the Gita, three forms, the question naturally arises, of which of these three forms of God, the human soul is essentially a portion? Another question, which also arises in this connection, is, what

(³) अंतवन्तः इमे देहाः नित्यस्य उक्ताः शरीरिणः ॥II. 18.

(⁴) शरीराणि विहाय जीर्णानि अन्यानि संयाति नवानि देही ॥

II. 22. (⁵) प्रकृतिं पुरुषं च एव विद्धि अनादी उर्मो अपि ॥ XIII. 19.

is meant by saying that the human soul is essentially a portion of God? Now, whatever the answer to this second question may be, it is certain, as regards the first of these two questions, that, according to the Gītākar, the human soul is essentially of the nature of God under the first of the three forms described in the second section of this chapter. And a brief consideration will show the truth of this statement.

For the Gītākar makes an absolute distinction between what are technically called Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. That is, if we take any human being, then what remains after deducting everything that, according to the Gīta, is included in Prakṛiti, is Puruṣa, *Ātma*, or the true and essential nature of the human soul. This is the original state of the human soul; it is also the state which, even throughout the embodied state, always belongs to it,—because, as we shall see, the nature of the soul is unchangeable; and the state which the soul will come to know, to feel, and to realise, as its own true state, at the attainment of Mukti or the final release and ever after it. What, then, is this state? It is, as was just said, that state of the human soul, in which it must be

supposed to be left, when from it are excluded all elements which, according to the Gita, constitute Prakriti ; *i.e.*, the Avyakta,¹ Buddhi (or the capacity for decision or judgment), Ahankar (or the capacity for being conscious of one's self as an individual), Manas (or the capacity for pondering over, or thinking of, things or objects), the five Jnana-indriyas (*i.e.*, the five-fold capacity for becoming conscious of things or objects), the five Karma-indriyas (*i.e.*, the five-fold capacity for doing external acts), the five objects of the five senses of knowledge (*i.e.*, form, taste, smell, touch, and sound), the five Mahabhutas (*i.e.*, earth, water, light, wind, and space) ; these together with desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, body, consciousness, and memory, constitute Kshetra (or Prakriti) and its consequences or developments. Now, since the Atma of each human being is what can be supposed to have remained of that human being when

(¹) महाभूतानि अहंकारः बुद्धिः अव्यक्त एवच । इंद्रियाणि दश एकंच पंच च इंद्रियगोचराः ॥ इच्छा द्वेषःसुखं दुःखं संघातः चेतना धृतिः । एतत् क्षेत्रं समासेन सविकारं उदाहृतम्॥

every one of these elements,—which constitute Prakṛiti and the consequences of Prakṛiti,—is excluded from that being, therefore, there remains no alternative but to say that, according to the Gita, the essential nature of the human soul is the same as that of God under the first of the three forms described above.

The essential nature, then, of the human soul, according to the Gītākar, is what is expressed by the term *Nirguṇatva* (निर्गुणत्व). From this follows another characteristic of *Ātma*, i. e., *akartṛitva* (अकर्तृत्व), which the Gītākar emphatically and clearly expresses in more passages than one. Thus he says:—
The man of devotion¹, who knows the truth, thinks that he does nothing at all, when he sees, hears, touches, smells, eats, moves, sleeps, breathes, talks, throws out, takes, opens or closes the eyelids; he holds that the senses deal with the objects of the senses. But if a man, who knows the truth (तत्त्वयित्),

(¹) न पुनरिदं विन करोमि इति युक्तः मन्येत तत्त्वयित् ।
 पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्पर्शन् भिषन् भक्षन् गच्छन् हसन् भगवत्प्रसादं
 विभूतं मुह्यन् उन्मिषन् निमिषन् अपि । इन्द्रियाणि इन्द्रियैर्बु

knows that his Atma is akarta, on the other hand, until and unless a man knows this, he cannot be said to have known the truth (द्रष्टा) :—He sees¹ (truly) who sees (all) actions (to be) in every way done by Prakriti alone, and likewise Atma (to be) not the doer. And, of course, the knowledge of this fact must have been attained, in order that a human being may reach the final goal.—When a² right—seeing person sees none but the gunas (to be) the doers (of all actions), and knows what is above the gunas, he enters into my essence.

So far, then, Atma is, like God under the first form, Nirguna and akarta. The other characteristics of Atma, described in the Gīta, necessarily follow from these and the consequent absolute distinction between Atma and Prakriti. For, because

वर्तन्ते इति धारयन् ॥ V. 8, 9. (1) प्रकृत्या एव च कर्माणि
 क्रियमाणानि सर्वशः । यः पश्यति तथा आत्मानं अकर्तारं पश्यति
 नः पश्यति ॥ XIII. 29. (2) न अन्यं गुणेभ्यः कर्तारं
 यदा द्रष्टा अनुपश्यति । गुणेभ्यः च परं वेत्ति सद्भावं सः अधि-
 गच्छति ॥ XIV. 19.

Atma is of the same nature as that of God, it is not¹ born, nor does it ever die ; nor, having existed, does it exist no more. So much so, that, since the absolute separation of Atma from Prakriti is a thing of absolute value to Atma, if what we call death could bring about this separation, murder or suicide would be the best means of attaining this final goal, Mukti, or final release from the body. But, until and unless complete knowledge of Atma, God, and their relation to each other, is attained by the practice of Karma-yoga-bhakti, as described in the first section of this chapter, or by Abhyasa-yoga, as described in the sixth chapter of the Gita, death does not mean absolute freedom of Atma from Prakriti ; but simply the passing of Atma from one Prakriti to another,—as we pass from youth to old age, or as we cast off old clothes in

(¹) न जायते म्रियते वा फलानिन् त न भयं भूया
मविता वा न भूयः ॥ II 20.

order to put on new ones:—As in this¹ body, infancy and youth and old age (come) to the embodied Atma, so does the acquisition of another body ; a sensible man is not deceived about that. As a man², casting off old clothes, puts on others and new ones, so the embodied Atma, casting off old bodies, goes to others and new ones. Thus being of the nature of God, Atma is incapable of being dead or killed ; and being, as we saw, akarta, it is incapable of killing. And hence it is that the Gitakar says :—He who³ thinks it to be the killer, and he who thinks it to be killed, both know nothing ; it kills not, is not killed.

From this it necessarily follows that the Atma of every human being that now exists,

- (¹) देहिनः अस्मिन् यथा देहे क्षामारं चावनं जरा ।
तथा देहान्तरप्राप्तिः धीरः तत्र न मुह्यति ॥ II. 13.
- (²) वासांसि जीर्णानि यथा विहाय
नवानि गृण्हाति नरः अपराणि ।
तथा शरीराणि विहाय जीर्णानि
अन्यानि संयाति नवानि देही ॥ II. 22.
- (³) यः एनं वेत्ति हंतारं यः च एनं मन्यते हतं ।
उभौ तौ न विजानीतः न अयं हंति न हन्यते ॥ II. 19.

has ever been and shall ever be. As the Gitakar puts it :—Never¹ did I not exist, nor you, nor these rulers of men ; nor will any one of us ever hereafter cease to be. What dies, or is capable of being dead or destroyed, is the body which at any time the Atma of any human being possesses. These bodies², says the Gitakar, appertaining to the embodied Atma, which is eternal, indestructible, and indefinable, are said to be perishable. But it is a mistake³ to think that Atma perishes or is destroyed when the body is destroyed

But not only is it a mistake to suppose that Atma dies or is destroyed when the body dies or is destroyed ; but, further, it must be borne in mind that Atma remains quite unaffected by whatever injures the body in any way. In the words of the Gitakar :—Weapons do⁴ not divide it (into pieces), fire does not burn it, waters do not

(¹) न तु एव अहं जातु न आसं न त्वं न इमे नराधिपः । न च एव न भविष्यामः सर्वे वयं अतः परम् ॥ II. 12.

(²) अंतवन्तः इमे देहाः नित्यस्य उक्ताः शरीरिणः । अनाशिनः अप्रमेयस्य... ॥ II. 18 (³) न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥ II. 20. (⁴) न एनं छिदन्ति शस्त्राणि न एनं दहति

moisten it, wind does not dry it up. Or, in general language, it is¹ not divisible, it is not combustible, it is not to be moistened it is not to be dried up.

All these, however, are what may be called the negative characteristics of Atma ; they only tell us what Atma is not, or cannot be. We learn the Gitakar's view about the positive characteristics of Atma from the following passage :—It is ²ever-lasting, all pervading, stable, firm, and eternal. It is said to be unperceived, to be unthinkable to be unchangeable.

पावकः । न च एनं क्लेशयन्ति अ.पः न शोषयन्ति मारुतः ॥II.23.

(¹) अच्छेद्यः अयं अदाह्यः अयं अक्लेद्यः अशोष्यः एव च ।

II. 24. (²) नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थणुः अचलः अयं सनातनः ।

अव्यक्तः अयं अचिन्त्यः अयं अविकार्यः अयं उच्यते ॥ II.

24-25.

Chapter II.

The Teaching of the Gita,—(Continued).

I

In the first chapter we learned the Gitakar's view about what is known as Karma-yoga-bhakti,—the special teaching of the Gita,—about the nature of God and that of the human soul, and the relation between these two,—the knowledge of which is necessary in order that Karma-yoga-bhakti may be practised in the proper way. But the Gitakar's view about the nature of the human soul necessarily raises a question. For any human being, as we know it, is constituted not only by Atma, as defined above, but by Atma and Prakriti, deha, sharira, or body,—the constituents of which latter we¹ have already known. It is this Prakriti or deha which is born and dies, which is perishable, destructible, changeable. Further, it is this Prakriti which, according to the Gita,² as we have² seen, is the true agent of all the acts which are said to be done

(¹) p. 24.

(²) p. 25.

by a man,—the only function of the embodied Atma, according to the Gitakar, being to experience the retribution (bhoga) for the doings of Prakriti. To quote his own words :—Purusha is¹ said to be the origin of the capacity of enjoying pleasures and pains. For Purusha² joined with Prakriti enjoys the gunas born of Prakriti. Similarly, we are told that Purusha,—presiding over³ the senses of hearing and seeing, touch and taste and smell, and the manas,—enjoys sensuous objects. And the true end of man is, and ought to be, according to the Gita, to absolutely and finally get his Atma released from this entanglement with Prakriti, i.e., to attain Mukti.

And the question which, as was said just now, arises from the Gitakar's view about the nature of the human or embodied soul is this : namely, if the primary, the actual at any time during the embodied state, and the ultimate, nature of the human

(¹) पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोगवृत्ते हेतुः उच्यते ॥ XIII. 20. (²) पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थः हि भुङ्गते प्रकृतिजान् सुखान् ॥ XIII. 21. (³) श्रोत्रं चक्षुः स्पर्शनं च रसनं घ्राणं एतच्च । अधिप्राय मनः च अयं विषयान् उपसेवते ॥ XV. 9.

soul is what the Gītākar says it is, then, why does it get itself entangled with the body,—which, as the Gītākar says, is an evil to be got rid of, or at least to be avoided so far as the future is concerned,—why has it to experience retribution for acts which are not its own,—and why does it ever come to be ignorant of its own nature, which is ever, without a beginning and without an end, the same as that of God under the first form?

To take the last part of this question first,—that is to say, why does an embodied soul ever come to be ignorant of its nature?—the answer which we get from the Gita to this question is simply the statement of a fact, namely, *Atma*, the moment it gets itself embodied, becomes subject to ignorance as to the truth about its own nature and that of everything else; and, of course, will continue to be ignorant until it attains knowledge by acting in conformity with the teaching of the Gita. Thus we read:—All beings¹...are deluded at the time of birth by the delusion...caused by the pairs of the opposites arising from desire and

(1) इच्छाद्वेषममृत्युर्न द्वन्द्वमोहेन . . . । सर्वभूतानि संमोहं युगे यान्ति... ॥ VII. 27.

aversion. But, if ignorance is then a necessary consequence of being embodied, then, the question naturally arises, why does Atma ever come to be embodied at all? And, thus, we are led to the consideration of the first of the three parts of the above question. Now, in order to get the Gita's answer to this question, we must remember that, according to him, the practice of Karma-yoga-bhakti in this life is the means of avoiding the state of being embodied in the future. This being the case, the reason of Atma's embodied state in this life is its attachment to action and to results of action in the previous life; its embodied state in the previous life was due to its attachment to action and to results of action in the life immediately previous to that; and so on. Further, since it is one of the principles of the Gita that once Atma attains the knowledge of itself, of God, of the world, and of their mutual relation, and consequently lives a life of non-attachment, it can never again fall into ignorance and attachment. Thus we read :—
Having learnt¹ that, you will not again fall

(¹) यन् ज्ञत्वा न पुनः मोहं एवं यास्यसि .. । येन

thus into delusion : and by means of it, you will see all beings, without exception, first in yourself, and then in God. From this the necessary inference is that Atma, which is now embodied and ignorant, could never have been aware of its true nature and free from attachment. Hence the chain of causes and effects, the final link, so far, of which is the present embodied state, has been without a beginning. (But it is not endless, because it rests on every human being to bring it to an end by practising Karma-yoga-bhakti.)

So, the only point, that now remains to be answered in connection with the above question, is, why has the Atma of any human being to experience retribution for acts which are not its own. Since the agent of all acts is Prakriti ? The answer, which we get from the Gita to this question, is that, though Atma is not the real doer of any act, still, on account¹ of its natural ignorance, it wrongly thinks that it is the doer of the acts which, in every way, are

भूतानि अग्नेः द्रक्ष्यसि आत्मनि अथैवमपि ॥ IV. 35. (1)
 प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः । अहंकारविमूढात्मा

done by the gunas of Prakriti. One necessary consequence of this wrong supposition is that Atma gets itself attached to acts and their results :—Those, who are deluded¹ by the gunas of Prakriti, form attachment to the actions of the gunas. And it is, on account of this attachment, that it has to undergo retribution (bhoga) for the acts as if it was the real agent of those acts. Evidently, this necessity of undergoing retribution will continue until Karma-yoga-bhakti is successfully practised. For if a man practises Karma-yoga-bhakti then after separation of his Atma from the present body, it will never be united with another and will attain ever-lasting release from the body, and all the bliss following from that state.

II.

But, if the cause of the entanglement of Atma with a body is the kind of acts done during the previous life, what is the means by which this entanglement is effected? The answer is that the three

कर्ता अहं इति मन्यते ॥ III. 27. (1) प्रकृतेः गुणसंमूढः
संजन्ते गुणकर्मसु ॥ III. २

gunas,—i. e., *satva*¹, *raja*, and *tama*, born of Prakriti,—constitute a sort of rope by means of which the inexhaustible Atma, during the embodied state, is tied down, so to say, to the body.

But the moment the Nirguna Atma thus comes into contact with the gunas, far-reaching consequences follow:—For the consequence² of its contact with *satvaguna* is that attachment to happiness and to knowledge is produced; the consequence³ of its contact with *rajoguna* is that attachment to action including activity, avarice, desire, and absence of tranquillity, is produced; and from⁴ its contact with *tamoguna* attachment to heedlessness, to intolerance, and to sleep is produced. It should be

(¹) सत्त्वं रजःतमःशुद्धि गुणाः प्रकृतिसंभवाः । निब-
धन्ति...देहे देहिने अव्ययम् ॥ XIV. 5. (²) तत्र सत्त्वं...
मुक्तसंगेन यथाति ज्ञानमंगेन च...॥ XIV. 6. (³) रजः...
निबध्नाति...कर्मसंगेन देहिनेम् ॥ XIV. 7. लोभः प्रवृत्तिः
आरंभः कर्मणां भक्षयः स्पृहा । रजसि एतानि जायन्ते प्रवृद्धे...॥
XIV. 12. (⁴) तमः...प्रमाद-आलस्यनिद्राभिः तं नि-
बध्नाति ॥ XIV. 8. अप्रज्ञासः अप्रवृत्तिः च प्रमादः मोहः
एव च । तमसि एतानि जायन्ते विवृद्धे... ॥ XIV. 13.

Further, the delusion, to which Atma is subject, and owing to which it is not able to know God, as long as the delusion lasts,—it also is due to the results of the presence of these three *gunas*:—The whole universe,¹ deluded by these three states of mind, developed from the *gunas*, does not know God, that is beyond them and inexhaustible. And this delusion, developed from the *gunas*, is divine, and difficult to transcend. There is only one way which enables a man to transcend this *Maya*, and that is to practise² *Karma-yoga-bhakti*.

It should be noticed that, though the ultimate end of man, according to the Gita, is to secure final release from the body, the immediate end, to be secured while life lasts, is to become free from the *gunas* (*gunatita*), i. e., to live in such a way as to become absolutely free,—not from the *gunas*, for that is impossible so long as the contact with the body lasts,—but from all the influ-

(¹) त्रिभिः गुणमयैर्भावैः एभिः सर्वं इदं जगत् । मोहितं न अभिजानति मां एभ्यः परं अव्ययम् ॥ VII. 13. (²) देवी हि एषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया । मां एव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायां एतां तरन्ति ते ॥ VII. 14.

Every sense¹ has its affections and aversions towards objects fixed. This being so, as soon as the senses come into contact with their objects on the birth of a man, it is inevitable that desires and aversions, for objects for which the senses have respectively attachments and aversions, should be produced in the man, and become the source of his delusion :—All beings...are² deluded at the time of birth by the delusion caused by the pairs of opposites arising from desire and aversion.

The same fact is better described, and its consequences pointed out more in detail, in another part of the Gita. There we learn that, when the³ senses come into contact with their objects, the *manas* begins, and keeps on, thinking over those objects ; from thinking over them is produced attachment to them ; from attachment arises desire ; and from desire follows anger (*i. e.*, when the desire is prevented from being fulfilled).

(¹) इंद्रियस्य इंद्रियाथै रागद्वेषौ व्यास्थितौ ॥ III. 34.

(²) इच्छाद्वेषसमुत्थेन द्वंद्वबोधेन... । सर्वभूतानि संमोहं यान्ति...॥ VII. 27. (³) ध्यायतः विप्रयान् पुंसः संगः तेषु उपजायते । संगेनैव संजायते कामः कामात् क्रोधः

If, therefore, the senses are allowed to come into contact with their objects, without first entirely ridding them of their attachments and aversions, attachment (संग), desire (इच्छा), and anger (क्रोध) are the necessary consequences. Now, according to the Gitakar, desire and anger are the greatest enemies of man. For they delude the soul, after enveloping knowledge :—It is¹ desire, it is anger, born from rajoguna ; it is very ravenous, very sinful. Know that that is the foe in this world. As fire is enveloped by smoke, a mirror by dust, the fetus by the womb, so is this (knowledge) enveloped by desire. Knowledge...is enveloped by this constant foe of the man of knowledge, in the shape of desire, which is like a fire and insatiable....It deludes the embodied soul after enveloping knowledge. For, as we are

अग्निमानवे ॥ II. 62. (१) कामः एव क्रोधः एव रजो-
गुणमनुद्धवः । मयागतः महापद्मा विद्धि एनं दृष्टं धैरिणं ॥
गुणेन आग्निरो अन्विष्टः यथा आग्नीः गलेन च । यथा सूर्येन
आहृतः गर्भः स्यात् तेन हरे आहृतं ॥ आहृतं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानिनः
निर्ययिरेषा । कामरूपेण...दृष्टुं अन्वयेन च ॥ ...विमोहयति
एव ज्ञानं आहृतं देहिन् ॥ III. 37-40.

told elsewhere, human knowledge is undeveloped by ignorance, therefore all creatures are deluded. We learn, in another place, that desire, anger, and greed, constitute the three-fold entrance to hell, ruinous to Atma.

How this happens, how desire and anger are the routes which surely and safely take a man on to hell, is graphically described in the following passages:—Bound down by nets of hopes in hundreds, given up to anger and desire, they wish to obtain heaps of wealth unfairly for enjoying objects of desire. "This have I obtained to-day; this wish I will obtain; this wealth is mine; and this also will be mine. This foe I have killed; others, too, I will destroy; I am lord, I am the enjoyer, I am perfect, strong, happy. I have wealth; I am of noble birth; who else is like me? I will sacrifice; I will make gifts; I will rejoice" thus, deluded

(¹) अज्ञेन आदृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ॥ V. 15.

(²) निविधे नश्यत्यद्दं द्वारं न दाने आत्मनः । ताम्रं मोघः तथा लोभः... ॥ XVI. 21. (³) आशायासवर्गः यद्द्वारः वामश्रोत्रपरायणः । ईदन्ते वामभोगार्थं अन्यथेन अस्मिन् संचयान् ॥ इदं अथ मया लब्धं इमं प्राप्स्ये मनोरथं । इदं अस्ति इदं अपि मे भविष्यति पुनः धनम् ॥ अस्मी मया हतः शत्रुः इति नये

by ignorance, tossed about by numerous thoughts, surrounded by the net of delusion, and attached to the enjoyment of objects of desire, they fall down into impure hell.

The same fact is mentioned briefly in another place by means of two slokas,—one of which was quoted above :—The man, who¹ ponders over objects of sense, forms attachment to them ; from that attachment is produced desire : and from desire anger is produced. From anger results want of discrimination : from want of discrimination, confusion of memory ; from confusion of memory, loss of reason (buddhi) ; and in consequence of the loss of reason, he is utterly ruined.

न अस्मान् अपि । द्वंद्वरः अहं अहं भोगो सिद्धः अहं बलवान्
 कर्मा ॥ मातुः अभिजननान् अस्मि कः अन्यः अस्ति महजः
 मया । मया स्वप्नमि मोक्षिणे ह्येव अज्ञानविमोहिताः ॥ अनेक-
 विधविचाराः मोक्षमालमार्गानां । प्रत्यक्षाः कामभोगेषु
 पर्वतिगतेः अधूर्णा XVI. 12-6 (1) ध्यानतः विषयात्
 पुंसः मयः नेतु इव ज्ञानवे । मयान् मयावते कमः कामान्
 केतुः काममार्गे ॥ केतुः अर्थः मयोदः मयोदस्तुति-

Thus, then, we see that, according to the Gitakar, desire, anger, and avarice are the source of the worst possible evils to man. What wonder, then, if he asks us to get¹ rid of them all? Of course, having already got them, we must, if we want to act up to the teaching of the Gita, abandon them. This, however, is not enough. The cause being there, the effect must necessarily follow. So, if we wish to be always free from an effect, we must take care that the cause of that effect shall never recur. Now, as we saw, the cause of desire and anger, according to the Gita, is the contact of the senses with their objects, for which they have natural attachments. So, in order to succeed, the blow must be struck at the root of the whole tree:—'Therefore, first² restrain your senses, then cast off this sinful thing (desire) which destroys knowledge and experience. And we shall have to put forth

विभ्रमः । रगृतिभ्रंशात् बुद्धिनाशः बुद्धिनाशात् प्रणश्यति ॥ II.
62-3. (1) तस्मात् एतत् त्रयं त्यजेत् ॥ XVI. 21.
(2) तस्मात् त्वं इंद्रियाणि आर्द्रां नियम्य... । पाप्मानं प्रजहि

all the strength, that we might possess, in order to check the senses. For, as the Gitakar¹ tells us, the boisterous senses... carry away by force the manas even of a wise man, who exerts himself.

What the Gitakar means by, and what, according to him, is required for, the control of the senses,—on the acquisition of which the success in acting up to his teaching primarily and ultimately depends,—is indicated in the following slokas :—A man's² mind becomes steady, when he withdraws his senses from (all) objects of sense, as the tortoise (withdraws) its limbs from all sides. Objects of sense draw back from a person who is abstinent, not so the taste (for those objects) ; but even the taste departs from him, when he has seen the Supreme.

Thus, according to the Gita, the control of the senses, which is of so much importance in connection with its teaching being

एनं ज्ञानविज्ञाननाशनम् ॥ III, 41. (1) चततः अपि...
 पुष्पस्य विपश्चिनः । इंद्रियाणि प्रमार्थानि हरन्ति प्रसभं मनः ॥
 II, 60. (2) यदा गेह्यते च अयं कूर्मः अंगानि इव सर्वशः ।
 इंद्रियाणि इंद्रियार्थेभ्यः तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥ विषयाः विनि-
 वर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनः । रमयन् रमः अपि अस्य परं दृष्ट्वा

successfully acted upon, consists of the double process of depriving them of their natural likes and dislikes for objects, and completely withdrawing them from those objects. But even the control of the senses in this sense, and the abandonment of desire, anger, and avarice, are not enough in order to be able to follow the teaching of the Gita, *i.e.*, to practise Karma-yoga-bhakti and to become *gunatita* or *sthitaprajna* (as he is otherwise called). For to this we must add the abandonment of all vanity,¹ force, arrogance, belongings, the feeling that this or that is mine, hope, sense of respect (for oneself), pleasure and pain. It necessarily follows that we must also learn, and bring ourselves, to feel² satisfied with whatever we might happen to get, and attain the mental state of one whose happiness is wholly³ within himself, whose recreation is wholly within himself, and whose light also is wholly within himself.

निवर्तते ॥ II. 58-9 (1) अहंकारं बलं दर्प... परिग्रह ममत्वं विमुच्य ॥ XVIII. 53. निराशीः त्यक्तसर्वपरिग्रहः ॥ IV. 21. मानापमानयोः तुल्य ॥ XIV. 25. द्वंद्वैः विमुक्ताः सुखदुःखमैत्रं. ॥ XV. 5. (2) यदृच्छालाभयंतुष्टः ॥ IV. 22. (3) अंतःसुखः अंतगरामः अंतर्ज्योतिः ॥ V. 24.

encountering the various agreeable and disagreeable things of this world. A man's mind is steady, when he withdraws his senses from (all) objects of sense, as the tortoise withdraws its limbs from all sides. Objects of sense draw back from a person who is abstinent; not so the taste for those objects. But even taste departs from him, when he has seen the Supreme.

The following two slokas refer to one who has attained the mental state in which he is pleased in his self and by his self (II. 55) :-
 'The man¹, who is attached to his self only, who is contented in his self, and is pleased with his self, has nothing that he ought to do. He has no interest at all in what is done, and none whatever in what is not done, in this world; nor is any interest of his dependent on anything.

तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥ विषयाः विनिरर्तन्ते निगद्धारस्य देहिनः ।
 रमन्ने रमः अपि अस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते ॥ II. 55-9.
 (1) यः तु आत्मरतिः एव स्यात् आत्मवृत्तः च मानवः ।
 आत्मनि एव च संतुष्टः तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥ न एव तस्य
 कृतेन अर्थः न अदृष्टेन इदं कः चन । न च अस्य सर्वभूतेषु
 कश्चित् अर्थः स्यादर्थः ॥ III. 17-18.

does not desire, who abandons both what is agreeable and what is disagreeable,—he is dear to God. He, who is alike to friends and foes, as also in honour and dishonour, who is alike in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, who is free from attachment, to whom praise and blame are alike, who is taciturn and contented with anything whatever (that comes), who is homeless and of a steady mind and full of devotion,—such a man is dear to God. Absence¹ of attachment, absence of self-identifying love for son, wife, home, and so forth; and constant equability on the approach of both what is agreeable and what is disagreeable—(this is included in knowledge).

The following four ślokaś describe the characteristics of a gunatita (which are practically the same as those of sthita-prajña mentioned above):—

विश्वे च तथा मानवानामन्यैः । शीतं दृष्ट्वा शूलं दृष्ट्वाप्युदराः संत-
 विराजितः ॥ तुल्यनिदा-स्तुतिः शीर्षा शंखशः येन केन चित् ।
 अनिहतः क्षिप्रमतिः मणितमनः मे प्रियः परः ॥ XII. 17-9.
 (1) अमपिनः अनभिप्रायः पुत्रदापृदादिषु । निर्वयं च समचित्तानं
 इष्ट-अनिष्ट-उपपत्तिषु ॥ XIII. 9.

He is said to have become¹ *gunatita*, who is not averse to light and activity and delusion when they prevail ; and who does not desire them when they cease ; who, living like one unconcerned, is never perturbed by the *gunas* ; who remains steady and moves not, thinking merely that the *gunas* exist (are the cause of whatever tends to disturb) ; who is self-contained ; to whom pleasure and pain are alike ; to whom a sod and a stone and gold are alike ; who has discernment ; to whom censure and praise of himself are alike ; who is alike in honour and dishonour ; who is alike towards the sides of friends and foes ; and who abandons all initiative of action.

V.

Now, only one point remains to be considered in order to complete the account of

(¹) प्रकाशं च प्रवृत्तिं च मोहं एव च...। न द्वेष्टि संप्रवृत्तानि न निवृत्तानि कांक्षति ॥ उदासीनवत् आसीनः गुणैः यः न विचाल्यते । गुणाः नर्तन्ते इत्येव यः अवतिष्ठति न द्रमते ॥ समदुःख-मुक्तः स्वस्थः समलोकात्मकाचनः । तुल्यप्रियाप्रियः धारः तुल्यनिदा-आत्मसंस्तुतिः ॥ मानापमानयोः तुल्यः तुल्यः मित्र-औरि-पक्षयोः । सर्वारम्भपरित्यागी गुणातीतः सः उच्यते ॥
XIV. 22-5.

the teaching of the Gita. And that point is, what is it that the Gitakar tells us we shall secure, if we completely and successfully act up to his advice, described above ? The following passages contain the Gitakar's answer to this question :—(1) He casts off both merit and sin ; (2) He incurs no sin ; (3) He is not fettered down, even though he performs works ; (4) All his works are destroyed ; (5) He is easily released from all bonds ; (6) He is not tainted, though he performs works ; (7) He is not tainted by sin, as the lotus-leaf is not tainted by water ; (8) He is for ever released.

It may be said, however, so far as these passages are concerned, that this is simply a negative result. They simply show that, if we practise Karma-yoga-bhakti, we shall not commit sin, though it must necessarily involve the performance of actions. But this

- (1) प्रहाति इह उभे मुक्तदुष्कृते ॥ II. 50.
 (2) न आप्नोति किल्बिषम् ॥ IV. 21. (3) कृत्वा अपि न निबध्यते ॥ IV. 22 (4) समग्रं (कर्म) प्रणिर्जयते ॥ IV. 23.
 (5) मुक्तं बन्धात् प्रमुच्यते ॥ V. 3. (6) कुर्वन् अपि न लिप्यते ॥ V. 7. (7) लिप्यते न सः पापेन पद्मं (त्र्यं) द्वयं अङ्गं ॥ V. 10. (8) सदा मुक्तः एव सः ॥ V. 28.

does not show that this *Mukti* is a necessity. In order to prove its necessity, positive advantages must be shown to result from it. And the following extracts show what the positive advantages are which, according to the Gita-kar, will result from the practice of *Karmayoga-bhakti*: (1) He is released from all sins; (2) He obtains tranquillity; (3) He attains the highest tranquillity; (4) He obtains that tranquillity which culminates in final release and assimilation with God; (5) He obtains indestructible happiness; (6) They have conquered birth and *Sanzar* even while living here; (7) They rest even now in Brahman; (8) He becomes fit for assimilation with Brahman; (9) He attains Brahman without delay; (10) Becoming one with Brahman, he obtains the

(1) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || X. 3. (2) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || II. 71. (3) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || V. 12. (4) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || VI. 15. (5) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || V. 21. (6) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || V. 10. (7) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || V. 20. (8) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || XVIII. 55. (9) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || V. 10. (10) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || XVIII. 55. (11) *prāptiḥ* *aparaṁ* || V. 21.

Brahman—bliss (i. e., that which follows from assimilation with Brahma) ; (1) You will be released (from the bonds of action), and will go to God ; (2) After attaining to God, there is no birth again ; (3) Attaining to God, they do not again come to life, which is transient, a home of woes ; (4) Released from the shackles of (repeated) births, they repair to that seat where there is no unhappiness ; (5) they go never to return again ; (6) they go undeluded to that imperishable seat ; (7) He obtains the imperishable and eternal seat.

(1) विमुक्तः मा उर्वेयमि ॥ IX. 28. (2) मा उर्वेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥ VIII. 16. (3) मा उर्वेय पुनर्जन्म दुःखालयं अशाश्वतं न आप्नुयन्ति ॥ VIII. 15. (4) जन्मबन्धविनिर्मुक्ताः पदं गच्छन्ति अनामयम् ॥ II. 51. (5) गच्छन्ति अपुनरागमिम् ॥ V. 17. (6) गच्छन्ति भूम्नाः पदं अव्ययं तत् ॥ XV. 5. (7) अवाप्नोति शाश्वतं पदं अव्ययम् ॥ XVIII. 56.

Chapter III

The Religious Aspect of the City.

tells us, among other things, what the ultimate end is, which man must attain, or what the real nature of the human soul is, which he must realise? While religion teaches us the way in which man must live in order that he may attain his ultimate end, or realise his real nature. Religious life, therefore, is simply the sole means for attaining the highest end of man. This being so, when the end is completely attained, no religious duty remains to be done. And it is for this reason that the Gita says :—That he,—who is engrossed with his self, is satisfied with his self, and is pleased with his self,—is subject to no duty which he ought to perform ; no benefit accrues to him either by doing any thing or by leaving it undone, he can have no object which depends upon any thing or being in the whole¹ world. The state of such a man is fully described

(¹) यः तु आत्मरतिः एव स्यात् आत्मतृप्तः च मानवः ।
 आत्मनि एव च संतुष्टः तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥ नैव तस्य कृतेन
 अर्थः न अकृतेन दृढं कःचन । न च अस्य सर्वभूतेषु कःचित्
 अर्थव्यगाश्रयः ॥ III. 17-8.

in the slokas which deal with the Sthita-
Prajna or the Guna-atishta¹.

The object of the religious teaching of the Gita, then, is to enable a man to live in such a way as to attain this state. Now, what is the religious teaching of the Gita? The sum and substance of this teaching is given by the Gita-kar himself in a single sloka. Just before closing the last Adhyaya, he says — Thus, then I have given to you the knowledge which is more mysterious than any mystery, fully think over this and act as you like. Listen, however, once more to my words which are most confidential of all, I tell you again what is for your benefit, simply because I love you very much—. With

(1) There are many other slokas also which describe the same state. I mention a few. अद्वष्टा सर्वभूतानां मैत्रं परमं एव च । निर्मम निरदंकार समदुःखसुख क्षमी ॥ सतुष्ट सतत योगा यतात्मा हृदीस्थः । मयि आप्तमनोजुहि यं मे भवत स मे प्रिय ॥ यस्मात् न उद्विजते लोकः लोकात् न उद्विजते च यः । हर्षामर्षभयोद्वेगं मुक्तं च स च मे प्रिय ॥ अनपेक्ष शुचि दक्ष उदासीन गतव्यथ । सर्वारम्भपरित्यागी य मे भवत स मे प्रिय ॥ XII 1 : 16

(2) इति ते ज्ञान आगच्छत गुण्यात् गुह्यतरं मया । विमृश्य एतत् अशेषेण यथा शृण्वसि तथा कुरु ॥ सर्वगुह्यतमं भूय दानु

this introduction, the Gitakar gives the following advice :—Concentrate your attention on the one real God, devote yourself to him, worship him, reverence him. If you do this, then it is absolutely certain that you will go to him.¹ The same advice is repeated in other slokas :—Forsaking all other ways, take refuge in him alone ; he will relieve you from all sin ; be not grieved.² Concentrate all your attention on him alone, make him the sole object of your thought ; if you do this, then, without any doubt whatsoever, you will dwell hereafter in³ him.

But the advice, contained in these and such other slokas, is not easy to follow. It requires or presupposes a long religious discipline or spiritual development. And this

मे परमं वचः । इष्टः असि मे दृढं इति ततः वक्ष्यामि ते हितम् ॥
XVIII. 63-64.

(¹) मत्-मनाः भव मद्भक्तः मत्-याजी मां नमस्कुरु । मां
एव एष्यसि सत्यं ते प्रतिजाने प्रियः असि मे ॥ XVIII. 65.

(²) सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मां एकं शरणं ब्रज । अहं त्वां
सर्वपापेभ्यः मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः ॥ XVIII. 66.

(³) मयि एव मनः आधत्स्व मयि बुद्धिं निवेशय । निवसि-
ष्यसि मयि एव अतः ऊर्ध्वं न संशयः ॥ XII. 8.

discipline or development itself consists of several stages or steps graduated according to the capacity of the disciple. The lowest or the first stage of this discipline or development is to cease to do any work with the desire for fruit. For the performance of works with this desire, instead of contributing to spiritual freedom, has the effect of prolonging bondage. Hence the Gita teaches :—He, who with devotion and without desire for fruit performs works, attains the highest tranquillity ; but he, who without devotion and with attachment for fruit performs works in consequence of some desire, falls into bondage.¹ The reason of this is that, when the attention is distracted by the various desires for the manifold fruits of works, it cannot be concentrated or controlled.² The Gitakar, therefore, loses

(1) युक्तः कर्मफलं त्यक्त्वा शान्तिं आप्नोति नैष्ठिकीम् ।
अयुक्तः कामकारेण फले सक्तः निबध्यते ॥ V. 12.

(2) यां इमां पुण्यतां वाचं प्रदयन्ति अविपश्चितः । वेदवाद-
रताः पार्थ न अन्यत् अस्तीति वादिनः ॥ कामात्मानः स्वर्गपराः
जन्मकर्मफलप्रदाम् । क्रियाविशेषबहुलां भोग-ऐश्वर्यगतिं प्रति ॥
भोगैश्वर्यप्रसक्तानां तथा अपहृतचेतसाम् । व्यवसायात्मिका बुद्धिः
समाधौ न विधीयते ॥ II. 42-4.

no opportunity to show his contempt for those who perform the prescribed works with the desire for fruit,¹

But, if no works are to be done for the sake of their fruit, then all works, the sole object of doing which is to attain some fruit, must be given up. Such works include, among others, those which are dedicated to particular deities, like Indra, Varuna², &c. These works, therefore, must be abandoned by a man who cares for his spiritual development, because they cease to have any meaning when the desire for their fruit is given up ; because they are dedicated, not to the one real God, but to the lower particular deities, who are simply partial manifestations of the one real God ; and also because

(¹) त्रैविद्याः मां सोमपाः पूतपापाः यज्ञैः इष्ट्वा स्वर्गंति प्रार्थयन्ते । ते पुण्यं आसाद्य सुरेन्द्रलोकं अश्नन्ति दिव्यान् दिवि देवभोगान् ॥ ते तं भुक्त्वा स्वर्गलोकं विशालं क्षीणे पुण्ये मर्त्यलोकं विशन्ति । एवं त्रयीधर्मं अनुप्रपन्नाः गतागतं कामकामाः लभन्ते ॥ IX. 20-1.

(²) कामैः तैः तैः हतज्ञानाः प्रपद्यन्ते अन्यदेवताः । तं तं नियमं आस्थाय प्रकृत्या नियताः स्वया ॥ VII. 20 ; कांक्षन्तः कर्मणां सिद्धिं यजन्ते इह देवताः । क्षिप्रं हि मानुषे लोके सिद्धिः भवति कर्मजा ॥ IV. 12.

their fruit is insignificant as well as temporary.¹ The same is true with respect of works done in honour of the deceased ancestors and the spirits of the dead.²

Thus all the works, which are to be done in honour of the deities, manes, &c., and all the works which are to be done for the sake of their fruit,—not to speak of all the bad or prohibited works or acts,—being excluded, there remain only such works as are said to be the duties of men as men and as members of a particular profession. These works are intended to be done, not for their fruit, but simply as the duties of men, and are dedicated to the one real God. It is these works, which, as the Gitakar is never weary of insisting, ought to be done by those whose duties they are, without

(¹) यः यः यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धया आर्चितुं इच्छति ।
तस्य तस्य अचला श्रद्धा ता एव विदधामि अहम् ॥ यः तया
श्रद्धा युक्तः तस्याः राधनं ईदृते । समेत च ततः कामान्
मया एव विदितान् दितान् ॥ अंतरत् तु फलं तेषां तत् भवति
अल्पमेधसां । देशान् देवयजः यान्ति मत्-भक्ताः यांति मां
अपि ॥ VII. 21-3.

(²) यांति देवयजः देशान् पितॄन् यान्ति पितृयजाः । भू-
तानि यांति भूतेज्याः यांति मयाजिनः अपि माम् ॥ IX. 25.

entertaining any desire for their fruit.¹ It is in respect of these works that he says that you ought not to be fond of doing nothing.² It is these works without doing which, the fitness for giving up all works cannot be attained.³ It is these works, the performance of which is a means of preparing oneself for the Samadhi-yoga⁴ described in the sixth Adhyaya. These works, therefore, ought not to be given up. To give them up through ignorance is bad ; to give them up simply for avoiding the trouble of doing them, does not contribute to Mukti.⁵

Even these works, however, which ought not to be abandoned, must be done, as

(¹) एतानि अपि तु कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा फलानि च ।
कर्तव्यानि इति मे पार्थ निश्चितं मतं उत्तमम् ॥ XVIII. 6.

(²) मा ते संगः अस्तु अकर्मणि ॥ II. 47.

(³) न कर्मणां अनारंभात् नैष्कर्म्यं पुरुषः अश्नुते ॥ III. 4.

(⁴) आरुक्षोः मुनेः योगं कर्म कारणं उच्यते ॥ VI. 3.

(⁵) नियतस्य तु संन्यासः कर्मणः न उपपद्यते । मोहात्
तस्य परित्यागः तामसः परिकीर्तितः ॥ दुःखं इत्येव यत् कर्म
कायक्लेशभयात् त्यजेत् । सः कृत्वा राजसं त्यागं नैव त्यागफलं
लभेत् ॥ XVIII. 7-8.

already mentioned, not for any fruit to be attained from doing them, nor because we are fond of doing them ; but simply because they are our duties. In other words, we *must* do our duties, and must not neglect them ; still the motive in doing these duties must be, not the expectation of any gain, nor any inclination, on our part, to do them, but simply the sense of duty as duty. And, at the stage we are considering, this way of doing duties is the best of abandonment.¹

II.

It, then, follows that, according to the religious teaching of the Gita, the first stage of religious discipline or development consists, on the one hand, in giving up all works which are not our absolute duties, and, on the other, doing those works which are our absolute duties from the pure sense of duty, and not from any attachment to them, nor from the expectation of any fruit from the performance of them. This part of the teaching of the Gita is repeated in a large num-

(¹) कार्यं इत्येव यत् कर्म नियतं कुरुते अर्जुन । संगं त्यक्त्वा फलं धेयं नः त्यागः शास्त्रिकः मतः ॥ XVIII. 9.

ber of slokas one or two of which may be quoted here :—Those works alone are the source of bondage which are unconnected with your absolute duties ; hence do your absolute duties, and everything that these duties require, without attachment.¹ Your business ends with the doing of works, it has nothing to do with their fruit ; let not, therefore, the fruit of works be your motive ; nor should you be attached to doing nothing² at all.

It should be noticed that this advice, if acted upon, cannot fail to produce many other consequences. For; when we do our duties exclusively from the sense of duty, then we shall not do our duties because we expect to succeed or to achieve some end, nor shall we be deterred from doing them from the expectation or suspicion of failure. It is for this reason that the Gitakar says :—Do your duties, being free from attachment and

(¹) यज्ञार्थात् कर्मणः अन्यत्र लोकः अयं कर्मबन्धनः । तदर्थं कर्म कौंतेय मुक्तसंगः समाचर ॥ III. 9.

(²) कर्मणि एव अधिकारः ते मा फलेषु कदाचन । मा कर्मफलहेतुः भूः मा ते संगः अस्तु अकर्मणि ॥ II. 47.

equable as to success or failure ; this equability is called *yoga*.¹ Similarly, when we do our duties solely from the sense of duty, we shall not hesitate, or be prompted, to do them on account of pain or pleasure that they may involve or produce. Hence says the Gitakar:—You will not incur any sin, if you engage in doing your duties, looking upon pain and pleasure, gain and loss, success and failure, as alike.² Again, if we bring ourselves always to do our duties simply because they are our duties, then it will necessarily follow that we shall feel contented simply by being able to do our duties, and shall have no occasion for feeling anger, hatred, rivalry ; and our satisfaction will not be dependent on any other thing. Hence the Gitakar preaches:—He,—who does his duties being free from the attachment for the fruit of works, being always satisfied, being dependent on none, feeling content with whatever he may chance to get, being free from jealousy, being unaffected by the pairs of opposites like plea-

(¹) योगस्यः कुरु कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा धनंजय । सिद्धि-
भसिद्धोः समः भूत्वा समत्वं योगः उच्यते ॥ II. 48.

(²) सुखदुःखे समे कृत्वा लाभालाभी जयाजयौ । ततः युद्धाय
युज्यस्व नैवं पापं भवाप्स्यसि ॥ II. 38.

sure and pain, and is indifferent as to success or failure,—does not fall into bondage on account of his performing¹ works.

But a further consequence of habituating ourselves to do our duties simply from a sense of duty, is that it will necessarily free us (1) from all particular desires for particular objects, (2) from all feelings,—such as liking or disliking, attachment or hate, love or enmity, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, anger, jealousy,—whether the objects of these feelings be things or persons.¹ In other words, a man, who strictly acts upon the teaching of the Gita under consideration,—*i. e.*, who does his duties,—not from

(¹) त्यक्त्वा कर्मफलासंगं नित्यतृप्तः निराश्रयः । कर्मणि अभिप्रवृत्तः अपि नैव किञ्चित् करोति सः ॥ IV. 20 ;

यदृच्छालाभसंतुष्टः द्वंद्वातीतः विमत्सरः । समः सिद्धौ असिद्धौ च कृत्वा अपि न निवध्यते ॥ IV. 22.

(²) इंद्रियार्थेषु वैराग्यम् ॥ XIII. 8 ; असक्तबुद्धिः सर्वत्र जितात्मा विगतस्पृहः ॥ XVIII. 49 ; द्वंद्वैः विमुक्ताः सुखदुःखसंज्ञैः ॥ XV. 5 ; हर्षामर्षभयोद्वेगैः मुक्तः ॥ XII. 15 ; रागद्वेषौ व्युदस्य... ॥ XVIII. 51 ; वीतरागभयक्रोधः ॥ II. 56 ; यः सर्वत्र अनभिस्नेहः ॥ II. 57 ; असक्तिः अनभिध्वंगः पुत्रदारगृहादिषु ॥ XIII. 9.

any expectation of fruit or any attachment to them, but simply and solely from the sense of duty,—will gradually develop that side of *Sthita-prajnatva* or *Guna-atitatva*, which is indicated by *Vairagya*¹ (वैराग्य). And when this stage is reached, then the man becomes fit for giving up *sansar* (or the *Grhastha-ashram*), and for having recourse to the *Abhyasa-yoga* described in the sixth *Adhyaya* of the *Gita*.² When, therefore, the *Gita*kar says:—That the wise, by giving up the fruit which results from works, become freed from bondage and attain the highest³ goal; that he, who performs his duties without attachment, attains the

(¹) वैराग्य may be briefly stated thus—इन्द्रियाणि विषयेषु रागद्वेषविच्युतानि कुरु । इन्द्रियाणि इन्द्रियार्थेभ्यः सर्वज्ञाः निर्गृहाण । इच्छालोभप्रोषप्रथं रागं द्वेषं दुर्षं लोभं भयं स्नेहं आसक्तिं परिमदं च त्यज । सुखदुःखसर्गः द्वन्द्वः विमुक्तः निर्भयः निराशीः अश्लेषधुः उदामीनः समलोष्टाश्मक्ताचनः येन केनचित् तृप्तः, विद्याविनयमंप्रे प्राम्दणे श्वशरे च साधुषु अपि च पापेषु समदर्शी, तुल्यप्रियाप्रियः तुल्यमानापमानः तुल्यस्तुतिनिन्दः सर्वोत्तमपरित्यागी च भव ॥

(²) यदा हि न इन्द्रियार्थेषु न कर्मणु अनुव्रजते । सर्वगं कल्पतान्यासी योगारूढः तदा उच्यते ॥ VI. ५.

(³) कर्मजं बुद्धियुक्ताः हि फलं त्यक्त्वा मनीषिणः । जन्मबन्धाविनिर्मुक्ताः पदं गच्छन्ति अनामयम् ॥ II. 51 ; तस्मात्

highest; hence you should do what you ought to do without attachment¹;—what he means is not that we can gain the highest end simply by doing our duties without entertaining desire for fruit and without attachment for them; he simply means that if we thus do our duties, we are put in the proper way; so that if we pursue it to the end, we shall attain the ultimate object of human life. For, as we just saw (VI. 4), the abandonment of the fruit of works and the attachment for them simply prepares us for the higher stage. Not only that, but even the attainment of this higher stage, *i.e.* वैराग्य or संन्यास, is not, by itself, the attainment of the absolute goal. For the Gitakar himself tells us that mere *sannyasa* or *vairagya* is not, by itself, the fulfilment of the ultimate object.¹

III.

Here, therefore, the question arises :—If mere *sannyasa* is not enough, what is that

असक्तः सततं कार्यं कर्म समाचर । असक्तः हि आचरन् कर्म
परं आप्नोति पूरुषः ॥ III. 19.

(¹) न च संन्यसनात् एव सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति ॥ III. 4.

which is required in addition? In order to be able to answer this question, we must not only consider the stage of spiritual development which is to follow the attainment of वैराग्य, but we must take into consideration an element in this previous stage which we have ignored so far. The first stage of religious discipline, which we have considered thus far, consists in performing one's duties from no other motive but the sense of duty. This advice, however, might be given or followed even by an atheist. In order, therefore, that it may contribute to *religious* development, some other element must be added to it,—if not from the beginning, then at some later stage. What, then, is this new element? This element is that we must do our duties,—not for our own sake, *i. e.*, not for securing the fruit which we might get through them, —but for the sake of God. The same idea is expressed by saying that we must do our duties by dedicating them to God, or that we must do our duties simply because they are God's commands to us, or,—in ordinary language,—we must do our duties in order that God may thereby be propitiated, and not that he may grant us something in return. Thus we read in the

Gita :—I will tell you how every man, by being intent on his own respective duties, gains what he ought to gain. He gains it by propitiating God through the performance of his duties in the manner already¹ explained. The same advice is given in other slokas also. For instance :—Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you give, the sacrifice that you make, the penance which you perform,—do all that as offered to² God.

It need not be mentioned, however, that we must try to follow these two pieces of the Gitakar's advice together,—though that may not be possible for us at the beginning. And hence slokas like the following :—He, who does his duties for the sake of God and without attachment, cannot be touched by

(¹) स्वकर्मनिरतः सिद्धिं यथा विन्दति तत् शृणु ॥ यतः प्रवृत्तिः भूतानां येन सर्वं इदं ततम् । स्वकर्मणा तं अभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ॥ XVIII. 45-6.

(²) यत् करोषि यत् अश्नासि यत् जुहोषि ददासि यत् । यत् तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत् कुरुष्व मत्-अर्पणम् ॥ IX. 27.

sin, as a lotus leaf by water.¹ Dedication in thought all that you do to God, concentrating your attention on God through mental abstraction (*i. e.*, by taking it away from desires, objects of desires, and fruits of works), be constantly given up to him.² He goes to God, who does every thing for God, to whom God is all in all, who devotes himself to God, who has no other attraction, and who feels no enmity towards anything or³ being.

It will be seen that the last sloka describes the life of a man who is completely following the two pieces of the Gitakar's advice under consideration. That does not, however, mean that we must wait until we are able strictly to follow each of the two pieces of advice,—or that we are not to begin to act upon the piece of advice said to belong to the later

(¹) मद्गुणि आधाय कर्माणि पूर्यं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः ।
द्विष्यते न सः पापेन पञ्चपन्नं ह्य भंभजा ॥ V. 10.

(²) चेतसा सर्वकर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य मत्परः ।
बुद्धियोगं उपाश्रित्य मत्-चित्तः सततं भव ॥ XVIII. 57.

(³) मत्-कर्मकृत् मत्परमः मत्-भक्तः संगवान्तैः ।
निर्धरः सर्वभूतेषु यः सः मां एति पादय ॥ XI. 55.

stage, until we are able to complete the earlier stage. The meaning is that, though we must begin by trying to give up desire for fruit and attachment, still we must also begin to try to dedicate our acts to God as soon as possible. For, as the Gitakar says, conformity to each of the two pieces of the advice, will help conformity to the other. The more are we able to take our attention away from the fruit of works, desires and the objects of desire, the more we shall be able to concentrate it on God; the more are we accustomed to deny ourselves the fruit of works, the more ready we shall be to do the works simply for the sake of God. This, of course, is natural. As to how the doing of our works for the sake of God will contribute to mental abstraction, one answer is that that also is natural. For it is only a common experience that the more do we habituate ourselves to work for the sake of others, the more forgetful we become of ourselves. But the other answer to the above question,—and this the Gitakar seems anxious to emphasize,—is that when we even try to do our duties for the sake of God, God, through his grace, comes to our help, and facilitates our attainment of mental abstrac-

tion,—and even enables us to surmount other difficulties, which we cannot help meeting with in this transitory state.

(1) गुणतन्मयस्यैव एव मोक्षमयं कथयन्निह । मन्वानरोम-
मुदगात्मा विमुक्तः सोऽर्हत्यमि ॥ IX. 28 ; मत्-चित्तः
मत्-वशप्रज्ञाः संशयान्नः परमार्थः । कथयन्तः स मां नित्यं
गुणवन्ति न रमन्ति च ॥ तेषां मत्प्रसूयतायां भगवतां प्रीतिरूहः ।
इदमपि मुद्दिषोग म मेन मां उवतन्ति मे ॥ X. 9-10 ; अपि
येन मुदुराचारः भगवन् मां भवन्तभाक् । गातुः एव मःमन्त्रज्यः
मन्दक् च्यवगितः हि मः ॥ इति भगवि भगवतां शम्भुं शान्तिं
निगच्छति । सर्वमेव प्रतिजानीहि न मे भवतः प्रन्दपति ॥ मां
हि पार्थ च्यवगितः ये अपि ह्युः पारथीनयः । श्रितः वेद्याः
तथा शूद्राः ते अपि शान्तिं परां गतिम् ॥ हि पुनः प्राप्ताः
पुन्याः भवताः शान्तिर्यः तथा । अन्विष्य भगुणं श्रेष्ठं इमं प्राप्य
भगवन् माम् ॥ IX. 30-33 ; ये तु सर्वाणि कर्माणि भवि-
मन्त्यस्य मत्पराः । अनन्देन एव योगेन मां ध्यायन्तः उवाच मे ॥
तेषां भद्रं मनुजैर्ना मृग्युद्यमारमाणात् । भवामि न विराट् पार्थ
मायि भावेति तत्रैकमात्रम् ॥ XII. 6-7 ; सर्वकर्माणि अपि मदा-
तुर्वाणः मत्-प्रसाधयः । मत्-प्रसादात् भवन्तीति शान्तिं परां
अज्यदम् ॥ XVIII. 56 ; मत्-चित्तः सर्वदुर्माणि मत्प्रसादात्
तरिष्यमि । भय चेत् त्वं अहंकारात् न श्रोष्यसि तिरिष्यसि ॥
XVIII. 58 ; ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृत्-देने अर्जुन तिष्ठति ॥
तं एव शरणं गच्छ सर्वभावेन भारत । मत्प्रसादात् परां शान्तिं
स्थानं प्राप्स्यसि शाश्वतम् ॥ XVIII. 61-2.

IV.

It should be noticed that, just as there are some slokas in the Gita, in which mental abstraction (बुद्धियोग) is preached as if it were the sole means, so there are other slokas in which the doing of our duties as offered to God is preached as if that were the sole means. But neither of these two can be taken by itself. For, as we saw, the following of one of the two pieces of advice presupposes, and leads to, the other. Hence the two must be taken together.

But now we have to take into consideration a third element in the advice of the Gita regarding the Karma-yoga-bhakti. Because, as the Gitakar says, though it is necessary for us to do our duties for the sake of God, still, in order to do this in the proper way, we must have a conception of what the real nature of God is. If we have a wrong conception about God's nature,—if we mistake one of the individual deities for the one universal God,—then, however much we might have practised abstraction, however much we may do our duties as offered to God, still, on account of our wrong conception of God, the highest end of religious discipline

cannot be achieved. So much so, that it is on account of men's ignorance about real God, that they go after particular deities or become atheists.¹ Hence it is only those, who have known the real nature of God, that are able to devote themselves to him without thinking of anything² else. This is the nature of God as the creator, sustainer, &c. of the universe.³

(¹) अन्यथैतं च्यवित आपन्नं मन्यन्ते मां अयुक्षयः ।

परं भावं अजानन्तः मम अव्यय अनुत्तमम् ॥ VII. 24

कर्मः तैः तैः हतज्ञानाः प्रपद्यन्ते अन्यदेवताः ॥ VII. 20

न मां दुष्कृतिनः मूढाः प्रपद्यन्ते नराधमाः ।

मायया अपहृतज्ञानाः आसुरं मां आधिताः ॥ VII. 15 ;

न अहं प्रकाशः सर्वस्य योगमायासमाश्रितः ।

मूढःअयं न अभिजानाति लोकःमा अजं अव्ययम् ॥ VII. 25 ;

अवजानन्ति मां मूढाः मानुषी तनु आधितं ।

परं भावं अजानन्तः मम भूतमहेश्वरम् ॥ IX. 11 ;

ये अपि अन्यदेवतामयताः यजन्ते श्रद्धया आन्यिताः । ते अपि

मां एव कर्तेय यजन्ति अविधिपूर्वकम् ॥ अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां

भोक्ता च प्रभुः एव च । न तु मां अभिजानन्ति तत्त्वेन

अतः च्यवन्ति ते ॥ IX. 23-4.

(²) महात्मानः तु मां पार्थ देवीं प्रकृति आधिताः । गजान्ति

अनन्यमनसः ज्ञात्वा भूतादि अव्ययम् ॥ IX. 13.

(³) भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां सर्वलोकमहेश्वरं । सुहृदं सर्वभूतानां

ज्ञात्वा मां शान्तिं कच्छति ॥ V 29 See above pp 5 20.

How then is this nature of God to be known? It cannot be known merely by the study of the Vedas ; nor by the performance of penance ; nor by bestowing gifts, nor by making sacrifices.¹ Nor is it possible to see this form of God by means of our sense of sight.² To be able to see God, therefore, a new divine sight (दिव्यचक्षुः) must be developed. And it is only when this new sight is secured, that this universal form of God can be seen. But now the question arises:—How is this spiritual insight to be developed? The answer, which the Gitakar gives to this question, is :—That it can be developed only by means of the same discipline, i.e., of the Karma-yoga-bhakti,—which we have been considering.³ There is no other way. And this is the only one way

(¹) न अहं वेदैः न तपसा न दानेन न च इज्यया ! शक्यः एवंविधः द्रष्टुम्...॥ XI. ५३ ; न वेदयज्ञ-अध्ययनैः न दानैः न च क्रियाभिः न तपोभिः उग्रैः । एकरूपः शक्यः अहं नृलोके द्रष्टुम्... ॥ XI. ४४.

(²) न तु मां शक्यसे द्रष्टुं अनेन एव स्वचक्षुषा ॥ XI. ८.

(³) भक्त्या तु अनन्यया शक्यः अहं एवं-विधः अर्जुन । ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप ॥ XI. ५४.

possible to any one, whatever he may¹ be. No wonder, therefore, if the Gitakar says that a yogi is superior to any one who performs penance, who has studied the Vedas, who does the prescribed works ;...and that a yogi, who devotes himself to the one real God with all his heart, is the best of all yogis.²

Thus then we see that the Karma-yoga-bhakti consists of abstraction from all worldly matters (बुद्धियोग), offering our duties to God, and knowing the universal form of God. These three elements of the Karma-yoga-bhakti, however, as we saw, are not independent of one another, but the greater and greater conformity to any one of these presupposes, and leads to, greater and greater conformity to each of the other two ;—though it may be broadly said that abstraction is the most easy of the three, and hence

(¹) सुदुर्लभं इदं रूपं दृष्टवान् अस्ति यत् मम । देशाः अपि अस्य रूपस्य नित्यं दर्शनकाक्षिणः ॥ XI. 52.

(²) तपस्विभ्यः अधिकः योगी ज्ञानिभ्यः अपि मतः अधिकः । कर्मिभ्यः च अधिकः योगी तस्मात् योगी भव अर्जुन ॥ योगिनां अपि सर्वेषां मत्-गतेन अंतरात्मना । श्रद्धावान् भजते यः मां सः मे युक्ततमः मतः ॥ VI. 46-47.

may be regarded, as the Gitakar does, as the first stage of religious discipline ; while the other two of these three constitute the immediately next (higher) stage. It is also easy to see that one, who follows this advice cannot but ask himself the reason of giving up the desire for fruit of works, &c., of doing every work, that he ought to do, for the sake of God. And a consideration of this question will necessarily lead him to study, or make himself acquainted with, the grounds of all this advice, namely, the philosophical aspect of the teaching of the Gita, summarised in the first two chapters of this essay. And when he is convinced about the necessity of this advice, and the truth of the grounds on which it is based, he will be better able and more anxious to act up to it. Thus we see that, in order to practise the Karma-yoga-bhakti properly and with all heart, it is necessary to attain knowledge of the real nature of God, of the human soul, of the external world, and of their mutual relation ; also the knowledge of the grounds of the soul's bondage, and of the means of release. In other words, the Karma-yoga-bhakti necessitates, and thus reconciles, Karma or good works, Jnana or knowledge, and Bhakti or love.

V.

Let us deviate just for a moment to consider (what may be called) the moral aspect of the life of the men, who are undergoing the threefold religious discipline, described above. As we have seen,¹ the Gita teaches that there is no created being in the whole universe that is absolutely free from the three *gunas*,—*tamas*, *rajas*, and *satva*. Though, however, all these three *gunas* are present in each and every being, and, therefore, in each human being, still all human beings fall into four classes as follows:—(1) those who have become *Guna-atita*, (2) those in whom the *tamo-guna* predominates over the other two, (3) those in whom the *rajo-guna* predominates, and (4) those in whom the *satva-guna* predominates. We have here to consider the last three of these four classes of human beings.

Now, each of these three *gunas* necessarily manifests itself by giving rise to those qualities which are its consequences:—the *satva*—

(1) See above, p. 38.

guna manifests itself by attachment to happiness and knowledge; the rajo-guna by attachment to activity, avarice, desire, uneasiness; and the tamo-guna by attachment to heedlessness, ignorance, idleness, illusion.¹ Hence, though in men, coming under each of the above three classes, all these three sets of qualities will and must exist in germ, still, according as, in any given human being, one or other of the three *gunas* predominates over the other two, the corresponding set of qualities also will predominate over the other two sets of qualities. Evidently, from the presence of the predominance of a particular set of qualities, the predominance of the corresponding *guna* must be inferred.²

The next important thing to remember is that, though, according to the Gita, the ultimate aim of each human being ought to be to transcend all these three *gunas*,—or to

(1) See above, p. 37.

(2) सर्वद्वारेषु देहे अस्मिन् प्रकाशः उपजायते । ज्ञानं यदा तदा विद्यात् विवृद्धं सत्त्वं इत्युत ॥ लोभः प्रवृत्तिः आरंभः कर्मणां अशमः स्पृहा । रजसि एतानि जायन्ते विवृद्धे भरतर्षभ ॥ अप्रकाशः अप्रवृत्तिः च प्रमादः मोहः एव च । तमसि एतानि जायन्ते विवृद्धे कुरुनन्दन ॥ XIV. 11-13.

become *Guṇa-¹ itita*, still, among those, who have not reached that stage, the men, in whom the *satva* *guṇa* predominates, are morally and spiritually superior to all those men in whom the *rajo* *guṇa* or *tamo* *guṇa* predominates ; and those, in whom the *rajo*-*guṇa* predominates, are superior to all those in whom the *tamo* *guṇa* predominates. That the Gita¹ recognises this distinction, is clear from the very nature of the qualities which, according to him, are the respective manifestations of the three *guṇas*. If any further evidence be required, it is supplied by such slokas as the following — If a man dies during the predominance of the *satva*-*guṇa*, he reaches the untainted world of those who know the highest. If, however, he dies during the predominance of the *rajo* *guṇa*, he is born in the family of those who are attached to works. Similarly, if he dies during the prevalence of the *tamo* *guṇa*, he is born in the wombs of the ignorant. The fruit of meritorious works is said to be untainted, — of the nature of *satva* ; the fruit of the *rajo* *guṇa* is misery, and the

(1) See above p. 10

fruit of the *tamo-guna* is ignorance. From *satva* is produced knowledge, from *rajas* is produced avarice, and from *tamas* are produced heedlessness, delusion, and ignorance. Those who resort to *satva* are born as heavenly beings, those who resort to *rajas* remain in the middle (are born as men), and those who stick to *tamas* are born among the lower animals.¹

If, then, according to the Gita, the *satva-guna* and its consequences are superior to the other two *gunas* and their consequences, and the *rajo-guna* and its consequences are better than the *tamo-guna* and its consequences, it necessarily follows that, as a matter of religious discipline or spiritual development, those, in whom the *tamo-guna*

(¹) यदा सत्त्वे प्रवृद्धे तु प्रलये याति देहभृत् । तदा उत्तम-
विदां लोकान् भ्रमलान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥ रजसि प्रलयं गत्वा कर्म-
संगिषु जायते । तथा प्रलीनः तमासि मूढयोनिषु जायते ॥ कर्मणः
सुकृतस्य आहुः सार्विकं निर्मलं फलम् । रजसः तु फलं दुःखं
अज्ञानं तमसः फलम् ॥ सत्त्वात् संजायते ज्ञानं रजसः लाभः एव
च । प्रमादमोहौ तमसः भवतः अज्ञानं एव च ॥ ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्ति
सत्त्वस्थाः मध्ये तिष्ठन्ति राजसाः । अधो गच्छन्ति तामसाः XIV, 14-18.

and the qualities produced by it predominate, ought to try to weaken and get rid of them, and to strengthen in themselves, if not the *satva-guna* and the qualities following from it, at least the *rajo-guna* and the qualities which are its results. This means that, according to the Gitakar, idleness, heedlessness, delusion, ignorance are the worst of all qualities that a human being can possess. It is better to have avarice, discontent, desires, disposition to activity, than these. Those, however, in whom the qualities which are the manifestation of the *rajo-guna* prevail, ought to try to weaken and get rid of them, and to strengthen in themselves, not the qualities corresponding to the *tamo-guna*, but those which follow from the *satva-guna*. As we saw above, the most important of the consequences of the *satva-guna* is the attainment of knowledge, and experience in conformity with that knowledge.

VI.

The above slokas indicate, in general language, the line of progress which a follower of the Karma-yoga-bhakti must pursue, until he attains *guna-atitatra*. For, as the Gitakar expressly says, there is no

royal road to this goal ; it can be attained only through the laborious method of living in conformity with the rules of the Karma-yoga-bhakti.¹ We have, however, seen that there is no human being,—that has not reached *guna-atitvatva*,—who is free from any one of the three *gunas*. In other words, even from those, in whom the *satva-guna* or the *rajo-guna* or the *tamo-guna* predominates, the other two cannot be wholly absent. But they are present in such a way that they modify the consequences of the *guna* which is predominant. And, of course, they modify them in proportion to their own strength. For instance, attachment to acts is the consequence of the predominance of the *rajo-guna*. Still the doing of acts itself will differ in different cases according to the degree of strength of the *satva-guna* and the *tamo-guna* which accompany the predominant *rajo-guna* in different individuals, or at different times in the same individual. And

(¹) गुणान् एतान् अतीत्य त्रीन् देही देहसमुद्भवान् । जन्म-
मृत्युजरादुःखैः विमुक्तः अमृतं अश्नुते ॥ XIV. 20 ;
मां च यः अव्यभिचारेण भक्तियोगेन सेवते । सः गुणान्
समतीत्य एतान् ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥ XIV. 26.

the same is true with reference to every other quality or state. Hence each quality, that a man can possess, falls under three heads,—*satvik*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. A few instances of these are given below from the Gita,

That knowledge is *satvik*, which enables us to perceive one common imperishable indivisible (spiritual) nature in all the various divisible beings; that knowledge is *rajas*, which makes us perceive different natures in different beings; and that knowledge is *tamas* which makes us look upon one particular thing as if that thing were all, which is of no avail, which is devoid of any truth, and is insignificant¹. That Buddhi (practical intelligence) is *satvik* by which we are able to know what is piety and what is impiety, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, where to dare and where to be

(¹) सर्वभूतेषु येन एकं भावं अव्ययं ईक्षते । अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु तत् ज्ञानं विद्धि सात्त्विकम् ॥ पृथक्तेषु तु यत् ज्ञानं नानाभावात् पृथक्-विधान् । वेत्ति सर्वेषु भूतेषु तत् ज्ञानं विद्धि राजसम् ॥ यत्तु कृत्स्नयत् एतस्मिन् कार्ये सक्तं अहेतुकम् । अतश्चार्थवत् अल्पं च तत् तामसं उदाहृतम् ॥ XVIII. 20-2.

afraid, what is bondage and what is Mukti ; that Buddhi is *rajas*, which does not enable us properly to understand what is piety and what is impiety, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done; and that Buddhi is *tamas* which, being shrouded with the *tamo-guna*, makes us mistake impiety for piety, and all things for what they are¹ not. That courage is *satvik*, which enables us to control the operations of mind, breath and the senses, which is unswerving, which always co-exists with mental abstraction and supports it ; that courage is *rajas*, which enables us to adhere to piety, desire, and the objects of desire (the ordinary aims of men), and strengthens our attachment to fruit of works; while that courage is *tamas*, which keeps us stuck to sleep, fear, sorrow, despair, and folly.²

(¹) प्रवृत्तिं च निवृत्तिं च कार्याकार्ये भयाभये । वन्द्यं मोक्षं च या वेत्ति बुद्धिः सा पार्थ सात्त्विकी ॥ यया धर्मं अधर्मं च कार्यं च अकार्यं एव च । अयथावत् प्रजानाति बुद्धिः सा पार्थ राजसी ॥ अधर्मं धर्मं इति या मन्यते तमसा आवृता । सर्वार्थान् विपरितान् च बुद्धिः सा पार्थ तामसी ॥ XVIII, 30-2.

(²) धृत्या यया धारयते मनः प्राणेन्द्रियाक्रियाः । योगेन अव्याभिचारिण्या धृतिः सा पार्थ सात्त्विकी ॥
यया तु धर्मकामार्थान् धृत्या धारयते अर्जुन । प्रसंगेन

That happiness is *satvik* which, though like poison at first, is comparable to nectar in the long run, and is the result of clear self-knowledge ; that happiness is *rajas* which, being produced from the contact of the senses with their objects, is comparable to nectar at first, but is like poison in the long run ; while that happiness is *tamas*, which, being produced from sleep, idleness, delusion, is the source of self-delusion from beginning¹ to end. That action is *satvik*, which is one of the prescribed duties for the doer of it, which is done without attachment, without the motive of fondness or aversion, without the desire for fruit ; that action is *rajas*, which is performed by one who wishes for objects of desire, who is full of egoism, and

फलाकांक्षं धृतिः सा पार्थ राजसी ॥ यया स्वप्न भय
शोकं विषाद मदं एव च । न विमुंचति दुर्मेधा धृतिः
सा पार्थ तामसी ॥ XVIII 33-35.

- (¹) यत् तत् अग्रे दिष्टं इव परिणामे अमृतोपमम् । तत् सुख
सात्त्विकं प्रोक्तं आत्मबुद्धिप्रसादजम् ॥ विषयेन्द्रिय-
संयोगात् यत् तत् अग्रे अमृतोपमम् । परिणामे विष्टं
इव तत् सुखं राजसं स्मृतम् ॥ यत् अग्रे च अनुबन्धे
च मुख्यं मोहनं आत्मनः । निद्रालम्ब्यप्रमादोत्थं तत्
तामसं उदाहृतम् ॥ XVIII, 37-39.

which involves much trouble ; while that action is *tamas* which is done through ignorance, without any regard to consequences, loss, injury, and one's own strength.¹ That agent is called *satvik*, who is free from attachment and from egoistic talk, who is possessed of courage and enthusiasm, and is unaffected by success or ill-success ; that agent is *rajas*, who is full of fondness, who has desire for the fruit of works, who is covetous, cruel impure, and who feels joy and sorrow ; while that agent is *tamas*, who is heedless, void of discernment, headstrong, crafty, malicious, lazy, melancholy, and dilatory.² That charity is *satvik*, which

(¹) नियतं संगरहितं अरागेद्वेषतः कृतम् । अफलेप्रेप्सुना कर्म यत् तत् सात्त्विकं उच्यते ॥ यत् तु कामेप्सुना कर्म साहंकारेण वा पुनः । क्रियते बहुलायासं तत् राजसं उदाहृतम् ॥ अनुबन्धं क्षयं हिंसां अनपेक्ष्य च पौरुषम् । मोहात् आरभ्यते कर्म तत् तामसं उदाहृतम् ॥ XVIII. 23-5.

(²) मुक्तसंगः अनहंवादी धृति-उत्साहसमन्वितः । सिद्धि-असिद्ध्योः निर्विकारः कर्ता सात्त्विकः उच्यते ॥ रागी कर्मफलप्रेप्सुः लुब्धः हिंसात्मकः अशुचिः । हर्षशोकान्वितः कर्ता राजसः परिकीर्तितः ॥ अयुक्तः प्राकृतः स्तब्धः शठः नैष्कृतिकः अलसः । विषादी दीर्घसूत्री च कर्ता तामसः उच्यते ॥ XVIII. 26-28.

is given because it ought to be given, which is given at a proper time, at a proper place, to a proper person such that he can do no service in return; that charity is *rajas*, which is *grudgingly* given for a return of service, and with the expectation of fruit (in the next world); while that charity is *tamas*, which is *insultingly* given to unfit persons, at an unfit time and place, and without respect.¹ Those, in whom the *satva* *guna* predominates, worship Gods; those, in whom the *rajo-guna* predominates, worship *Yakshas* and *Rikshasas*; while those, in whom the *tamo-guna* predominates, worship the departed spirits and the multitudes of *Bhutas*.² That sacrifice is *satvik*, which is performed simply as a duty, without the

(¹) दातव्य इति यत् दानं दीयते अनुपकारिणे । देशे काले च पात्रे च तत् दानं सात्त्विकं स्मृतम् ॥ यत् तु प्रत्युपकारार्थं फलं उद्दिश्य वा पुनः । दीयते च परिक्लिष्टं तत् दानं राजसं स्मृतम् ॥ अदेशकाले यत् दानं अपात्रेभ्यः च दीयते । अमरुतं अवशातं तत् तामसं उदाहृतम् ॥ XVII. 20-22.

(²) यजन्ते सात्त्विकाः देवान् यक्षरक्षांसि राजसाः । प्रेतान् भूतगणान् च अन्ये यजन्ते तामसा जनाः ॥ XVII. 4.

desire for fruit and with determination, and which is prescribed in religious ordinances ; that sacrifice is *rajas*, which is performed with the desire for fruit and for the purpose of ostentation ; and that sacrifice is *tamas*, which is performed without faith, the performance of which is against the religious ordinances, in which no food is dealt out, and which is devoid of *mantra* and *dakshina*.¹ Penance is of three kinds :—Bodily penance consists of paying reverence to Gods, Brahmanas, preceptors, and men of knowledge ; it also consists of purity, straight-forwardness, life of a Brahmachari, and harmlessness ; vocal penance consists of the study of the Vedas, and of speech which causes no sorrow, is true, and is beneficial and agreeable ; and mental penance consists of calmness of mind, mildness, control of the tongue, self-restraint,

(¹) अफलाकांक्षिभिः यज्ञः विधिदृष्टः यः इज्यते । यष्टव्यं एव इति मनः समाधाय सः सात्त्विकः ॥ अभिसंभाय तु फलं दंभार्थं अपि चैव यत् । इज्यते भरतश्रेष्ठ तं यज्ञं विद्धि राजसम् ॥ विधिहीनं असृष्टान्नं मंत्रहीनं अदाक्षिणम् । श्रद्धाविरहितं यज्ञं तामसं परिचक्षते ॥ XVII, 11-13.

and purity of heart.¹ This three-fold penance is called satvik, if it is practised with perfect faith, with devotion, and without desire for fruit ; it is called rajas, if it is done for the sake of respect, honour, reverence, and with ostentation, and if it is uncertain and transient ; while it is called tamas, if it is performed under a misguided conviction, with hardship to oneself, or for the destruction of² another.

It is worth while to notice that though, according to the Gita, Mukti is the highest goal to be attained by man, still Guṇa-atitva

(¹) देवद्विजगुरुप्राज्ञपूजनं शौचं आर्जवम् । ब्रह्मचर्यं आर्द्रिषा च शरीरं तपः उच्यते ॥ अनुद्वेगकरं वाक्यं सत्यं प्रियहितं च यत् । स्वाध्यायाभ्यासनं चैव वाक्-मनसं तपः उच्यते ॥ मनःप्रसादः मौम्यत्वं मौनं आत्मविनिग्रहः । भावसंशुद्धिः इति एतत् तपःमानसं उच्यते ॥ XVII. 14-15.

(²) श्रद्धया परया तप्तं तपः तत् त्रिविधं नरैः । अफलाकांक्षिभिः युज्येतः सार्विकं परिचक्षते ॥ रत्कारमानपूजार्थं तपः दंभेन चैव यत् । क्रियते तत् इह प्रोक्तं राजसं चलं अध्रुवम् ॥ गूढप्राहेण आत्मनः यत् पाण्डया क्रियते तपः । परस्य उत्सादनार्थं वा तत् तामसं उदाहृतम् ॥ XVII. 17-19.

is the highest ideal to be reached in this life; or just as Mukti is the highest goal that a man can reach after death, so Guna-atitattva is the highest goal which a man must attain by living in conformity with the rules of the Grihastha-ashrama. In the same way, the highest goal to be attained by man, within the Grihastha-ashrama, is to develop in himself the satva-guna to the maximum extent, and to reduce the other two gunas to the minimum extent. This ideal of the Grihastha-ashrama is described by the Gitakar himself under the name of *Daivi-Prakriti* or *Daivi-Sampat*¹. In other words, a man must live in the sansar-state in such a way as to make it the means of developing in himself the satva-guna in all respects to the utmost possible extent or completely.

VII.

From these and such other slokas we see that, just as, according to the Gita, besides

(¹) अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धिः ज्ञानयोगव्यवस्थितिः । दानं दमः
च यज्ञः च स्वाध्यायः तपः आर्जवम् ॥ अहिंसा सत्यं अक्रोधः
त्यागः शान्तिः अपैशुनम् । दया भूतेषु अलोलुप्त्वं मार्दवं ह्रीः अचा-
पलम् ॥ तेजः क्षमा धृतिः शौचं अद्रोहः नातिमानिता । भवन्ति
संपदं दैवीं अभिजातस्य भारत ॥ XVI. 1-3.

those who have attained Guna-atitvatva or Sthiti-prajñatva, there are three classes of men,—those in whom the satva-guna predominates, those in whom the rajo-guna predominates, and those in whom the tamo-guna predominates; in the same way, within each of these three classes, especially of the first two, there are three subdivisions, the Satvikas, the Rajasas, and the Tamakas, each following division being inferior to the preceding. It necessarily follows that, though a man, in whom the rajo-guna predominates, may not at once be able to rise to the rank of one in whom the satva-guna predominates, or one in whom the satva-guna predominates to the rank of one who has become guna-atita,—still he must try his best to rise to a higher level within his own class. And hence, though the highest goal, *i.e.*, Guna-atitvatva, may not or cannot immediately be within the reach of every one, still it is within the power of every one to act up to the teaching of the Gita in respect of the Karma-yoga, according to his own fitness (योग्यता) ; and every step, however small it may be, taken in advance, is a step towards the highest goal. And it is for this reason that the Gitakar says :—To whatever extent it may

be practised, to that extent it is beneficial, there is nothing that can obstruct it ; even a little of this Karma-yoga gives protection from great danger¹.

When a man lives completely in conformity with the principles of the Karma-yoga-bhakti, described above, he achieves what is called purity of mind (चित्तशुद्धि), that is to say, his mind ceases to be distracted by the objects of the particular desires, and becomes fit for concentration on his real self or Brahma². And here comes in the necessity of practising the Abhyasa-³ yoga, described in the sixth chapter of the Gita, - to have constant recourse to which requires the abandonment of all works. This stage of religious discipline is what is called the Jnana-nishtha or the Sankhya-marga or the Sannyas-yoga.⁴

(¹) न इह अभिक्रमनाशः अस्ति प्रत्यवायः न विद्यते । स्वल्पं अपि अस्य धर्मस्य त्रायते महतः भयात् ॥ II. 40.

(²) यतः प्रवृत्तिः भूतानां येन सर्वं इदं ततम् । स्वकर्मणा तं अभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ॥ XVIII. 46.

(3) See above, pp. 222-224.

(⁴) असक्तबुद्धिः सर्वत्र जितात्मा विगतस्पृहः । नैष्कर्म्य-सिद्धिं परमां संन्यासेन अधिगच्छति ॥ XVIII. 49.

Of course, when a man has reached this stage it is not necessary for him to *abandon* saṁsār, because no saṁsār remains to him. Nor need he cease doing any works, because he no longer does¹ them. Nor is he affected by their being done. Nor can he be guilty of omitting to do his duties, for when this stage is reached, no duties remain to be done by him, because nothing remains for him to be gained by doing any work².

The practice of the Abhyāsa-yōga or the Jñāna-niṣṭhā enables him to attain what the Gītākar calls the Para-bhakti in the following way :—I will briefly tell you how

(¹) तत्सर्विन् तु मद्भवाद्देो गुणकर्मविभागयोः । गुणाः गुणेषु वर्तन्ते इति मया न सृजते ॥ III. 28 ; नैव किञ्चिन् करोमि इति युद्धतः मन्येत तत्सर्विन् । पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्मृश्वन् जिघ्रन् अश्नन् गच्छन् स्वप्नन् शमन् ॥ प्रलयन् विमृजन् गृह्णन् उन्मिषन् निमिषन् आरि । इन्द्रियाणि इन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन् ॥ V. 8-9 ; उदासीनयन् आसौनः सुखः यः न विचाल्यते । गुणाः वर्तन्ते इत्येव यः अप्रतिष्ठति न द्वेष्टे ॥ XIV. 23.

(²) यः तु आत्मरतिः एव स्यात् आत्मतृप्तः च मानवः । आत्मनि एव च संनुष्टः तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥ नैव तस्य कृतेन अर्थः न अकृतेन इह कथनः । न च अस्य सर्वभूतेषु कश्चित् अर्थव्यवधारः ॥ III. 17-18.

the man, who has attained the completion of the Karma-yoga-bhakti, becomes able to attain Brahma. He becomes fit for attaining Brahma by having his mind purified, by controlling himself with courage, by abstracting his mind from the objects of the senses, by being free from fondness and aversion ; by residing in clean places, by moderate eating, by having his senses under his control, by being always intent on meditation, by having no concern about anything, and by being free from egoism, stubbornness, arrogance, desire, anger, belongings, and the idea of anything as his ; thus, having reached Brahma-tva, with a tranquil self, having ceased to grieve or desire, and being alike to all beings, he attains the fitness for the highest devotion to God¹.

(¹) सिद्धं प्राप्तः यथा ब्रह्म तथा अप्रोति निबोध मे ।
 समासेन एव कौतये निष्ठा ज्ञानस्य या परा ॥ बुद्ध्या विशुद्धया
 युक्तः धृत्या आत्मानं नियम्य च । शब्दादीन् विषयान् त्यक्त्वा
 रागद्वेषौ व्युदस्य च ॥ विविक्तसेवी लब्धाशी यतवाक्-कायमानसः ।
 ध्यानयोगपरः नित्यं वैराग्यं समुपाश्रितः ॥ अहंकारं बलं दर्पं कामं
 क्रोधं परिग्रहम् । विमुच्य निर्ममः शान्तः ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥ ब्रह्मभूतः
 प्रसन्नात्मा न शोचति न कांक्षति । समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु मद्भक्तिं
 लभते पराम् ॥ XVIII 50-54.

Chapter IV.

The Gita and Progress—A possible criticism.

I.

In the foregoing chapters I have tried to summarize what I understand to be the teaching of the Gita, as briefly as I could, and yet as fully as was necessary to give the reader a clear idea of the positive views of the Gitakar. I have explained what the ideals are,—namely, those indicated by Sthitaprajñatva or Guna-atitvatva,—which the Gitakar advises us to pursue and to realise in this life; I have explained what the means are,—namely, all the various stages of which the Karma yoga-bhakti consists,—which, according to the Gitakar, we must adopt, if we wish to realise those ideals; I have pointed out what the ultimate end is,—namely, Mukti,—which, as the Gitakar tells us, we shall secure at the close of this life, if we completely realise those ideals in it; and I have explained what the views of the Gitakar are about God, man, and the world, which views evidently form the basis of all this advice as to the end to be achieved after death, the ideals to be pursued and realised in this life, and the means of realising those ideals.

Now, what are we to think of all this teaching of the Gita? What is its value,—from the logical as well as from the practical point of view? Before, however, proceeding to consider this question, it is but

fair to tell the reader that it is just possible that a vast majority of the followers and admirers,—nay, even of the disinterested students,—of the Gita may deny that the teaching of the Gita is correctly given in the previous three chapters. And this is not only just possible, but even most certain. For the followers or admirers or students of the Gita may be roughly classified into seven or eight groups or schools :—(1) The *Kevala-advaitis*, according to whom the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is to be found in Shankar's commentary on the Gita; (2) the *Shuddha-advaitis*, according to whom the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is to be found in Vallubha's commentary on the Gita; (3) the *Vishisht-advaitis*, according to whom the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is to be found in Ramanuja's commentary on the Gita; (4) the *Dvaitis*, according to whom the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is to be found in Madhava's commentary on the Gita; (5) the theosophists, according to whom the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is to be found in Mrs. Anne Beasant's English translation of the Gita; (6) a section of the Brahmos, according to whom the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is to be found in Pandit Gaur Govind Roy's commentary on the Gita; (7) those who do not follow any one of these commentators, but have their own way of interpreting the teaching of the Gita, but who may agree with the followers of the above-mentioned commentators in believing that the teaching of the Gita, as they understand it, is perfect; (8) those who, like the last school, have their own way of interpreting

complaint can never be avoided. I shall, therefore, with the above warning to the reader, proceed to a consideration of the question, stated above, namely, what is the value of the teaching of the Gita, as summarized in the foregoing chapters.

Now the teaching of the Gita may be roughly divided, as already indicated, into three parts :—(1) The view which the Gita takes of God, man, and the material world ; (2) the view which we find in the Gita about the ultimate end of man ;—these two parts may be distinguished as the theoretical or philosophical aspect of the teaching of the Gita ; and (3) the ideals which the Gita asks us to pursue and to realise in this life, and the ways in which, according to the Gita, we must live in this life, because the real nature of man is what the Gita thinks it to be, and because man has to secure the ultimate end which is, according to the Gita, the necessary consequence of this nature of man ;—this last may be distinguished as the practical aspect of the teaching of the Gita, as distinguished from the theoretical or philosophical aspect under which the first two of these three parts are included.

Since, then, the practical aspect of the teaching of the Gita is a logical consequence of its theoretical aspect, the value of the former must ultimately depend upon the soundness or validity of the latter. Deferring, however, for the sake of convenience, the consideration as to the soundness of the philosophical aspect of the teaching of the Gita, I shall take the practical aspect of its teaching absolutely,—

or censure, however unjust or undeserved that censure or dishonour may be. In such cases we are exactly in the position of the noble and chaste heroine of Browning's poem, who, to her face and at a public meeting where she was occupying the place of honour, was falsely charged with unchastity with the accuser, and who, being afterwards asked as to what answer she made to the charge, replied :—

“ I ? what I answered ? As I live .
 I never fancied such a thing
 As answer possible to give.
 What says the body when they spring
 Some monstrous torture-engine's whole
 Strength on it ? No more says the soul.”

It is also true that, in some cases, the best way of meeting dishonour or censure, however undeserved, is to let it alone, and not to notice it at all. But the silence, which is either forced upon us, or which is itself the best or most effective answer to the censure in some cases, is essentially different from the silence which is due to the mind becoming insensitive to all censure and praise, to all dishonour and honour.

So far we have supposed that the censure or dishonour is undeserved. Suppose, however, that it is deserved. Then, are we not to take a lesson from a deserved censure ? But is it possible that a man can take a lesson from a deserved censure, and will not act in a way so as to deserve similar censure again, if he has become insensitive to all censure and praise,—nay, even if it be his aim to acquire this state of mind ? And what will be the result, if we try to

pursue this ideal of the Gita? The result must be this, to the same extent to which we shall be ready to make efforts from the bottom of our heart to realize this ideal, we shall lose the sense of self-respect. And how can a man, who is devoid of the sense of self-respect, take any useful part in any movement for progress?

Another ideal, placed before us by the Gita-kar, seems to be that we ought to deal equally upon stones, logs of wood, and pieces of gold (मनसि विचार्य पश्यतः ॥); and to be satisfied with what we chance to get (यत्कृतमस्तु ॥ यन्मतेऽस्ति ॥). It is enough to remark, in connection with this ideal, that, if it were approved by the Hindus of the present age, we should never have heard so much and so long talk about the growing poverty of the people, about the revival and improvement of the industries of the country, about the need of technical and scientific education, about political principles, and so on.

A third ideal of the Gita is said to be that we ought to treat equally, i. e., we ought not to recognize any sort of difference between a saint and a sinner, a learned gentleman and an ignorant wretch, just as we ought to look upon gold and stone and wood as alike. It should be observed, with reference to this ideal, that, though the social reformers are right in maintaining that all caste distinctions are bad, still the ignoring of the distinctions, indicated by this ideal, will not be a source of less danger and mischief than the existence of the caste system among us. And how can the pursuit of this ideal be consistent with the efforts for moral and educational reform?

Another ideal of the Gitakar is that we must feel pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, sorrow and joy alike (समदुःखसुखः ॥ द्वैतैःविमुक्तः सुखदुःख-संज्ञैः ॥). This, again, is equivalent to teaching that we ought to try to bring about such a state of mind as never to be affected by any of these feelings. Now, in order to estimate the value of this ideal, we must remember that to be incapable of all feelings of pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, is also to become incapable of realizing that others experience those feelings. And a man, who is not capable of being acutely stung by the miseries and evils caused to his fellow-beings,—men and women,—by bad customs and practices and unfortunate circumstances, cannot do anything to alleviate the misery and evil caused to his fellow-beings by reforming or abolishing bad customs, practices, &c., *i. e.*, cannot be a real reformer.

Similarly, if we are to strike a blow at ignorance and sin, we must hate these, and love their opposites, knowledge and virtue. But then the Gita teaches that we ought neither to hate nor to love anything (न द्वेष्टि संप्रवृत्तानि न निवृत्तानि कांक्षति ॥).

But perhaps the most important of these ideals of the Gita remains yet to be noticed. But then it is also most obstructive to all progress. For if there is one thing more than another, which prevents each and every reform-movement in India,—in whatever sphere of life,—from accomplishing much, it is *Indifference*,—indifference on the part both of the supporters of that movement as well as on the part of its opponents. And it is the life of indifference

brought together, and expressed in the form of one Sanskrit sentence, sticking to the language of the Gita as far as possible :—

इन्द्रियाणि विषयेषु रागद्वेषवियुक्तानि कृत्वा तानि च इन्द्रिया-
र्थेभ्यः सर्वशः निगृह्य, इच्छालोभक्रोधत्रयं रागं हर्षं सर्वपरित्रहं च
त्यक्त्वा, निर्वैद्वः निर्भयः निराशीः बाह्यस्पर्शेषु असक्तात्मा अन्तः-
सुखः अन्तर्ज्योतिः भूत्वा, अफलप्रेप्सुः मुक्तसंगः नियतं कर्म
कार्यं इत्येव कुरु ॥

Now, it is easy to see that each of the phrases, criticised above, very brief though they are, sums up, as was just said, the whole practical teaching of the Gita. For let the reader consider what the mental state of an agent (the doer of an act),—supposing such an agent to be possible,—will be, — an agent who has no attachment or aversion whatever for any beings or things, who has given up all desire for the fruit of his works, who has neither liking nor disliking for any work he does or has to do, who is quite indifferent to all the consequences of his works, who is totally insensible to all pleasure and pain, who has given up all belongings, and who has abandoned all desire and all hope. It must be plain that the mental state of the man, who acts under these conditions, —supposing he can act at all,—is accurately described by each of the phrases—उदासीन, यद्विच्छालोभसंतुष्ट, न द्वेष्टि संप्रवृत्तानि न निवृत्तानि कांक्षति, and so on. On the other hand, it is also clear that, if the ideal of उदासीनत्व, &c., is to be realized, then the man, who pursues this ideal, must observe all the injunctions about वृत्तेच्छाद्वेषः, &c., laid down in the Gita.

Further, it should be noticed that these two parts of the practical teaching of the Gita are a necessary consequence of another view of the Gita, which ought not to be over-looked. It is a fundamental part of the theory of the Gita that works, done with attachment and desire for fruit, are the source of the bondage of Atma to a body (बन्धन). Thus the present bondage of any given embodied Atma is due to works done during previous embodied states with attachment and desire for fruit. It is also a fundamental part of the theory of the Gita that each man, now living, is born with a particular nature (स्वभाव), which nature is a result of works done by him during previous embodied states; and that, on account of this nature, it is unavoidable that the man should have to do certain works,—that is, the works which are the duties of the caste to which he belongs, in addition, of course, to the works which ought to be done by men of all castes. Thus we read:—Bound by your office (*i. e.*, your duty as a Kshatriya or warrior), which springs from your own nature, O son of Kunti, that, which you do not wish to do through delusion, you shall do even against your will.

The result of all this is that the present life, or bondage of Atma to a body, is due to Atma's attachment to, and desire for the fruit of, the works done by

(1) स्वभावजेन कौन्तेय निबद्धः स्येन कर्मणा । कर्तुं न इच्छसि यत् सोढात् करिष्यसि अवशः अपि तत् ॥ XVIII. 60.

is Prakriti in the previous life. For the same reason also it is subject to certain definite works being done by its Prakriti during this life. This retribution for works done in past life will not come to an end until all these works are done. So it will not do either to commit suicide or to try to give up works altogether. All these works, therefore, must be performed. But then we must also live this life, and allow all these works to be done in such a way as not to prepare a new bondage for the future ; i. e., we must live without attachment to, and desire for the fruit of, the works which are being performed by our Prakriti in this life. And hence are necessitated all those injunctions indicated by the name of the Karma-yoga or Buddhi-yoga or Bhakti-yoga.

It must, therefore, be admitted that all these portions of the practical teaching of the Gita are essentially connected with one another, and, are therefore, quite consistent. Hence the criticism, passed above against the ideals of the Gita, applies equally to all these portions of the Gitakar's teaching. And the point of that criticism is that the teaching of the Gita does not seem to support any of the movements for progress, which are at present carried on by the Hindus. This, however, does not enable us to come to any decision as to the absolute value of the practical teaching of the Gita. For it is just possible that all these movements are wrong, while the teaching of the Gita is right. All, therefore, that that criticism shows is that those, who wish to act up to the teaching of the Gita, must give up all these movements.

IV.

And here we must notice another difficulty in connection with the practical teaching of the Gita. This difficulty is that it is not possible to do any act under the conditions laid down in the Gita. As we saw in the previous section, the Gitakar insists that, in order to do our duties in conformity with the rules of the Karma yoga, we must fulfil the preliminary condition of casting off all feelings, passions, emotions, sentiments, and desires. Now, as psychology teaches, all the acts, which are performed by any human being, can be classified under four heads:— (1) Those acts which are purely physical; this class chiefly includes the movements of the body during sleep, and those bodily movements during waking life of which the man is not even conscious. Evidently these acts cannot properly be called the acts of the man any more than the movements of his hair can be so-called. (2) Instinctive acts; this class includes such acts of new-born babes and little infants as sucking, spitting out, clasping an object which touches the fingers, carrying to the mouth an object when grasped, crying at bodily dis-comfort, &c. But all these instinctive acts belong to very early age, and do not survive infancy. (3) Impulsive or sentimental acts; this class includes such acts as are due to some temporary yet strong agitation or disturbance of our normal mental condition, such as extreme pain or joy, sudden calamity, rage, terror, &c. (4) Deliberative acts, *i. e.*, those which are consciously performed as means to some chosen ends.

Now it is clear that the acts, called impulsive, cannot survive the rooting out of all feeling, passion,

and emotion,—which are the source of these acts. So the only point, which remains to be considered, refers to the class of deliberative acts, it being borne in mind that the acts, known as habitual acts, must be included in the class of deliberative acts out of which they arise. Now the acts, which are called deliberative, fall under two groups :—(a) those which are done as means to the good of other human beings than the doer ; (b) those which are done as means to the doer's own good. The former group consists of what are ordinarily known as charitable acts. Now such acts either aim at teaching others their duty, or at making them happy,—by way of removing their pain or giving them pleasure. But it is easy to see that those acts, which aim at making others happy, are apparently prohibited under the Gitakar's teaching about indifference to pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, &c. So the only charitable acts, that are so far left to be performed, are confined to teaching the ignorant their duty,—or rather teaching them the lessons to be learnt from the Gita, and persuading them to live according to those lessons.¹

Turning, for the moment, to the other group of deliberative acts, i. e., those which are performed as means to the doer's own good, such as the acquisition of wealth, health, knowledge, &c., we find that all these acts are prohibited under the Gitakar's strict teaching about giving up all desire for the fruit of works. For since, in acts like these, the chief

(¹) यः इदं परमं गुह्यं मत्-भक्तेषु अभिधास्यति । भक्तिं मयि परां कृत्वा मां एव एष्यति असंशयः ॥ XVIII, 68.

motive is the doer's own good, if the desire for that good is deliberately and consciously given up, then these acts will never be performed,—only we must remember that to *forget* the end, and to *abandon* it, are two quite different things. If, however, we remember that this group of deliberative acts includes the acts of eating and drinking; and that, therefore, with the giving up of the desire for the fruit of acts, the acts of eating and drinking must cease; if we remember this, we shall see that the maximum period, left for performing the only charitable work allowable under the teaching of the Gita, is that during which a man can live without food or drink.

But here we must remember the Gītākar's precept about giving up all desire. For this piece of advice would make impossible even the purely charitable work of teaching the Gita to our ignorant fellow-beings, which might have been supposed to survive all फलेच्छात्याग. For, if we consciously and deliberately give up all desire, and hence the desire to do acts for the good of others,—whatever that good may mean,—no charitable acts will be possible for us.

Chapter V

From the Gita to the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, and the yoga.

I.

From the considerations put forth in the last chapter, it seems to be a necessary conclusion that the practical teaching of the Gita does not support any of the various movements carried on (e. g.) for the political, social, industrial regeneration of the Indian society. If, on the other hand, we resolve to give up all those movements and henceforth to act up to the teaching of the Gita, we seem to find that, though the Gita insists on our doing our duty, still the way in which it requires us to do them seems to render the performance of any act whatever simply impossible. It may be said, therefore, that even supposing that the above mentioned movements are wrong and the teaching of the Gita is right, still, if the practical teaching of the Gita is thus self-contradictory, it must necessarily follow that at last the whole of it cannot be right. But, before accepting this criticism as valid, we must take into consideration one of the pre-suppositions on which the practical teaching of the Gita is based, and reconsider it in the light of that pre-supposition. (Leaving however, this consideration to later) chapter, let us point out another objection to which the practical teaching of the Gita seems to be open.

As was said above, the practical teaching of the Gita seems to be self-contradictory. For one part of it insists upon doing one's duties, while the rest of that teaching insists upon bringing about such a state of mind as would make the performance of any action whatever impossible. So the question naturally arises, —which of these two mutually contradictory parts of the practical teaching of the Gita should be accepted?

Now, the first thing to be noticed with reference to this question is that the second of the two parts, just mentioned, of the practical teaching of the Gita leads to asceticism. In other words, the state of mind, described above in detail, with which, according to the Gita, we must do our duties, can best be attained by resorting to asceticism. For though, as the Gita says, it is true that :—No man can attain to freedom from work merely by not undertaking works, nor can he obtain the perfect state by merely renouncing them : for the man who, restraining the organs of action, remains inactive, but yet a man, confused in soul, is called a hypocrite² :—though this is true, yet it seems that, unless there be any special reason for continuing to engage in any class of works, the abandonment of the practice of

(1) See above, p. 69.

(²) न कर्मणां अनारंभात् नैककर्म्यं पुरुषः अश्नुते । न च संन्यसनात् एव सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति ॥ कर्मेन्द्रियाणि संन्यस्य यः आस्ते मनसा स्मरन् । इंद्रियाणि विमूढात्मा मिथ्याचारः सः उच्यते ॥ III. 4, 6.

such means will be the surest method of freeing the mind from the contemplation of the objects to which these words refer. For suppose that a man is addicted to drinking liquor. Is it not the best method of getting rid of this bad habit first to cease to drink liquor through the desire to drink it any more? Is it not also a step in the same direction to keep away from objects and places which may remind him of liquor? Is it not also a further step in the same direction to keep himself engaged in something else at the time when the usual hour of drinking liquor comes? Similarly, if it be required to cast off all liking and disliking for objects, and to eradicate all desire, anger, pride, affection, hate, joy, sorrow, attachment, and hope, &c., is it not a step in the proper direction first to give up the corresponding practices? Is it not another step in the same direction to keep away from beings and things which foster these mental states? And is it not a further step in the same direction to keep our attention concentrated on something else in order to divert it from these objects and mental states?

It would thus seem that the best method of bringing about the mental state required by a large portion of the Gita's practical teaching, is to give up all works and acts which are referable to these mental states, and to keep away from all things and beings the contact with which causes them, i.e., to leave society, to reside in a desert, and then to concentrate all attention on some thing or being which will cause us to forget all these objects and all the feelings produced by their contact and memory. And what else can this thing or being be on which to concentrate our attention but Atma? For this can

centration of all attention on Atma will be of use, not only for acquiring freedom from attachment, &c., but also for attaining the mental state of a man who is happy in himself, who finds light in himself, and who is contented with himself alone (अंतःसुखः अंतर्ज्योतिः आत्मनि एव आत्मना तुष्टः ॥). And is all this anything else than the Indian asceticism (वैराग्य) pure and simple?

II.

It seems, therefore, that, not only is the practice of the Karma-yoga meant for preparing a man for living the life of वैराग्य, but a resort to वैराग्य would be the best way of attaining the very mental state with which the Karma-yoga is to be practised? Why then not take this short cut? Why should a man be required to pass through the intermediate stage of sansar or the Grihastha-ashrama? Let us just consider if the Gita puts forth any convincing reasons, which require the performance of works. One reason, which the Gita puts forth to show the necessity of performing works, is as follows:—When the Creator had created mankind together with sacrifice, he said to man:—This is the means of your prosperity, be this the source of the attainment of your desires. You should propitiate the Gods with sacrifice, and the Gods will satisfy you. Thus satisfying each other, you will obtain the highest good. For the Gods, satisfied with sacrifice, will supply you with the objects of your desire. He, who enjoys things, which are given to him by the Gods, without offering to them in return, is a thief. All creatures live by food. food is produced by rain, rain is caused by sacrifice, and sacrifice is the result of

works. He, therefore, who does not contribute to the revulsion of this appointed cycle here below, such a man, in living in sin and for gratifying the senses, lives in vain.

It should be remembered, however, that these works are prescribed as a means for the attainment of the fruit resulting from them. Hence, because all desire for the fruit of works is to be altogether given up, these works also, coming under the category of what are called *कर्मव्ययम्*, must be given up. Besides, these works are to be done in reference to the individual finite deities. And, according to the Gītākar, the world of these deities is very *superficial*. This reason there-

(¹) महर्षयः प्रजाः सृजन् पुनराव प्रजावतिः । अननं प्रवृत्ति-

पार एषः नः भवन् दृष्टव्यम् ॥ देवान् भावयन् अननं ते
देवाः भावयन्तु यः । परस्परं भावयन्तः धेयः पर ब्रह्मण्यथ ॥
इदं न मेमार्गं विदुः देवाः दाम्पत्ये यजमानिनः । नैःशतान्
अप्रदाय एन्यः नः भुङ्क्ते स्तेनः एव सः ॥ III. 10-12 :
अस्मात् भवन्ति भूतानि पर्जन्यात् अप्रभवंतः । यमात् भवति
पर्जन्यः सतः कर्मणमुद्भवः ॥ III. 11 : एव प्रवर्तितं यज्ञं न
अनुवर्तयति इह यः । आपातुः इंद्रियाश्रमः मोघं पापे नः
जीवति ॥ III. 15.

(²) प्रसूयन्निषयाः वेदाः निर्धनस्यः प्रज्जेन ॥ II. 15.

(³) ये' अपि अन्यदेवताभक्ताः यजन्ते ब्रह्मदान्विताः ।
ते अपि मा एव कीर्तेय यजन्ति अविधिपूर्वकम् ॥ IX. 23 :
अव्यक्तं व्याप्तं, आपन्नं मय्यन्ते मा अपुद्भवाः । परं भागं अजा-
नन्तः मम अज्यं अनुत्तमम् ॥ VII. 21 ; अंतवत् तु फलं

fore, is inconsistent with the general teaching about the Karma-yoga, and, therefore, is not convincing.

Another argument of the Gita to show the necessity of doing works is an appeal to the past :—Works were done by men of old, who sought for final deliverance. You should, therefore, engage in works as it was done in past time by men who lived before¹ you. But, then, it may be said that, just as some men in the past performed works with the hope and expectation of thereby attaining final deliverance, in the same way, others have given up all works with the same hope. Why, then, follow the example of the former only?

A third argument of the Gita is that Janaka and others attained Mukti by means of the performance of² works. This cannot, however, mean that Janaka and others attained Mukti directly by means of the performance of works, but only indirectly through the purification of their souls, to which the practice of the Karma-yoga contributes. And this is the reason why, as we learn from the Gita, even sages perform works

तेषां तत् भवति अल्पमेधसाम् । देवान् देवयजःयान्ति मत्-भक्ताः
यान्ति मां अपि ॥ VII. 23 ; अनन्याः चिन्तयन्तः मां
ये जनाः पर्युपासते । तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां योगक्षेमं वहामि
अहम् ॥ IX. 22.

(¹) एवं ज्ञात्वा कृतं कर्म पूर्वैः अपि मुमुक्षुभिः । कुरु कर्म
एव तस्मात् त्वं पूर्वैः पूर्वतरं कृतम् ॥ IV. 15.

(²) कर्मणा एव हि संसिद्धिं आस्थिताः जनकादयः ॥ III 20.

for the purification of their souls. But the purification of the soul means its freedom from desire, attachment, hate, &c. And we have seen above how that purification can be attained by means of the abandonment of works (कर्मत्याग) also.

Another argument of the Gita in this connection is:—That you ought to perform works from regard to the masses of mankind, &c., in order to set them a good example. For, says the Gita, whoever is done by a man who is high in position, that other men do, whatever it may be; whatever example he offers, the people follow it. But, then, before we do anything as an example to be imitated by the masses of our fellow-beings, it is necessary first to be convinced that the example we are setting to them is a good one; &c. in the present case it must previously be proved that the performance of works is the proper thing.

Thus it would seem that none of these arguments, to be found in the Gita for showing the necessity of performing works, is convincing. But one more

(1) कायेन मनसा बुद्ध्या चेन्द्रियैः अपि । योगिनः कर्म कुर्वन्ति संगं त्यक्त्वा आत्ममुद्ध्ये ॥ V. 11.

(2) कर्म त्यागः प (108) ॥

(3) लोकसमष्ट एव अपि संगः यन् यन् अदंति ॥ III. 20

(4) यन् यन् आचरति श्रेष्ठः तत् तत् एव इतरः जनः । सः यत् प्रमाणं कुर्ये लोकः तत् अनुवर्तते ॥ III. 21,

argument remains, which must now be taken into account. That argument is that the talk about renouncing work is altogether foolish and vain. For the renouncement of all work is impossible to man. So long as he lives, he will be forced to perform works even against his will. For, says the Gita, it is not possible for any embodied soul to abstain from work absolutely.¹ Similarly it is said, in another place in the Gita, that no man ever continues to cease from action even for a moment; since every one is compelled by the *gunas* of his Prakriti to act independently of his will.² And suppose that a man refuses to act altogether. What will be the result? Simply this,—by ceasing to work, he will cease to live. For, as the Gita says, even the means of subsistence of the body cannot be gained by a man if he remains altogether inactive.³ Now this, of course, cannot be denied. No man can live without eating or drinking; and to eat or to drink is to perform action. But, then, because we have to admit this, it does not necessarily follow that we must do all the works which we have to do by living in the sansar-state. Since the performance of works is the source of bondage, and yet, as the Gita points out, since we must do some works for the main-

(¹) न हि देहभृता शक्यं त्यक्तुं कर्माणि अशेषतः ।
XVIII. 11.

(²) न हि कश्चित् क्षणं अपि जातु तिष्ठति अकर्मकृत् ।
कार्यते हि अवशः कर्म सर्वः प्रकृतिजैः गुणैः ॥ III. 5.

(³) शरीरयात्रा अपि च ते न प्रसिद्ध्येत् अकर्मणः ॥ III 8.

tenance of life, therefore, we should do only such works as are necessary for maintaining life, and renounce all others. But here comes in the supplementary argument of the Gita; i.e., that it is inevitable for man not only to perform such works as are necessary for maintaining life, but such other works as specially belong to his caste).

But this argument evidently gives rise to a dilemma. For, if the argument is true, then fatalism is the consequence; and, therefore, it renders unnecessary and superfluous all advice, including that of the Gita about the obligation of doing works. But, if it is untrue, then there is no convincing argument in the Gita, which shows the necessity of doing works. Evidently, however, the argument is *not* true. And, hence, the conclusion must be that the Gītākar's teaching, contained in passages like,—do your appointed works,—is not supported by any sound or convincing argument to be found in the Gita. It should be noticed, however, that all that this proves is, not that the precept about doing works is wrong; but simply that we find nothing in the Gita itself which necessitates and thus justifies it.*

Supposing, then, that the previously mentioned contradiction exists in the two parts of the teaching of the Gita, the question as to the value of asceticism as a method of life becomes important in order to

(1) स्वभावेन कर्तव्य निबद्धः स्येन कर्मणा । कर्तुं न
 दृष्टमि यन् मोहान् कारयिमि भवतः अपि तत् ॥ XVIII.
 66.

decide the question stated above, namely, which of the two mutually contradictory parts of the practical teaching of the Gita should be accepted. In order, however, to estimate the value of Asceticism on its practical side, it is necessary first to study and consider the philosophical theory on which Asceticism, that is, the Indian Asceticism (वैराग्य) is founded. For all Asceticism, even as a form of practical life, is originally based upon a theory of philosophy. A human being is born in the family or society, i. e. in the sansar-state, and the natural tendency is to continue to be in that state. Reflection and philosophical thought, therefore, must have far advanced before the necessity of renouncing the sansar-state is first felt in any nation. But, whether this general proposition be true or not, it is a fact that Asceticism, as it exists in India, is, as a matter of fact, founded upon particular philosophical systems, well-known as the Vedanta as expounded by Shankar, the Sankhya as ascribed to Kapila, and the Yoga of Patanjali. And, therefore, as was said above, in order to estimate the value of the Indian Asceticism as a form of life, it is necessary first to study, and consider the value of, these philosophical systems, on which it is based. This consideration will also help us to estimate the value of the philosophical aspect of the teaching of the Gita.

And, for this reason, is given, in the following six chapters, a brief sketch of each of these three systems of the Indian Philosophy.



Chapter VI.

The Vedānta as expounded by Shankar.

I.

The Vedānta philosophy, as expounded by Shankar, starts with the assumption that the subject (Vishayi or Atma) and the object (Vishaya or whatever is not Atma) are absolutely distinct from each other. To quote the words of Shankar:—It¹ is a proved and established fact that Vishayi (*i. e.*, the subject) and Vishaya (*i. e.*, the object) are, in their very nature, absolutely opposed to each other, like darkness and light; and, therefore, the one can never be the other. Not only can one of these not be the other, but² even their characteristics can never be interchanged.

The necessary corollary of this assumption, of course, is :—that³ it is a mistake to

: (1) विषयविषयिणोः तमःप्रकाशवत् विरुद्धस्वभावयोः इतरे-
तरभावानुपपत्तिः सिद्धा ॥ (2) तद्वर्माणां अपि इतरेतरभावा-
नुपपत्तिः ॥ (3) इत्यतःविषयिणि विषयस्य तद्वर्माणां च
अध्यासः, तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणः तद्वर्माणां च विषये अध्यासः
मिथ्या ॥

regard the Vishayi as being, or as having the characteristics of, the Vishaya ; it is similarly a mistake, on the other hand, to regard the Vishaya as being, or as having the characteristics of, the Vishayi. But, though to do so is a mistake, it is only a too common mistake. For, in spite of this distinction¹ between Vishaya and Vishayi, it is a usual and natural practice on the part of man to say "this is I," "this is mine,"—which practice is due to wrong knowledge, and to the habit of regarding each of the Vishaya and Vishayi as being, and as having the characteristics of, the other. Further, it is this² mistake of regarding the one as being, or as having the characteristics of, the other,—which is natural, without beginning, and without end,—it is this mistake which is the source of the idea that Atma is an agent and enjoyer. The learned³ call this mistake of

(¹) तथापि अन्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यात्मकतां अन्योन्य-धर्मान् च अध्यस्य इतरेतर-अविवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः धर्म-धर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः...अहं इदं मम इदं इति नैसर्गिकः अयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥ (²) अयं अनादिः अनन्तः नैसर्गिकः अध्यासः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः ॥ (³) तं...अध्यासं पण्डिताः अविद्या इति मन्यन्ते । तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यां आहुः ॥

regarding the one as being, or as having the characteristics of, the other, Avidya (nescience); while the knowledge of the true nature of a thing or being, due to discrimination, is called Vidya.

But we cannot get rid of the habit of committing the above mistake merely by the study of the Vedas and the Shastras, or by living in conformity with the precepts contained in the Vedas and the Shastras, or customs in vogue; for all these¹ Vedas, Shastras, customs, &c. are based upon the presupposition of Avidya. There is only one² way of getting rid of this Avidya: and that is the study of the Vedānta, the subject-matter of which is the true knowledge of Atma, and the object of which is to put a stop to this mischievous Avidya,—of course, of those who will study it. Thus, the most important thing, which we must know and which we can know only by studying the

(¹) तं एतं अविद्यामयं आत्म-भनात्मनोः इतरेतर-अध्यासं
पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाण-प्रमेयव्यवहाराः लौकिकाः वैदिकाः च
प्रवृत्ताः सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि ॥

(²) अस्य अनर्घहेतोः प्रहाणाय, आत्मैकविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे
वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते ॥

Vedanta, is the true nature of our Atma. And the question, to get an answer to which we study the Vedanta, is. What is the nature of Atma ?

II.

We may here stop just to notice that, in the above account, the whole existence is supposed to be divided into two parts :— Atma, on the one hand, and Anatma or what is not Atma, on the other,—the former being called Vishayi, the latter Vishaya ; further, Atma or Vishayi is regarded as absolutely opposed to Anatma or Vishaya ; we are also told that all ideas on the part of Atma about its being an individual (अहंकार), a possessor (समत्व), an agent (कर्तृत्व), and an enjoyer (भोक्तृत्व), are due to Avidya ; that this Avidya is without beginning, without end, and natural ; and that this Avidya can be put a stop to, in the case of each particular man, by his study of the Vedanta philosophy, and by *that alone*, the object of which is to teach us the nature of Atma.

Let us then inquire—what is the nature of Atma ? The answer, which the Vedanta philosophy gives to this question, is contained in the brief, well-known formula—

thou art that (तत् त्वं असि), which is also expressed by—I am Brahman (अहं ब्रह्म अस्मि), or Atma is nothing but Brahman (आत्मा ब्रह्म एव). Thus we learn, from the Vedānta, that Atma, which is absolutely opposed to everything that is not Atma, is identical with Brahman. And, therefore, the question,—what is the true nature (स्वरूप) of Atma?—now changes into the question,—what is the true nature (स्वरूप) of Brahman?

What, then, is Brahman? This question is answered by such passages in the Vedānta as the following:—Brahman is absolutely without any difference (समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्विकल्पकं एव ब्रह्म), Brahman is absolutely without any attribute (सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितं ब्रह्म निर्गुणं ब्रह्म), Brahman is absolutely unchangeable (कूटस्थ). From such passages we get what may be called the negative definition of Brahman. All that we learn from them is that Brahman is such that whatever quality, attribute, or property can be named or thought of, is to be denied of Brahman. The only words, therefore, which can define this characteristic of Brahman, are—it is not this, it is not that, &c. (नेति नेति). The only positive characteristic of Brahman, we get so far, is that Brahman is. We further learn that

But this statement of the nature of Brahma raises a difficulty. We were told before that Brahma is absolutely without any quality (निगुण),—which implies that, among other things, Brahma is without any activity. But, if Brahma is without any activity, how can it be the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world? The difficulty is increased when we further learn that Brahma is, not only the efficient cause of the world, but also the material cause (प्रकृति) of the world. In other words, the statement, that Brahma creates and destroys the world, means that Brahma becomes the world and reabsorbs it into itself. This view is necessitated by one of the fundamental principles of the Indian philosophy, *i. e.*, that an effect is identical with its cause. As was said just now, this view of Brahma becoming the world, increases the difficulty; because we were previously told that Brahma is absolutely without any change (कूटस्थ or विकाररहित), but now we are asked to believe that Brahma modifies itself into the world in which we find ourselves.

But this last phrase,—the world in which we find ourselves,—reminds us of a new difficulty. We are engaged in this

inquiry about the nature of Brahma, because our original object is to know the nature of Atma, which belongs to each human being ; and when we took up the Vedānta in order to acquire the knowledge of the nature of Atma, we were told that Atma is nothing but Brahma. And now we get two, at least apparently, inconsistent definitions of Brahma ;—one being that Brahma is that whose nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom (नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं), and the other that Brahma is the omniscient and omnipotent creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world (सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्ति-स्थितलयकारणम्). But, if we look into ourselves, we find that none of us is Brahma either according to the one definition or according to the other. None of us is Brahma according to the former definition, because every one of us is born and dies ; undergoes childhood, youth, old age ; is now rich now poor ; is now sick now healthy ; has wife, children, relatives, friends, enemies, and loses them ; is now happy now miserable ; has desires, feelings ; is an agent ; has sleep, dreams, and wakefulness. That none of us is Brahma according to the second of the above definitions of that term,

need not be mentioned. For what man, if only he is in his senses, can say that he is all-knowing and all-powerful?

III.

Now, the Vedānta philosophy is able to answer all these difficulties, and to vindicate itself, against all objections that might be founded upon them, at one single stroke of far-reaching consequences. And all these difficulties and objections will be seen to have vanished as soon as we are introduced to a new idea of the Vedānta, known as *Maya*.

Now what is *Maya*? The answer, which the Vedānta gives to this question, is that *Maya*,—which is without beginning and without end,—is that, on account of which or by means of which, *Brahma*, whose nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, becomes the omniscient and omnipotent creator, &c., of the world; *Maya* is again that, on account of which or by means of which, the *Atma* of man becomes ignorant of its true nature,—which is simply *Brahma* whose nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom,—and mistakenly assumes itself to be, or to have the characteristics of, that

which is not Atma ; Maya is further that, by means of which or on account of which, Brahma, which is pure and absolute unity without any difference whatever, comes to be full of multiplicity, division, and difference ; Maya is also that, by means of which or on account of which, the Atma of man perceives multiplicity, division, distinction and form, where there is none.

Thus, apart from Maya, Brahma—with its nature of eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom (नित्यशुद्धसुक्तबुद्धस्वभावंब्रह्म)—alone exists, and nothing else exists,—what we call the Atma of each man being nothing but this Brahma. But now introduce the idea of Maya ; and this Brahma is at once seen to be the all-knowing and all-powerful cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe ; and we have immediately before us the whole universe in the midst of which we find ourselves just now, and men leading their lives as they do now.

So, then, when we are taught by the Vedanta that Atma is nothing else but Brahma, what we ought to understand is that Atma, which is truly identical with Brahma, is eternal purity, intelligence and

freedom (नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव). And a man must realise this in order to get rid of all struggle and misery.

IV.

In order to complete this account, one more point must be borne in mind. We have just seen that, though Maya is, from the general point of view, beginningless and endless, still in reality, in the case of each man, it is to come to an end, to be annihilated. Now one of the fundamental principles of the Indian philosophy is, that what is real never comes to an end, and what is unreal never exists (न असतः चिद्यते भावः न अभावः चिद्यते सतः). Now the converse of the first part of this principle is, that what is to come to an end, cannot be said to have reality even before it comes to an end. Applying this principle to the case of Maya, we see that Maya, which must come to an end, as man is to know himself as identical with Brahma, is itself unreal; and, therefore, whatever is due to this nonentity also must be unreal; nor can anything, which is simply nought, can affect anything. So the original nature of Brahma and Atma, which

are identical with each other, remains exactly as it originally was absolutely unaffected by Maya during the Avidya (अविद्या) state; while all that comes into existence on account of Maya, that is, this world with all its multiplicity, form, and difference, as well as the individuality of the human soul, so also the all-powerfulness, all-knowingness, and causality of Brahma,—all this is simply unreal, both because it is due to something, *i. e.*, Maya, which is itself unreal, and also because it is to vanish at the attainment of true self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान), and therefore, by the principle mentioned above, it cannot be real even now.

And thus we get the whole philosophy of Shankar contained in the well-known single line,—ब्रह्म सत्यं जगत् मिथ्या आत्मा ब्रह्म एव न अपरः ॥—which means that Brahma alone is real, the world is unreal, Atma is Brahma and nothing else.

Before closing this chapter, we must introduce, and explain the meaning of, a term which is constantly to be met with in the Vedanta of Shankar. This term is Upadhi (उपाधि),—which is translated into English by the phrase “limiting adjuncts”. It means

that power or organ with which Atma is connected, or with which Atma is in bondage,—and, by means of which or on account of which, Atma perceives multiplicity and difference where there is nothing but Brahman, and mistakenly assumes itself to be, or to have the characteristics of, that which is not Atma. To illustrate this, a few passages from the Vedānta may be quoted :—(a) The unmodified¹ Brahman is what is known as the individual soul,—the difference between the attributes of the two is due to the limiting adjuncts. (b) The unmodified² highest Brahman, owing to its contact with the limiting adjuncts, appears as the individual soul. (c) As long³ as its connection with the limiting adjuncts lasts, so long the individual soul remains individual soul, implicated in the *samsār*⁴ (संसार) state. Moreover, as the connection of Atma with the limiting adjuncts is due to wrong

(¹) अविवृतस्य एव प्रक्षणः जीवभावाभ्युपगमात् लक्षण-
भेदः अपि अनयोः उपाधिनिमित्तः एव ॥ II. 3, 17. (²)
पर एव भेदः अविवृतं उपाधिसपर्कात् जीवभावेन अतिष्ठने ॥
II. 3.18. (³) यावत् अयं उपाधिसम्बन्धः तावत् जीवस्य
जीवत्वं समारित्वं च ।...अपि च मिथ्याज्ञानपुरःसरः अयं
आत्मनः ...उपाधिसंबन्धः । न च मिथ्याज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धज्ञानात्

knowledge, and wrong knowledge cannot be brought to an end except by the attainment of real knowledge ; hence, so long as the knowledge of Brahma being identical with Atma is not attained, the connection of Aama with the limiting adjuncts will not cease. (d) Atma¹ undergoes the state of being an enjoyer, &c., only on account of its contact with the limiting adjuncts. (e) The agentship² of Atma is solely due to the limiting adjuncts.

Now this Upadhi, to which the human Atma is subject, is, in its widest sense, the whole man including everything except³ Atma. In a narrower sense, Upadhi, so far as cognition is concerned, is made up by the five senses of knowledge, Manas (मनः) and Buddhi (बुद्धिः). And, in a still narrower sense,

अन्यत्र निवृत्तिः अस्ति इत्यतः यावत् ब्रह्मात्मता-अनवबोधः तावत् अयं..उपाधिसंबन्धः न शाम्यति ॥ II. 3, 30.

(¹) उपाधिसंपृक्तस्य एव आत्मनः भोक्तृत्वादि-विशेषलाभः ॥ II. 3, 40. (²) कर्तृत्वं अपि आत्मनः उपाधिनिमित्तं एव ॥ II. 3, 40. (³) In this sense, Upadhi of Shankar is exactly the same as Prakriti (प्रकृति), in the wider sense, of the

Upādhi is represented by Buddhi alone, or Manas alone. Thus says Śhankar :—The internal¹ organ (*i. e.*, Upādhi) is called Manas (मनः) when it is in the state of doubt, Buddhi (बुद्धिः) when it is in the state of decision and the like.

So, we have to remember the three terms, —Maya, Upādhi and Avidya. The difference between them may be briefly stated by saying that the subjection of Atma to Upādhi is due to Maya ; while during the state of this subjection, the human Atma is liable to be subject to Avidya, and thus to commit the mistake of regarding itself as being, and having the characteristics of, what is Anatta (*i. e.*, Upādhi in the widest sense).

Gītakar. (1) क्वचिन् च...मंदयादिशक्तिं मनःश्रुति
उच्यते निधयादिशक्तिं बुद्धिः इति ॥ 11. 3. 32.

Chapter VII.

Shankar's Answers to Objections.

I.

As explained in the last chapter, Shankar holds that the Atma of every human being is essentially eternal (unborn and unchangeable), pure, free, and intelligent (नित्यशुद्धमुक्तबुद्धस्वभाव). As to the difficulty, -if Atma is essentially of this nature, how is it good and evil, how does it experience pleasure and pain, how is it born, how does it grow, decay and die? the answer of Shankar, as we saw, is that all this is due to the connection of Atma with the body, the senses, and the other limiting adjuncts (उपाधि); while the connection of Atma with these adjuncts, as we also saw, is simply due to Maya, which is itself unreal. So, really nothing happens to Atma, which is ever in its original state, i. e., identical with Brahma as defined above.

Now, Shankar maintains that Atma, like Brahma, is essentially intelligent (जीवस्य अपि नित्यचैतन्यस्वरूपत्वं !), and that the essence of a thing never changes (स्वरूपस्य अनप्ययि-

त्वात् । III. 2, 7). To this it may be objected that this view is not consistent with the state of dreamless sleep, during which Atma does not know anything. Shankar answers that Atma is not conscious during¹ sleep of anything that it knows during waking life, not because it ceases to be intelligent, but simply because it ceases to be in contact with the senses and the other limiting adjuncts,—which are Atma's instruments of knowing things in this world,—and, therefore, these things cease to be the objects of Atma's knowledge during sleep. And so far from ceasing to be intelligent during what we call dreamless sleep, Atma knows itself to be identical with Brahma during the state of dreamless sleep. In other words, during this state, Atma is in the same state in which it will be when it has annihilated its Maya through the attainment of self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान). To quote his own words :—During² sleep Atma abides in Brahma. But even when Shankar says that,

(¹) यत् तु सुप्तादयः न चेतयन्ते इति विषय-अभावात् इयं अचेतयमानता न चैतन्य-अभावात् ॥ II. 3, 18. (²) सुषुप्तौ ब्राम्हणि एव अवतिष्ठते ॥ III. 2, 7.

in deep sleep, Atma¹ abides in Brahma, i.e. does not mean thereby that there is a difference between the abode (i. e., Brahma) and that which abides (i. e., Atma); but that there is absolute identity of the two, i.e., that, during sleep, Atma abides in Brahma means that Atma becomes Brahma during sleep. And this is another reason² why, during the state of sleep, Atma is not conscious of anything.

And, as Shankar further explains, there is nothing strange or extraordinary in this view, namely, that during sleep Atma becomes Brahma. It is simply the Vedanta doctrine that Atma is, and is ever, Brahma. So, what is meant is, not that Atma is not Brahma during the waking and dreaming life, and becomes Brahma in sleep; but that Atma is Brahma always, during waking and dreaming life no less than in sleep. But during waking and dreaming life, being in contact with the limiting adjuncts, which are due to Maya, Atma remains ignorant of

(¹) मय-आधारत्वं अपि अस्य सुषुप्ते नैव आधारधेय-
भेदनिशेधेन उच्यते । कथं तर्हि साक्षात्प्राप्तिशेधेन ॥ III 2, 7.

(²) तत्र सति संशयः सावन् तदेकत्वात् न विजानाति ॥ III. 2, 7.

its real nature ; while, in sleep, being free from the effects of Maya, it knows its true nature. In the words of Shankar :—It¹ cannot be said that Atma is at any time not united (*i. e.*, one) with Brahma ; for its true nature (which is identical with that of Brahma) can never change. But, if it be metaphorically said that, in the waking and dreaming states, Atma, owing to its contact with the limiting adjuncts, changes into something else, then it may also be said that, when the contact with those adjuncts ceases in deep sleep, it passes back into its true nature.

And² this view, that Brahma is the abode of Atma in the state of deep sleep, is not only consistent with the theory, that Atma is nothing but Brahma (आत्मा ब्रह्मैव नापरः), but it further shows that Atma is essen-

(¹) न कदाचित् जीवस्य ब्रह्मणा संपत्तिः नास्ति स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात् । स्वप्नजागरितयोः तु उपाधिसंपर्कवशात् पर-
रूपापत्तिं इव आपेक्ष्य तदुपशमात् सुषुप्तेः स्वरूपापत्तिः वक्ष्यते ॥
III. 2, 7. (²) तेन तु विज्ञानेन प्रयोजनं अस्ति,
जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्व-अवधारणं स्वप्नजागरितव्यवहारविमुक्तत्व-
अवधारणं च ॥

tially non-connected with the world of which it becomes aware during waking and dreaming life.

II

Just as Atma becomes aware of this world and everything included in it on account of its connection with the limiting adjuncts, similarly Atma, though it neither acts nor enjoys or suffers, thinks that it acts and enjoys or suffers, on account of its connection with these same adjuncts. Thus says Shankar :—The¹ sansar (संसार) state, which consists in being subject to action and enjoyment or suffering and which is ascribed to Atma that neither acts nor enjoys or suffers, is altogether due to Atma being wrongly considered to have the characteristics of Buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts.

It should be observed that² this non-agency (अकर्तृत्व) of Atma is a necessary con-

(¹) बुद्धि-उपाधिधर्म-अध्यासनिमित्तं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादि-
लक्षणं संसारित्वं भर्तुः अभोक्तुः च असंनारिणः आत्मनः ॥
II 3, 29. (²) न स्वाभाविकं कर्तृत्वं आत्मनः संभवति
अनिर्माक्षप्रसंगात् ॥ II. 3, 40.

sequence as well as requirement of the Vedanta philosophy. For, if Atma were an agent (कर्त्ता) by nature, then its nature, as an agent, could never cease, and, therefore, Mukti would be absolutely impossible. Nor can Atma become really an agent during the state of Maya ; for, as we saw, the nature of a thing, and therefore the nature of Atma, is unchangeable and is ever the same. Atma, therefore, really remains non-agent (अकर्त्ता) even during the sansar (संसार) state ; but wrongly thinks itself to be an agent, while under the influence of Maya. Thus, we read:—The agentship¹ of Atma is solely due to the attributes of its adjuncts (उपाधि) being wrongly ascribed to it, and does not form part of its nature. But the connection of Atma with the adjuncts as well as the wrong ascription is due to Maya (मिथ्या-ज्ञानपुरःसरः अयं आत्मनः बुद्धि-उपाधिसंबन्धः ॥ II. 3, 30.) ; and, so, finally we learn² that the states of being an agent, and of enjoying and suffering are due solely to Maya.

(¹) उपाधिधर्म-अध्यासेन एव आत्मनः कर्त्तृत्वं न स्वाभाविकं ॥ II, 3. 40. (²) अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितत्वात् कर्त्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वयोः ॥ II. 3, 40.

But, then, an opponent may object,—if Atma is not an agent, how do Scripture and writings like the Gita enjoin works? Are they talking nonsense? Shankar answers this question in the negative. He says that none of these is useless or nonsensical, only their teaching to perform works must be assigned its proper place. For, so far as they teach this, they are meant only for the period during which man is under the influence of Maya, and lives as if he was an agent. In his own words:—The scriptural¹ injunctions, which prescribe certain works, assume the agentship of Atma established somehow, but do not themselves aim at establishing that agentship. Now, the agentship of Atma cannot be a part of its real nature, because Scripture teaches that its real nature is Brahma. The Vedic injunctions therefore, are operative with reference to that agentship of Atma which is due to Maya.

(¹) विधिशास्त्रं तावत् यथाप्राप्तं कर्तृत्वं उपादाय कर्तव्य-
विशेषं उपादिशति न कर्तृत्वं आत्मनः प्रातिपादयति । न च स्वाभा-
विकं अस्य कर्तृत्वं अस्ति ब्रह्मात्मत्व—उपदेशात् । तस्मात् अ-
विद्याकृतं कर्तृत्वं उपादाय विधिशास्त्रं प्रदर्शयते ॥ II. 3, 40.

But, then, it may be retorted, -does Shankar mean to assert that the Vedic injunctions are useless to one who has attained self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान)? No, is the answer, this is not what he means. What he means is that the Vedic injunctions were never meant for the man who has attained self-knowledge, and not that they become useless to him. Thus we read :—Injunctions¹ and prohibitions cannot be said to be purportless for him who has obtained perfect knowledge : for to such a man no obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with reference to things to be avoided or desired. How then should he, who is conscious of nothing but Atma, stand under any obligation ?

Are we, then, to understand Shankar to say that a man of perfect knowledge should act as he pleases? Not at all. For, as we saw, action is due to Maya. Now, if perfect

(¹) सम्प्रक्-दर्शिनः तर्हि अनुज्ञापरिहार-भानर्थक्यं प्राप्तं । न । तस्य कृत—अर्थत्वात् नियोज्यत्व—अनुपपत्तेः । हेयोपादेय-योः हि नियोज्यः नियोक्तव्यः स्यात् । आत्मनः तु अतिरिक्तं हेयं उपादेयं वा वस्तु अपश्यन् कथं नियुज्येत ॥ II. 3, 48.

knowledge is attained, then Maya must disappear ; so there can be no action possible to a man of perfect knowledge. How, then, can it be said that he is to act as he pleases ? As Shankar himself puts it :—It does¹ not follow, from the absence of any injunction or obligation for a man of perfect knowledge, that he is to act as he likes. For, in all cases, it is only Maya or Avidya that is the source of action. But that Avidya is absent in the case of the man who has attained perfect knowledge. How then can such a being act as he pleases , since he cannot act at all?

Since the agentship of Atma is due to its connection with the limiting adjuncts, sin and merit, which are the results of works which are attributed to Atma, are also consequent upon its connection with the adjuncts, and hence are the result of Maya. Further, it is not Atma that is born and grows, decays and dies and is born again. But it is the limiting adjuncts which undergo

(¹) न च ,नियोग-अभावात् सम्यग्दर्शिनः यथेष्टचेष्टाप्रसंगः॥ सर्वत्र अभिमानस्य एव प्रवर्तकत्वात् अभिमान—अभावात् च सम्यग्दर्शिनः ॥ II. 3, 48.

all these states; and it is simply through mistake, due to Maya, that they are imposed upon Atma. In the same way, the states of feeling, desire, &c., do not really belong to Atma, but to the limiting adjuncts, and are attributed to Atma through Maya or Avidya.

The conclusion, then, is that all the difference that we see between human Atma and Brahma, as defined in the last chapter, is simply due to the nature and attributes of the limiting adjuncts (उपाधि) being, wrongly through Avidya, imposed by Atma upon itself, which is ever,—absolutely unaffected by this mistake,—identical with Brahma. Hence says Shankar:—‘The pure¹, unmodified Brahma is what we call the individual soul; the difference between the attributes of both also is owing to the limiting adjuncts only. The same view is repeated in several other places. For instance, Shankar tells us that the unmodified² highest

(¹) अविकृतस्य एव ब्रम्हणः जीवभाव-अभ्युपगमात् ।
 उक्षणभेदः अपि अनयोः उपाधिनिमित्तः एव ॥ II. 3, 17.
 (²) परं एव ब्रम्ह अविकृतं उपाधिसंपर्कात् जीवभावेन अव-
 तिष्ठते ॥ II. 3, 18.

Brahma itself appears, owing to its contact with the limiting adjuncts, as the individual soul.

III.

One more objection, which may be raised and which Shankar tries to remove, is this :—If there is only one Atma, and that Atma is Brahma, how do so many individual souls come into being at the same time, and how are the feelings, &c., of each of these souls distinct from those of the rest ?

The first part of this objection, *i.e.*, about the plurality of souls, is explained by pointing out that the one Atma, *i. e.* Brahma, on account of its contact with various limiting adjuncts, looks as if it were a plurality. In the words of Shankar:—As the sun¹ appears multiplied, as it were, by its reflections in the water,—which constitutes its

(1) यथा...सवितृप्रभृतयः...उदकप्रभृतिषु..उपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषाः इव अवभासन्ते न च स्वाभाविकी. अविशेषात्मतां जहति । एवं उपाधिनिमित्तः एव अयं आत्मभेदः, स्वतः तु ऐक्यं एव ॥ III. 2, 25.

limiting adjunct,—while, in reality, it preserves its essential unity : so the distinction of different souls is due to the limiting adjuncts only, while the oneness of all souls is natural and original.

The other part of the objection, i. e., if Atma in all men is the same, why do not all souls feel in the same way? this objection also is answered by the analogy of the sun's reflections in water. For, says Shankar, the individual¹ soul is to be considered a mere appearance of the highest Atma (Brahma), like the reflection of the sun in water. It is neither directly Brahma nor a different being. Hence just as, when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not, on that account, tremble also : so, when one soul enjoys or suffers, another soul is not, on that account, similarly affected. But, since this suffering and enjoying as well as individual selfhood, are

(1) आत्मानः एव एवः जीवः परमस्य आत्मनः जलमूर्त्य-
कामिवत् प्रतिबिम्बवत् । न सः एव मायान् नायं परान्-भेदवत् ।
अन्येन वत्ता न परात्मनः जलमूर्त्यके यस्मात्तमे जलमूर्त्येच्छादरे
कल्पते । एव न एवमिव जीवे कर्मफलमवेष्टिते जीवान्तरस्य

both due to the limiting adjuncts, i.e., to the influence of Maya, therefore, at the removal of Maya, there results the cognition of the soul being in reality nothing but ¹ Brahma.

IV.

In the previous sections of this chapter we have seen how Shankar has anticipated and answered, in his own way, some of the objections which might be brought against his theory, so far as he maintains that the nature of the human soul is the same as that of Brahma. The general answer to all the objections being, that the soul of man, while under the influence of Maya, does not know its own nature, and mistakes the attributes of the limiting adjuncts (Upadhi) to be its own, and hence all the struggle and misery of man.

तद्वैश्वः ॥ II. 3, 50. (1) आमासस्य च अविद्याकृत-
त्वात् तदाश्रयस्य संसारस्य अविद्याकृतत्वउपपत्तिः तत्-
व्युदासेन च पारमार्थिकस्य ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य उपदेशोपपत्तिः ॥
II. 3, 50.

But now objections may be raised from the opposite point of view. It will be asked:—If Atma is identical with Brahma, but, on account of Maya, is beset with struggle and misery, does it not necessarily follow that Brahma also is, for the same reason, full of struggle and misery? Now Shankar admits at once that Brahma, being identical with Atma,—which is affected with Maya,—must also be affected with Maya. But, because Brahma is affected with Maya, as Atma is, is it also subject to struggle and misery as man is? That is a question which must be carefully considered.

Shankar himself states this objection in the following way:—If the individual¹ souls,—which are affected with Maya,—are related to Ishvar,—*i. e.*, Brahma affected with Maya,—as parts to the whole, does it not necessarily follow that Ishvar is beset

(¹) ननु जीवस्य ईश्वरांशत्वं-अभ्युपगमे तदीयेन संसार-दुःखोपभोगेन अंशिनः ईश्वरस्य अपि दुःखित्वं स्यात् । ततः च तत्प्राप्तानां महत्तरं दुःखं प्राप्नुयात् । अतः वरं पूर्वावस्थः संसारः एव अस्तु इति सम्यग्दर्शन-आनर्थक्यप्रसंगः स्यात् इति॥II.3,45.

with as much pain, misery, and struggle, as all the individual souls put together ; and that to attain the state of Ishvar by means of perfect knowledge, is to attain the state of one who is infinitely more miserable than any man ever is ? Is not, then, our present state of struggle and misery infinitely better than the state we can hope to attain by the study of the Vedānta, which promises to make each of us Brahma ?

The answer of Shankar to this objection is, that it is based upon a misunderstanding of the Vedānta doctrine. All that the Vedānta says is that, like the Atma of man, Brahma is affected with Maya ; and, just as Atma becomes an individual soul (जीव), so Brahma, on account of Maya, becomes Ishvar, —i. e., the omniscient and omnipotent creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. But, then, there is an infinite difference between Brahma as Ishvar, and Brahma or Atma as the individual soul (जीव). For the characteristic of Brahma as Ishvar is omnipotence and omniscience, in the ordinary sense of these words ; and, therefore, Brahma as Ishvar becomes also the creator, sustainer, ruler, and destroyer, of the

whole universe. Brahma as Ishvar is the personal God whom men worship, who rules over men's destinies, and distributes rewards and punishments to men according to the nature of works done by them during their previous life. All this is due to the omnipotence and omniscience of Ishvar. It is also, on account of the omniscience of Ishvar, that he never commits the mistake of wrongly regarding himself as being, or having the attributes and states of, the limiting adjuncts; and therefore he does not wrongly transfer to himself the qualities of agentship, enjoying and suffering,—which really belong to the limiting adjuncts. Therefore, though subject to Maya, Ishvar is free from all enjoying or suffering. But Brahma as the individual soul does not possess omnipotence and omniscience. Not only, therefore, is the individual soul subject to Maya in the same sense in which Brahma as Ishvar is, *i. e.*, in the sense of being in contact with the limiting adjuncts; but, further, not being omniscient, it commits the mistake of wrongly regarding itself as being, and having the attributes and states of, the limiting adjuncts, and thus makes itself the subject of pleasure and pain. To quote the

words of Shankar:—Ishvar does¹ not feel the pain of the sansar (संसार) state as the individual soul does. The individual soul, while engrossed by Avidya, identifies itself, as it were, with the body and the other limiting adjuncts, and imagines itself to be afflicted by the experience of pain,—which is thus due to Avidya and which really belongs to the Upadhi. Ishvar, on the other hand, (on account of his omniscience) neither wrongly identifies himself with the Upadhi nor, therefore, imagines himself to be afflicted by pain, &c. Besides, the pain experienced by the individual soul is not real, but due to Avidya and the consequent non-discrimination between itself and the Upadhi, which is itself due to Avidya. For these reasons there² is no ground to suppose that Brahma as Ishvar is affected by the pain to which the individual soul is liable.

(¹) यथा जीवः संसारदुःखं अनुभवति नैवं परः ईश्वरः अनुभवति इति प्रतिजानीमहे । जीवः हि अविद्यावेशवशात् देहादि-आत्मभावं द्रव्यं गत्वा तत्कृतेन दुःखेन दुःखी भवेति अविद्या-कृतं दुःखोपभोगं अभिमन्यते । न एवं परमेश्वरस्य देहादि-आत्मभावः दुःखाभिमानः वा अस्ति । जीवस्यापि अविद्याकृतं नाम-रूपनिवृत्तदेहेन्द्रियादि-उपाधि-अविवेकभ्रमनिमित्तम् : एव दुःखाभिमानः न तु पारमाधिकः अस्ति ॥ II. 3, 10. (²) तस्मात् नास्ति जीवेन दुःखेन परमात्मनः दुःखित्वप्रसङ्गः II. 3, 16.

This being so, the objection, that the acquisition of perfect knowledge would produce a state infinitely more miserable than the state of Avidya, this objection does not apply. For, when the state of perfect knowledge is reached, not only will Atma not commit the mistake of thinking itself to be, and to have the states of, the body and the other limiting adjuncts ; but,—what is more important,—it will not even be conscious of the body and the other limiting adjuncts, whose presence is due to Maya. Thus says Shankar:—Two¹ things being admitted, namely, that the experience of pain is due to misconception, and that right knowledge prevents this misconception even while we are in the sansar (संसार) state, is it necessary to point out that Atma, when it is conscious of nothing else except itself with its nature of pure eternal intelligence, must be free from all pain, and that, therefore, perfect knowledge is not useless ?

(¹) निश्चितं एनत् अवगम्यते मिथ्याभिमानभ्रमनिमित्तः एव दुःखानुभवः इति । लौकिकस्यापि पुंसः सम्यग्दर्शन-अर्थवत्त्वं दृष्टं किमुत विषयशून्यात् आत्मनः अन्यत्-वस्तु-अंतरं अपश्यतः नित्यचैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपस्य इति । तस्मात् नास्ति सम्यग्दर्शन-आनर्थक्यप्रसंगः ॥ II. 3, 46.

V.

But Shankar at least admits that Brahma is affected by Maya and Upadhi. Then it may be asked :—Are there two forms of Brahma, or is the same Brahma affected by Maya as well as unaffected by it at the same time ? The latter question Shankar answers negatively. He denies that Brahma has two opposite natures. Brahma, says he, can't not, in itself, possess a double nature. For, on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is impossible to admit that one and the same thing should by itself possess certain qualities,—such as form, &c.,—and should not possess them.

The other question,—whether Brahma has two forms,—is sometimes answered in the affirmative. Thus we read :—Are there² two forms of Brahma, one higher and the other lower ? Quite so. Similarly we are

(¹) न तावत् स्वतः एव परस्य प्रलयः उभयस्मिन् उपायते । न हि एकं वस्तु स्वतः एव रूपादिशेषोपेत तद्विपरीतं च इति अभ्युपगन्तुं नम्यं विरोधात् ॥ III. 2, 11.

(²) किं द्वै प्रसङ्गा परं अपरं च । यादम् ॥ IV 3, 14.

told, in another passage, that Brahma¹ is known to have two forms. Under one of these forms Brahma is connected with Upadhi, while under the other form it is absolutely free from all Upadhi. But we must remember that this connection with Upadhi does not, and cannot, change the original nature of Brahma. For, says Shankar, even² the connection with the limiting adjuncts is not able to impart to a thing of a certain original nature an altogether different nature. Besides, the presence of Upadhi is due to Avidya. We get the real explanation of the difficulty, when we learn that Brahma is regarded³ as having one form or the other according as it is the object of right knowledge or misconception, - though, as a matter of fact, Brahma is, and ever remains, one as defined above. Not only does Brahma thus become the creator, &c, when looked at under the influence of Avidya, but Brahma also becomes

(¹) द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्म अवगम्यते...उपाधिविशिष्टं तद्विपरीतं च सर्व-उपाधि-विवर्जितं ॥ I. 1, 11. (²) न हि उपाधियोगात् अपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनः अन्यादृशः स्वभावः संभवति। उपाधी-नां च अविद्याप्रत्युदस्थापितत्वात् ॥ III. 2, 11. (³) विद्या-अविद्याविषयभेदेन ब्रह्मणः द्विरूपता ॥ I. 1, 11.

the object of worship and devotion only when thus looked at¹.

The same objection may be differently expressed thus :—Shankar holds that Brahma, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself, is the cause of the world. But Brahma, of course, is altogether without parts. Being without parts, a partial modification of Brahma is impossible. Hence a modification of the entire Brahma must be assumed. But that means that the unmodified Brahma,—the object of perfect knowledge,—does not exist. And, therefore, the advice to know Brahma becomes useless, there being no Brahma apart from its effect, i.e. the world. If, on the other hand, in order to escape from this difficulty, Shankar says that Brahma consists of parts, then Brahma cannot be eternal, for that which is composed must be decomposed. Hence the Vedānta doctrine cannot be maintained in any² way.

(¹) तत्र अविद्या-अवस्थायां ब्रह्मणः उपास्य-उपागच्छादि-
लक्षणः सर्वं व्याहारः ॥ (²) चेतन एव अद्वितीयं ब्रह्म स्वयं
परिणममानं जगतः कारणं इति स्थितम् । निरवयवं तु ब्रह्म भव-

Shankar answers this objection as follows:—He says that his¹ view is not open to any objection whatsoever, (much less to the present objection). For the alleged break in the nature of Brahma is a mere figment of Avidya. By a break of this nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double. It is by the element of plurality,—which is the mere fiction of Avidya,—that Brahma becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, &c.; while in its original and real nature, it, at

गम्यते । ततः च एकदेशपरिणाम—असंभवात् कृत्स्नपरिणाम-
प्रसक्तौ सत्यां मृजेच्छेदः प्रसज्येत, द्रष्टव्यता—उपदेश-आन-
र्थक्यं च कार्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य ब्रह्मणः असंभवात् । अथ एतद्दोष-
परिजिहीर्षया सावयवं एव ब्रह्म अभ्युपगम्येत तथापि अनित्यत्व-
प्रसंगः इति सर्वथा हि अयं पक्षः घटयितुं न शक्यते ॥ II. 1, 26.
(¹) न खलु अस्मत्पक्षे कःचित् अपि दोषः अस्ति । अविद्या-
कल्पितरूपभेद—अभ्युपगमात् । न हि अविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदे-
न सावयवं वस्तु संपद्यते । न हि अनेकः इव चन्द्रमाः दृश्यमानः
अनेकः एव भवति । अविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन ब्रह्म परिणामादि-
सर्वव्यवहार—आस्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते । पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण
सर्वव्यवहार-अतीतं अपरिणतं अवीतघृते । वाचारंभणमात्रत्वात्
च अविद्याकल्पितस्य नामरूप-भेदस्य इति न निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः
कुप्यति ॥ II. 1, 27.

the same time, ever remains unchanged, lifted above the perceptible world. And, as the distinction of names and forms,—the fiction of Avidya,—originates entirely from speech (and has no ground in reality), it does not militate against the fact that Brahma is without parts.

In the same way is to be explained the difficulty as to how Brahma, absolutely without any attributes, is spoken of as omnipotent. To quote Shankar's own words :—The difficulty, he says, as¹ to how Brahma, to which the descriptive phrase, "no, no," denies all attributes, can be also regarded as possessed of all powers, can be explained by the assumption of an element of plurality in its nature, which, however, is merely due to Avidya.

In another place we read :—Ishvar, who is² all-present, the Atma of all, all-knowing, and all-powerful, may, although

(¹) "नेति नेति" इति प्रतिषिद्धवर्तिनोऽप्येव अपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवति इति पृथक् अपि भाष्येष्टावन्ति तस्य भेद—उपन्यासेन उक्तं एव ॥ II. 1, 31. (²) प्रशस्तिरहितः अपि ईश्वरः सर्वगतः सर्वात्मा सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः च मन्, सर्वे

himself unmoving, move the universe. And, if it be objected that there is no room for a moving power, as, in consequence of the oneness of Brahma, no motion can take place, the answer is that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by pointing to the fact of Ishvar being connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Avidya.

But why does Shankar object to the view, that Brahma is both one and many, that the element of plurality in Brahma is real, and not due to Avidya or Maya? This objection also is stated and answered by Shankar himself in a passage which runs thus :—What objection¹ is there, if we suppose that unity and manifoldness are both real? Shankar maintains that this doctrine

प्रवर्तयेत् इति उपपन्नं । एकत्वात् प्रवर्त्य-अभावे प्रवर्तकत्व—
अनुपपत्तिः इति चेत् । न । अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूप-
मायावेशवशेन असकृत् प्रत्युक्तत्वात् ॥ II. 2, 2.

(¹) ननु एकत्वं नानात्वं च उभयं अपि सत्यं एव । न एवं
स्यात् । शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्वं अवगम्यमानं स्वाभाविकस्य शारी-
रात्मत्वस्य बाधकं संपद्यते । बाधिते च शरीरात्मत्वे तदाश्रयः
समस्तः स्वाभाविकः व्यवहारः बाधितः भवति यत्प्रसिद्धये

cannot be admitted. For the doctrine, which he teaches, that the individual soul (जीव) has Brahma for its essential nature, if once understood, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul. But, if the independent existence of the individual soul vanishes, the entire perceptible world,—which has its source in the individual soul, and for the establishment of which alone an element of manifoldness as real is to be assumed in Brahma,—all this perceptible world also vanishes. Hence manifoldness is due to wrong knowledge (अधिद्या), and, therefore, does not require a real element in Brahma to explain it. Moreover, on this doctrine of the reality of the manifold, Mukti cannot result from knowledge. For, how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness, if both are equally real? And, so long as the cognition of the manifold continues, there can be no Mukti.

नानात्वोऽयं अक्षरः ब्रह्मणः कल्पयेत् । अतः मिथ्याज्ञानार्थं नृभिर्नितं
नानात्वं । न च अस्मिन् दर्शने ज्ञानात् मोक्षः क्षिप्रं उपपद्यते ।
उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं एकत्वज्ञानेन नानात्वज्ञानं अपनुद्यते
इति ॥ II. 1, 14.

But, then, it may be objected:—Is not this talk about the unreality of the manifold,—i.e., the perceptible world,—simply nonsensical and absurd? How can even philosophy and Scripture contradict experience? This question, however, leads to objections against Shankar's view about the created world that it is unreal (जगत् मिथ्या). How Shankar answers objections to this part of his theory, will be explained in a later chapter¹.

(1) See the last section of chapter XIII.

Chapter VIII.

The Practical Aspect of the Vedānta.

I.

It must have been plain, from the account of the Vedānta given in the last two chapters, that the attainment of self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञानं) is the sole means of securing Mukti,—nay, according to Shankar, self-knowledge itself is Mukti. That he who *knows* Brahma becomes Brahma (सः यः ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्म एव भवति॥), is a proposition which is a direct corollary of the view, that Atma is Brahma (अयं आत्मा ब्रह्म॥), and which Shankar seems to be most interested in maintaining against those who insist, that the performance of works is the sole means of attaining Mukti,—self-knowledge being only required in order that these works may be properly done. In this connection, Shankar tries to refute two doctrines, namely, (1) that works alone, quite apart from self-knowledge, are the means of attaining Mukti; and (2) that works constitute the sole direct means of Mukti,—knowledge being required only as the means of the proper performance of works.

The first of these two doctrines is stated by Shankar as follows :—It is said¹ by some that, if duties of daily and of special obligations be done in order that no hinderance to Mukti may arise; and if no works are performed which are forbidden or which aim at the attainment of any fruit, so that heaven as well as hell may be avoided ; further, if all those works, which are the legacy of our conduct in the previous life, have been accomplished by actual experience ; then, at the end of this life,—there being no occasion for a new birth,—Mukti, consisting of Atma abiding in itself, will necessarily follow even in the absence of self-knowledge. Shankar's attitude towards this doctrine will be understood from the following pass-

(¹) यत् तु कैःचित् जल्प्यते नित्यानि नैमित्तिकानि कर्माणि अनुष्ठीयन्ते प्रत्यवाय-अनुत्पत्तये, काम्यानि प्रतिषिद्धानि च परिह्रियन्ते स्वर्गनरक-अनवाप्तये, सांप्रतदेह-उपभोग्यानि च कर्माणि उपभोगेन एव क्षप्यन्ते, इत्यतःवर्तमानदेहपातात् ऊर्ध्वं देहान्तरप्रतिसंधानकारण-अभावात् स्वरूप—अवस्थान-लक्षणं कैवल्यं विना अपि ब्रह्मात्मतया एवंवृत्तस्य सेत्स्यति इति ॥ IV. 3, 14.

age :—This doctrine is wrong.¹ For there is no ground for it. No Scripture has taught that one, who aims at Mukti, should live in this way. It is purely fanciful to suppose that, because the sansar--state is due to works, therefore, it will not arise if the cause is absent. This cannot be an inference, because the absence of the cause of the Sansar-state cannot be known. For, in the case of each man, a large number of works of different kinds have been accumulated, the results of some of which are pleasant, of others unpleasant. Now, since the fruits of all of them,—being inconsistent with one another,—cannot be simultaneously

(¹) तत् असत् । प्रमाण-अभावात् । न हि एतत् शास्त्रेण केनचित् प्रतिपादितं मोक्षार्थं इत्थं समाचरेत् इति । स्वभनीयया तु एतत् तर्कितं यस्मात् कर्मनिमित्तः संसारः तस्मात् निमित्त-अभावात् न भविष्यति इति । न च एतत् तर्कयितुं शक्यते निमित्त-अभावस्य दुर्ज्ञानत्वात् । यद्वा हि कर्माणि जात्यन्तर-संचितानि इष्टानिष्टविपाकानि एकैकस्य जन्तोः संभाव्यन्ते । तेषां विरुद्धफलानां युगपत्-उपभोग-असंभवात् कानिचित् लब्धावसराणि इदं जन्म निर्भ्रमते कानिचित् तु देशकालनिमित्तप्रतीक्षाणि, आसते । इत्यतः तेषां अवशिष्टानां सांप्रतेन उपभोगेन क्षयण-असंभवात् न यथाचार्यतत्त्वचरितस्य अपि यत्माने देहपाते देहान्तर-निमित्त-अभावः शक्यते निश्चेतुम् ॥ IV. 3, 14.

know, they may give rise to their own fruit. Further, none, who has not attained self-knowledge, can succeed in avoiding, from birth to death, all works which aim at their fruit or which are prohibited. For even the best of men are known to commit slight faults. Of course, this may not be true. Yet it cannot be denied that the absence of the occasion for a new embodied state is unknowable.

II.

The last sentences take us to the second of the two doctrines above referred to. For it may be said that self-knowledge is necessary, but that it is necessary simply because the works of permanent and occasional obligations should be properly done, and works prohibited and works aiming at particular results should be completely avoided, by us. This view is stated by Shankar as follows:—It is true¹ that the nature of Brahma is to be learnt from Scripture; still

(1) यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म तथापि प्रतिपत्तिविधि-विषयतया एव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते । यथा यूपादीनि विधिशेषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यन्ते तद्वत् । कुतः एतत् । प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिप्रयोजनत्वात् शास्त्रस्य । तथाहि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदः आहुः ।

Scripture treats of Brahma only as the object of certain injunctions, in the same way in which Scripture gives us knowledge about the sacrificial post as supplementary to certain injunctions. For the sole object of Scripture is to prompt us to, or restrain us from, works. Thus it is said that work is the purport of Scripture,—whatever does not refer to work is purportless. Hence, even the knowledge of Brahma, which we get from Scripture, is meant to subserve work. For instance, when we come across assertions like the following, —Atma is to be seen; Atma, which is free from sin, ought to

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् आनर्थक्यं अनर्थानां इति... । अतः पुरुषं कश्चित् विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत् कुतश्चित् विषयविशेषात् निवर्तयत् च अर्थवत् शास्त्रम् ।...कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्य एव ब्रह्मणः प्रीतिपाद्यमानत्वात् । “ आत्मा ये अरे द्रष्टव्यः ” । “यः आत्मा अपहृतपाप्मा ” “ मः अन्वेष्टव्यः सः विजिज्ञासितव्यः ” । “ आत्मा इत्येव दशासीत् ” । “ ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्म एव मयति ” । इत्यादिविधानेषु सन्तु “ कः अस्मै आत्मा किं तत् ब्रह्म ” इति आर्काशार्थं तत्स्वरूपमवर्णनेन सर्वे वेदान्ताः उपयुक्ताः “निराः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतः नित्यवृत्तः निर्व्यगृहबुद्धमुस्तस्वभावः विज्ञानं आनन्दं ब्रह्म ” इति एवं आदयः । तत्-उपायनात् च मोक्षः फलं भविष्यति इति ।... तस्मात् प्रतिपात्तिविधिविषयतया एव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म अभ्युपगन्तव्यं इति ॥ I. 1. 1.

be sought out, ought to be understood : Let a man worship it as Atma : He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma,—we are naturally induced to know the nature of Brahma. We also learn, from the Vedānta passages, that Brahma is eternal, omniscient, omnipresent, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent, and free ; perfect knowledge and bliss itself. And when we learn this, we are necessarily led to worship it ; and from this worship results Mukti. The conclusion then is that Scripture treats of the knowledge of Brahma only in so far as this knowledge subserves the injunctions about works to be done or avoided.

The following passage contains Shankar's answer to the above view and to the argument on which that view is based:—The¹ view described above is wrong, in as much as the fruit of works is essentially different from the fruit of knowledge. The fruit of works which are good, and the fruit of

(¹) अत्र अभिधीयते । न । कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोः वैलक्षण्यात् । तयोः चोदनालक्षणयोः अर्थ-अनर्थयोः धर्म-अधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे शरीरवाक्मनोभिः एव उपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोग-

works which are evil,—both of which are defined in Scripture,—are known to be respectively pleasure and pain, which are perceptible only to the senses, which are produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects, and to which all sentient creatures are subject. Now Scripture as well as observation teaches that the pleasure and pain experienced by different creatures differ in degree. From this difference is inferred the difference in the degrees of merit resulting from the performance of religious duty. And from this difference follows the difference in the degrees of the qualification for performing religious duty. We also learn from Scripture that those only, who perform one kind of prescribed work, —i.e., yāga and others,—

अन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे । मनुष्यत्वात् आरभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यं अनुभूयते । ततः च तत्-हेतोः धर्मस्य तार-
तम्यं गम्यते । धर्मतारतम्यात् अधिकारितारतम्यं । तथा च
“यागादि-अनुष्ठायिनां एव विद्यासमाधिविशेषात् उत्तरेण पथा
गमनं केवलैः इष्टापूर्वदत्तप्रार्थनैः धूमादिक्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा
गमनं । तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यं तरसाधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात्...
गम्यते । तथा मनुष्यादिषु सुखैलवः चोदनालक्षणधर्मसाध्यः एव
इति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः ॥ I. 1, 4.

go, on account of their superiority in knowledge and meditation, along the northern path ; while those, who perform the other kind of prescribed works, —Ishtapurti, &c, —are carried through smoke and the other stages along the southern path. And that even in those regions there are degrees of pleasure and of the means of pleasure. From this it is to be inferred that the difference in the degrees of pleasure, experienced by different sentient beings, are merely due to the difference in the degrees of their religious merit as defined in Scripture.

So far with reference to the fruit of good works. As regards evil works, Shankar points out that :—From the¹ difference in the degrees of pain, experienced by different creatures, is inferred the difference in the degrees in its cause, *i. e.*, the religious demerit belonging to those creatures, as defined in the prohibitory injunctions.

Now, as to the nature of the fruit of works, we must notice, Shankar observes that :—

(1) तथा ऊर्ध्वगतेषु अधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्य-
दर्शनात् तत्-हेतोः अधर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तत्-अनु-

This difference¹ in the degrees of pleasure and pain,—following from the difference in the degrees of merit and demerit of embodied beings,—is known, from Scripture as well as reasoning, to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature. This being the nature of the fruit of works, it is evident that Mukti cannot result from works. For we learn from Scripture that, when Mukta, Ātma is ever absolutely free from pleasure and pain. Thus we read :—When it is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches it. It follows from such passages that the disembodied state, called Mukti, cannot be a result of religious merit as defined by Scriptural injunctions. For if it could result from such merit, it could not be declared to be absolutely free from pleasure and² pain.

छायेनां च त्वातम्यं गम्यते ॥ I. 1, 1. (1) एवं...धर्माधर्म-
तारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीर-उत्पादानपूर्वकं सुखदुःखतारतम्यं अनित्यं
संसाररूपं श्रुतस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् ॥ I. 1. 1. (2) “अशरीरं
वाच्यं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पर्शतः” इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रति-
षेधात् चोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाम्यस्य अशरीरत्वस्य प्रति-
शिष्यते इति गम्यते । धर्मकार्यत्वं हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधः
न उपपद्यते ॥ I. 1, 1.

It is thus¹ established, by the authority of Scripture, that Mukti is essentially different from all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state. It is eternal in the true sense, *i.e.*, in the sense of even being; absolutely free from any change whatever. It is also omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, and of a self-luminous nature. It is, in fact, the same as Brahma. If the knowledge of Brahma were simply subservient to certain works, and Mukti were to result from those works, it would be non-eternal, and would have been regarded merely as something occupying the supreme place among the non-eternal fruits of works differing in

(¹) अतः एव अनुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यं अशरीर-
त्वं नित्यं इति सिद्धम् ।...इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थं नित्यं व्यो-
मवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयं-
ज्योतिःस्वभावम् ।...अतः तत् ब्रह्म...। तत् यदि कर्तव्यशेष-
त्वेन उपदिश्येत तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यः चेत् मोक्षः अभ्युपगम्येत
अनित्यः एव स्यात् । तत्र एवं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेषु एव तार-
तम्य-अवस्थितेषु अनित्येषु कःचित् अतिशयः मोक्षः इति प्रस-
ज्येत । नित्यः च मोक्षः सर्वैः मोक्षवादिभिः अभ्युपगम्यते । अतः
न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशः युक्तः ॥ 1. 1, 4.

degrees among themselves. But whoever speaks of Mukti speaks of it as eternal. And hence it follows that the knowledge of Brahman, which we get from Scripture, cannot be merely subservient to works.

Not only can it, in this way, be proved, on the authority of Scripture, that it is wrong to hold that Mukti results from works,—self-knowledge being only subservient to those works; but it can also be proved, on the same authority, that Mukti, as defined above, does result from self-knowledge. For a number¹ of Scriptural passages can be quoted, which declare that Mukti follows directly from the knowledge of Brahman, and thus exclude the possibility of any works coming between the attainment of this knowledge and the attainment of Mukti. For instance :—He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman : All his works perish when Brahman has been beheld which is higher and lower : He, who knows the bliss of Brahman, fears nothing : What

(1) अपि च “ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्म एव भवति;” “क्षायन्ते च अस्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे,” “आनन्दं ब्रह्मणः विद्वान् न विभेति कुतःचन” “तत्र कः मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वं अनुपश्यतः” इति । एवं-आद्याः श्रुतयः वेदविद्यो-भनन्तरं मोक्षं

sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who has known Brahma ? Moreover, the knowledge¹ of Brahma does not necessarily require any action of man; but, like the knowledge of the objects of perception, &c., it depends on the object of knowledge only. So much so, that it² is not even the object of the act of knowing,—nor the object of the act of devotion. The conclusion, therefore, is that the knowledge of Brahma can neither be meant to be subservient to any works, nor can it be said to be dependent on any action. As Shankar puts it :—Such being³ the nature of Brahma and of its knowledge, neither of them can, by any argument, be connected with works or action. In another place he says :—As it can⁴ not be shown that there

दर्शयन्त्यः मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति ॥ I. 1, 4. (¹) न पुरुषव्यापारतंत्रा ब्रह्मविद्या । किं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषय-वस्तुज्ञानवत् वस्तुतंत्रा ॥ I. 1, 4.

(²) न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशः ब्रह्मणः... विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधात् । तथा उपास्तिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधः अपि भवति ॥ I. 1, 4. (³) एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणः तत्-ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचित् युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुं ॥ I. 1, 4. (⁴) मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचित् दर्शयितुं । तस्मात् ज्ञानं एकं मुक्त्वा क्रियायाः गन्धभात्रस्य अनुप्रवेशः इह न उपपद्यते ॥ I. 1, 4.

is any connection whatever between Mukti and action, it is impossible that Mukti should, in any way, depend upon action : evidently it depends upon knowledge alone. Shankar, it should be noticed, is careful to point out that knowledge is not an act. For, he says, an action¹ is that which is prescribed as being independent of the nature of existing things, and dependent on the energy of some person's mind : while knowledge has for its objects existing things.... and, therefore, depends neither on Scriptural injunctions nor on the mind of man.

III

Now, this conclusion as to the relation between self-knowledge and works directly raises the question :—If, in this way, there is no connection whatever between self-knowledge and works,—either by way of self-knowledge being subservient to certain works, or depending upon certain acts for its acquisition ; but if the attainment of self-

(¹) क्रिया हि नाम मा यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षा एव
 बोधेन पुरुषवित्तव्यापारार्थिना च । ज्ञानं तु .. वस्तुतन्त्रं एव तन्
 न बोधनान्त्रं नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् ॥ 1. 1, 1.

knowledge is Mukti, and self-knowledge is attained by means of the study,—consisting of reading (श्रवण), understanding (मनन), and reflection (निदिध्यास),—of the Vedanta philosophy; why not give up all works, resort to asceticism (वैराग्य and संसारत्याग), and devote all time and energy to the study of the Vedanta as thus defined?

Shankar answers this question by pointing out that, though the performance of works cannot be the direct means of attaining Mukti, yet, if the prescribed works are performed without the desire for their fruit, then they indirectly contribute to the attainment of Mukti by removing obstacles in the way of attaining self-knowledge,—obstacles which are due to the accumulated desert for works done during the previous state of existence.¹ That this utility is possessed by works if performed without the desire for fruit, even though the performance is

(¹) यत् नित्यं कर्म वैदिकं अग्निहोत्रादि तत् तत् कार्याय एव भवति । ज्ञानस्य यत् कार्यं तत् एव अस्यापि कार्यं । इत्यर्थः । कुतः “ तं एतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणाः विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन ” इत्यादिदर्शनात् । ननु ज्ञानकर्मणोः विलक्षणकार्यत्वात् कार्य-एकत्व-अनुपपत्तिः । न एषः दोषः । ज्वरमरणकार्ययोः अपि

unaccompanied by knowledge ; of course, if it is accompanied by knowledge, then the utility is¹ greater. But, if the works are performed with the desire for their fruit, then only they cannot contribute to the attainment of Mukti even thus indirectly,

दधिविषयोः गुह्यमंत्रमनुवृत्तयोः गुह्यगुह्यकार्य-रसोत्तर । तद्वत्
कर्मणः आदि ज्ञानमनुवृत्तस्य मोक्षकार्योत्तरणेः । ननु अनारभ्यः
मोक्षः कथं अस्य कर्मकार्येषु उत्पद्यते । न पणः शेषः । आगत्य
उपकारकशक्त्यै कर्मणः । ज्ञानस्य एव हि प्राप्तक मन्त्रं प्रज्ञाद्या
मोक्षकारणं इति उच्यते । अतः एव न भवितुमिच्छते एतन्
कार्य-एक्य-भविष्यत् । न हि प्रज्ञाविदः आगत्य अमिहोप्रादि
संभसति ॥ IV. 1, 16. See also the next foot-note.

(1) गुह्यमंत्रं एतत् नित्यं अमिहोप्रादिकं कर्म मुमुक्षुना
मोक्षप्रयोजन-उद्देशेन कृतं उपायदुरितक्षयहेतुद्वारेण मन्त्रादि-
कारणतो प्रतिपद्यमानं मोक्षप्रयोजनप्रत्याभिगम्यनिमित्तत्वेन प्रज्ञा-
विद्यया मद एवकार्यं भवति इति । तत्र अमिहोप्रादि कर्मोप-
व्यसाधनविद्यामनुवृत्तं केवलं न अस्ति । तत्र इदं विचार्यते किं
विद्यासंयुक्तं एव अमिहोप्रादिकं कर्म मुमुक्षोः विद्याहेतुत्वेन तथा
मद एवकार्यत्वं प्रतिपद्यते न केवलं उक्तं विद्यासंयुक्तं केवलं न
अविशेषेण इति । किं तावत् प्राप्तं विद्यामनुवृत्तं एव कर्म अमिहो-
प्रादि भावविद्याशेषस्य प्रतिपद्यते न विद्याहीनं । विद्या-उपेयस्य
विशिष्ट-अवगमात् विद्याविहीनान् । एवं प्राप्तं प्रतिपद्यते । सत्यं
एतन् । विद्यासंयुक्तं । कर्म अमिहोप्रादिकं विद्याविहीनात् कर्मणः
अमिहोप्रात् विशिष्टम्... । तथापि न अत्यन्तं अनपेक्षं विद्या-
विहीनं कर्म अमिहोप्रादिकं । कस्मात् “ स एनं आरम्भं यज्ञेन

whether they are, or are not accompanied by knowledge¹. On the contrary, such works (i.e., those which are done with the desire for fruit) increase the obstacles in the way of the attainment of self-knowledge by giving

विविदिषन्ति ” इति अविशेषेण अग्निहोत्रादेः विद्याहेतुत्वेन श्रुतत्वात् । ननु विद्यासंयुक्तस्य अग्निहोत्रादेः विद्याविहीनात् विशिष्टत्व-अवगमात् विद्याविहीनं अग्निहोत्रादि आत्मविद्याहेतुत्वेन अनपेक्षं एव इति युक्तं । न एतत् एवं । विद्यासहायस्य अग्निहोत्रादेः विद्या-निमित्तेन सामर्थ्यातिशयेन योगात् आत्मज्ञानं प्रति कः चित् कारणत्वातिशयः भविष्यति न तथा विद्याविहीनस्य इति युक्तं कल्पयितुम् । न तु “ यज्ञेन विविदिषन्ति ” इत्यत्र अविशेषेण आत्मज्ञान-अंगत्वेन श्रुतस्य अग्निहोत्रादेः अनंगत्वं शक्यं अभ्युप-गन्तुं । तथाहि श्रुतिः “ यत् एव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धया उपनिषदा तत् एव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति ” इति विद्यासंयुक्तस्य कर्मणः अग्नि-होत्रादेः वीर्यवत्तरत्व-अभिधानेन स्वकार्यं प्रति कंचित् अतिशयं ब्रूवाणा विद्याहीनस्य तस्य एव तत्प्रयोजनं प्रति वीर्यवत्त्वं दर्शयति । कर्मणः च वीर्यवत्त्वं तत् यत् स्वप्रयोजनसाधनसहत्वं । तस्मात् विद्यासंयुक्तं नित्यं अग्निहोत्रादि विद्याविहीनं च उभयं अपि मुमुक्षुणा मोक्षप्रयोजन-उद्देशेन इहजन्तानि जन्मान्तरे च प्राक् ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः कृतं यत् तत् यथासामर्थ्यं ब्रह्माधिगमप्रतिबन्धकारण-उपात्तदुरितक्षयहेतुत्वद्वारेण ब्रह्माधिगमकारणत्वं प्रतिपद्यमानं श्रवणमननश्रद्धातात्पर्यादि-अंतरंगकारणापेक्षं ब्रह्मविद्यया सह एक-कार्यं भवति इति स्थितम् ॥ IV.1, 18. (See also III.4, 26, 27.) (1) अग्निहोत्रादेः नित्यात् कर्मणः अन्था अपि हि अस्ति साधुकृत्या या फलं अभिसंधाय क्रियते...। तथा-

rise to new desert, and thus postpone the attainment of Mukti. It will be observed that, in all this teaching, Shankar strictly follows the Gita.

IV.

But now the question arises:—If the performance of the prescribed works, done without any desire for fruit, thus contributes to the attainment of Mukti, is it *necessary* that those works must be performed in order that Mukti may be attained? It should be noticed that this question is simply another form of the question:—whether it is necessary to go through the stage of life known as the Grihastha-ashrama (*i. e.* the condition of the life of house-holders) for the attainment of Mukti? For it is during this stage of life alone that the prescribed works, referred to in the previous discussion, ought to be performed and not during the higher or later

जातीयकस्य काम्यस्य कर्मणः विधां प्रति अनुपकारस्त्वे संप्रति-
पत्तिः उभयोः अपि अमिनित्रादयणयोः आचार्ययोः ॥
IV. 1, 17.

whether they are, or are not accompanied by knowledge¹. On the contrary, such works (*i.e.*, those which are done with the desire for fruit) increase the obstacles in the way of the attainment of self-knowledge by giving

विविदिषन्ति ” इति अविशेषेण अग्निहोत्रादेः विद्याहेतुत्वेन श्रुतत्वात् । ननु विद्यासंयुक्तस्य अग्निहोत्रादेः विद्याविहीनात् विशिष्टत्व-अवगमात् विद्याविहीनं अग्निहोत्रादि आत्मविद्याहेतुत्वेन अनपेक्षं एव इति युक्तं । न एतत् एवं । विद्यासहायस्य अग्निहोत्रादेः विद्या-निमित्तेन सामर्थ्यातिशयेन योगात् आत्मज्ञानं प्रति कः चित् कारणत्वातिशयः भविष्यति न तथा विद्याविहीनस्य इति युक्तं कल्पयितुम् । न तु “ यज्ञेन विविदिषन्ति ” इत्यत्र अविशेषेण आत्मज्ञान-अंगत्वेन श्रुतस्य अग्निहोत्रादेः अनंगत्वं शक्यं अभ्युप-गन्तुं । तथाहि श्रुतिः “यत् एव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धया उपनिषदा तत् एव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति ” इति विद्यासंयुक्तस्य कर्मणः अग्नि-होत्रादेः वीर्यवत्तरत्व-अभिधानेन स्वकार्यं प्रति कंचित् अतिशयं ब्रुवाणा विद्याहीनस्य तस्य एव तत्प्रयोजनं प्रति वीर्यवत्त्वं दर्शयति । कर्मणः च वीर्यवत्त्वं तत् यत् स्वप्रयोजनसाधनसहत्वं । तस्मात् विद्यासंयुक्तं नित्यं अग्निहोत्रादि विद्याविहीनं च उभयं अपि सुमुक्षुणा मोक्षप्रयोजन-उद्देशेन इहजन्तानि जन्मान्तरे च प्राक् ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः कृतं यत् तत् यथासामर्थ्यं ब्रह्माधिगमप्रतिबन्धकारण-उपात्तदुरितक्षयहेतुत्वद्वारेण ब्रह्माधिगमकारणत्वं प्रतिपद्यमानं श्रवणमननश्रद्धातात्पर्यादि-अंतरंगकारणापेक्षं ब्रह्मविद्यया सह एक-कार्यं भवति इति स्थितम् ॥ IV.1, 18. (See also III.4, 26, 27.) (1) अग्निहोत्रादेः नित्यात् कर्मणः अन्या अपि हि अस्ति साधुकृत्या या फलं अभिसंधाय क्रियते...। तथा-

rise to new desert, and thus postpone the attainment of Mukti. It will be observed that, in all this teaching, Shankar strictly follows the Gita.

IV.

But now the question arises:—If the performance of the prescribed works, done without any desire for fruit, thus contributes to the attainment of Mukti, is it *necessary* that those works must be performed in order that Mukti may be attained? It should be noticed that this question is simply another form of the question:—whether it is necessary to go through the stage of life known as the Grīhastha-āshrama (*i. e.* the condition of the life of house-holders) for the attainment of Mukti? For it is during this stage of life alone that the prescribed works, referred to in the previous discussion, ought to be performed and not during the higher or later

जातीयकस्य काम्यस्य कर्मणः विधां प्रति अनुपकारत्वे संप्रति-
पत्तिः उभयोः अपि अभिनिवादायनयोः आचार्ययोः ॥
IV. 1, 17.

stages¹. And, as Shankar points out, the works which a Grihastha ought to perform, and the works which,—if performed without the desire for fruit,—indirectly contribute to the attainment of Mukti, are exactly² the same. Here also Shankar³ follows the authority of the Gita.

Shankar has to undertake a long discussion in order to maintain that the different stages of life,—those of studentship (ब्रह्मचर्यं), householdership (गार्हस्थ्यं), austerity (तपश्चर्यं), and asceticism (वैराग्यं),—are based upon the authority of Scripture.

(¹) न हि अग्निहोत्रादीनि वैदिकानि कर्माणि तेषां सन्ति ॥ III. 4, 17. (²) सर्वाणि एव आश्रमकर्माणि विद्या-उत्पत्तौ अपेक्षितव्यानि ॥ III. 4, 27. सर्वथा अपि आश्रम-कर्मत्वपक्षे विद्यासहकारित्वपक्षे च ते एव अग्निहोत्रादयः धर्माः अनुष्ठेयाः । ते एव इति...कर्मभेदशंकां निवर्तयति ॥ III. 4, 34. (³) स्मृतिलिङ्गं अपि—“अनाश्रितः कर्मफलं कार्यं कर्म करोति यः”—इति विज्ञातकर्तव्यताकं एव कर्म विद्या-उत्पात्ति-अर्थं इति दर्शयति ॥ III. 4, 34.

After having done¹ it, he points out the order in which these stages are to be gone through:—Having completed his studentship, a man is to become a householder ; having lived as a householder, he should become a dweller in the forest ; and after having dwelt in a forest, he should wander² forth.

But this proof from Scripture raises the question under discussion with a double force. The question is :—If the performance of prescribed works without the desire for fruit contributes to the attainment of Mukti, by means of removing the obstacles in the way of attaining self-knowledge, can a man attain Mukti who does not perform those works, or,—which is the same thing in another form,—who does not live the life of a Grihastha ? Now the question becomes :—If each of the four stages of life, and, therefore, the Grihastha-ashrama, is enjoined by

(¹) तत्र यज्ञादिलिङ्ग-गृह्याश्रमः एकः धर्मस्कन्धः निर्दिष्टः, प्रत्यक्षारो इति च स्पष्टः आश्रमनिर्देशः तपः इत्यपि कः अन्यः तपःप्रदानात् आश्रमात् धर्मस्कन्धः अभ्युपगम्येत ।...तस्मात् अनुष्ठेयं आश्रमान्तरम् ॥ III. 4, 19. (²) प्रत्याचर्य समाप्य गृही भवेत् गृही भूत्या वनी भवेत् वनी भूत्या प्रव्रजेत् ॥ III. 1, 20.

Scripture, how can a man pass over the Grihastha-ashrama, and yet attain Mukti ?

The answer of Shankar to this question is that it is not absolutely necessary that a man should go through the Grihastha-ashrama in order to attain Mukti. For we learn¹, from Scripture itself, that a man, who is so inclined and, therefore, fit, may pass over that stage, and resort to the forest-life immediately after completing the first stage (ब्रह्मचर्यं). Only, if a man does so, i.e., if he passes over that stage, then he cannot return to it again.¹

Lastly, it is worth while to notice that though, according to Shankar, it is optional to a man whether to become a Grihastha or not ; yet, if a man chooses to become a Grihastha, and performs all the duties of a Grihastha without entertaining the desire for their fruit, still he cannot attain Mukti unless and until he gives up the sansar-state.

(¹) ब्रह्मचर्यात् एव प्रव्रजेत् ॥ प्रतिपन्न-अप्रतिपन्नगार्ह-स्थ्यानां अपाकृत-अनपाकृत-ऋणत्रयाणां च ऊर्ध्वरेतस्त्वं श्रुति-स्मृतिप्रसिद्धम् ॥ III. 4, 17. (²) आरोहरूपाणि वचंसि उपलभ्यन्ते न एवं प्रत्यवरोहरूपाणि ॥ न च एवं आचाराः

realise this, then the symbol would disappear for him, and the worship of symbols would cease. Hence, to insist that the symbol-worshipper ought to realise during the worship that what he is worshipping is Brahma, will be equivalent to insisting that there should be no symbol-worship at all. It follows that, if symbol-worship is to be allowed, it cannot be made a condition that the symbol-worshipper ought to realise that what he worships is really Brahma or Atma.

Another question discussed by Shankar in this connection is :—Whether¹ the symbol, e.g., Aditya, is to be worshipped as Brahma or Brahma is to be worshipped as the symbol? The answer of Shankar to this question is that it² is the symbol that is to be regarded by the worshipper as Brahma,

आश्रितं भवति । स्वरूप-उपमर्दे च नामादीनां कुतः प्रतीकत्वं
आत्मग्रहः वा।... अतः उपासकस्य प्रतीकैः समत्वात् आत्मग्रहः
न उपपद्यते ॥ ...अतः न प्रतीकेषु आत्मदृष्टिः क्रियते॥ IV.1,4.

(¹) किं आदित्यादिदृश्यः ब्रह्मणि अध्यक्षितव्याः किंवा
ब्रह्मदृष्टिः आदित्यादिषु ॥ IV. 1, 5. (²) ब्रह्मदृष्टिः एव
आदित्यादिषु स्यात् । विकारप्रविलयः हि एवं स्यात्, ततः च

and not Brahma as the symbol. For to do the latter, the knowledge of Brahma would be required. But, if the worshipper has attained this knowledge, then no symbol would remain for him. Besides, if this knowledge is attained, then there will be no occasion for the worship or meditation of the symbol. Besides, by looking on the symbol as Brahma, we exalt our ideas ; but by doing the opposite we lower them. It need not be objected that, if the actual object of our worship be a symbol, then we cannot get the fruit of the worship,—for that rests with Brahma. This objection is not valid. Because, after all, we do worship Brahma,—only mistaking its symbol for itself.

As regards the fruit of this worship, it is the same as that of the performance of prescribed duties, to which reference was made

प्रतीक-अभायप्रसंगं अयोचाम । परमात्मवाक्यं च इदं तदानीं
 स्यात् ततःच उपासना-आधिकारः वाध्येत । एवं उरहर्षेण आदि-
 त्यादयः दृष्टाः भवन्ति, उत्कृष्टदृष्टेः तेषु अध्यासात् । यत् तु उक्तं
 मद्गोपासनं एव आदरणीयं फलवत्त्वाय इति । तत् अयुक्तं ।...
 फलं तु आदित्यादि-उपासने अपि मद्ग एव दास्यति सर्वार्थशक्त्यात्॥
 IV. 1, 5.

above. That is to say, if the worship is accompanied with the desire of some worldly gain, from the attainment of heaven (Svarga) to wealth, health, &c, then the worshipper would gain these objects only. But, if the worship is absolutely without any desire for fruit, and is done simply because it is a means of attaining Mukti, then it will contribute to the attainment of self-knowledge, and thence to 'the attainment of Mukti'. Of course, what is true of the worship of symbols (प्रतीकः), holds also in respect of the worship of images or प्रतिमाः.

Shankar's answer to the question, -how long is the worship to be continued? is that the worship, which is to contribute to Mukti, must last until self-knowledge is attained; while the worship, which is to

(1) तत्र कानिचित् ब्रह्मणः उपासनानि अभ्युदयार्थानि कानिचित् क्रममुक्ति-अर्थानि कानिचित् कर्मसमृद्धि-अर्थानि तेषां गुणविशेष-उपाधिभेदेन भेदः। एकः एव तु परमात्मा ईश्वरः तैः तैः गुणविशेषैः विशिष्टः उपास्यः यद्यपि भवति तथापि यथागुण-उपासनं एव फलानि भिद्यन्ते। "तं यथा यथा उपासते तत् एव भवति"

contribute to some fruit to be enjoyed after death, must last till death.

It may be noted that, just as, according to Shankar, worship in the form of attaining knowledge of Atmā is the highest ; worship in the form of doing prescribed works accompanied with knowledge and free from desire for fruit, stands next in importance; worship in the form of doing prescribed works without desire for fruit, but unaccompanied with knowledge, takes the third rank ; and worship in the form of doing prescribed works with the object of getting fruit, stands lowest ; in the same way, according to Shankar, the worship of Para Brahma is the highest ; the worship of Aparā Brahma is next in value ; and the worship of symbols

इति श्रुतेः ॥ I. 1, 12. (1) यानि तावत् सम्यग्दर्शनार्थानि उदात्तानि तानि, कार्यपर्यवसानानि । न हि सम्यग्दर्शने कार्ये निष्पन्ने यत्नान्तरं किञ्चित् शासितुं शक्यम् । आनेयोज्यवद्भा-
त्मत्वप्रतिपत्तेः शास्त्रस्य अविपर्ययत्वात् । यानि पुनः अभ्युदयफलानि तानि आप्रायणान् एव आवर्तयेत् प्रत्ययम् । अन्त्यप्रत्ययवशात् अदृष्टफलप्राप्तेः ॥ IV. 1, 12.

is the lowest. Of course, in each case, a higher form of worship dispenses with all the lower¹.

VI.

In order to complete this account of the practical aspect of the Vedanta, it is necessary just to refer to two more points :—(1) What is the relation of the practice of morality,—as ordinarily understood,—with the attainment of Mukti? and (2) How must sansar be carried on during the Grihastha-ashrama, if we resort to that Ashrama because, as Shankar says, the performance of prescribed (religious) works without the desire for fruit contributes to Mukti indirectly?

(1) This statement is based upon such passages as these :—स्थितं एतत् कार्यविषया गतिः न परविषया इति ।...प्रतीक-आलम्बनान् वर्जयित्वा सर्वान् अन्यान् विकार-आलम्बनान् नयति ब्रह्मलोकम्...।...यः हि ब्रह्मकृतुः सः ब्राह्मं ऐश्वर्यं आसोदेत्...। न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्मकृतुत्वं अस्ति प्रतीक-प्रधानत्वात् उपासनस्य । तं यथा यथा उपासते तत् एव भवति । न प्रतीक-आलम्बनानां इतरैः तुल्यफलत्वम् ॥ IV. 3, 15-16 ; तस्य (सम्यग्दर्शिनः) कृतार्थत्वात् नियोज्यत्व-अनुपपत्तेः ॥ II. 3, 48 ; यानि सम्यग्दर्शनार्थानि उपासनानि तानि...कार्यपर्यवसानानि...। न हि सम्यग्दर्शने कार्ये निष्पन्ने यत्नान्तरं किञ्चित् शासितुं शक्यम् ॥ IV. 1, 12.

The answer of Śhrīkar to the first of these two questions is to this effect :—As we have seen, the sole direct or independent means of attaining Mukti is self-knowledge, which is gained by the study, &c., of the Vedānta. Mere life in conformity with any rules of morality, therefore, cannot by itself contribute to the attainment of Mukti, any more than the mere performance of prescribed religious works. Can we then say

(१) यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्त नैदमप्यनं नियमेन अपेक्षते एवं प्रज्ञाजिज्ञासा अपि नत पूर्ववृत्त नियमेन अपेक्षते तत् नवर्तव्यम् । स्वाध्याय-भानन्तरे तु ममा । अनुदृष्ट धर्म-अवबोध-भानन्तरे विशेषः । न । धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्राक् अपि अभीत-वेदान्तस्य प्रज्ञाजिज्ञासा-उत्पत्तिः । न च इदं क्रमः विरहितः । शेषशेषिके अभिवृत्तभविष्ये वा प्रमाण-अभावात् धर्मप्रज्ञाजिज्ञासयोः फलजिज्ञास्यभेदात् च । अव्युदयफल धर्म-भानं तत् च अनुष्ठान-अपेक्षम् । निःशेषफलं तु प्रज्ञाविज्ञानं न च अनुष्ठान-अन्तर-अपेक्षम् । भव्यः च धर्मः जिज्ञास्यः न ज्ञानशाले अस्ति पुष्टय्यापारतंत्र्यमात्, इदं तु भूतं प्रज्ञा जिज्ञास्य नित्यत्वात् न पुष्टय्यापारतंत्र्यम् । तस्मात् किं अपि यत्तव्य यदनन्तरं प्रज्ञा-जिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते इति । अन्येते । नित्य-अनिनायस्तुविशेषः इदं भव्य अर्थभोगविरागः दामदमादिगाभनगंवत् मुमुक्षुत्वं च । तेषु हि सन्तु प्राक् अपि धर्मजिज्ञासायाः ऊर्ध्वं च इवयते प्रज्ञा जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च न विपर्यये ॥ I. 1, 1.

that we may disregard the rules of morality, only taking care to study, &c., the Vedanta? The answer is that, just as the study, &c., of the Vedanta is necessary to the attainment of self-knowledge,—which is Mukti,—in the same way, we must have lived and, therefore, must have acquired the habit of living, in conformity with the rules of morality, in order that we may be qualified to study, &c. the Vedanta properly. And thus the observation of the rules of morality indirectly contributes to the attainment of Mukti. We have also seen that the performance of the prescribed religious works indirectly contributes to the attainment of Mukti. But, as we saw, the performance of these works, *i.e.*, the resort to the Grihastha-ashrama, is left to the option of the individual. But this is not the case in regard to the observation of moral rules. For, if we want to attain Mukti; we must study, &c. the Vedanta,—there can be no option. And, if we have to study, &c. the Vedanta, then we must qualify ourselves to study it properly,—there can be no option with respect to this either. But, according to Shankar, this qualification consists of the acquisition of the habit of living in conformity with the rules of

morality. Thus it follows that, according to Shankar, though the observation of the rules of morality, like the performance of prescribed religious works, only indirectly contributes to the attainment of Mukti, still, unlike the performance of prescribed religious works, the practice of morality is the necessary and indispensable,—though indirect,—means of attaining Mukti.

As regards the second of the two questions, just referred to,—i. e., how should those, who resort to the Grihastha-ashrama and are yet desirous of Mukti, carry on sansar?—we find Shankar's view on this point in the passage¹ where he points out the effect produced by the study of the Vedānta on the mind of one who determines to act up to its teaching. His view, briefly speaking, is

(¹) ननु भुक्तमश्ननः अपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनात् न अर्थवत्त्वं इति उक्तम् । अत्र उच्यते । न भवगन्तमश्नात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम्... । न हि शरीरादि-आरामाभिमानिनः दुःखमयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टं इति तस्य एव वेदप्रमाण-जनितमज्ञायमत्ते तन्-अभिमाननिवृत्तौ तत् एव मिथ्याज्ञान-निमित्तं दुःखमयादिमत्त्वं भवति इति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । न हि धनिनः गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनः धनापहारनिमित्तं

that such a man does not commit the mistake of wrongly regarding the body or the prakriti or the Vishaya to be, or to have the characteristics of, Atma or Purusha or Vishayi, and *vice versa* ; and, therefore, is able to, or at least tries to, prevent all the mischievous consequences which were shown above to follow from this fatal mistake. In other words, such a man tries to act up

दुःखं दृष्टं इति तस्य एव प्रव्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तत् एव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति । न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्व-अभिमान-निमित्तं सुखं दृष्टं इति तस्य एव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्व-अभिमानरहितस्य तत् एव कुण्डलित्व-अभिमान-निमित्तं सुखं भवति । तत् उक्तं श्रुत्या । “ अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः ” । शरीरे पतिते अशरीरत्वं स्यात् न जीवतः इति चेत् । न । सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् न हि आत्मनः शरीर-आत्म-अभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । नित्यं अशरीरत्वम् अकर्म-निमित्तत्वात् । तत् कृतधर्माधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वं इति चेत् । न । शरीरसंबन्धस्य असिद्धत्वात् धर्माधर्मयोः आत्मकृतत्व-असिद्धेः । शरीरसंबन्धस्य धर्माधर्मयोः तत्कृतत्वस्य च इतरेतर-आश्रयत्व-प्रसंगात् अन्धपरंपरा एषा अनादित्वकल्पना । क्रियासमवाय-अभावात् च आत्मनः कर्तृत्व-अनुपपत्तेः । संनिधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वं इति चेत् । न । धनदानादि-उपार्जित-भृत्यसंबन्धित्वात् तेषां कर्तृत्वउपपत्तेः । न तु आत्मनः धनदानादिवत् शरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिसंबन्धनिमित्तं किञ्चित्

to the ideal indicated by *Sthita-prajñatva* or *Gunatītatva*, described in the fourth section of the second chapter of this book.

ज्ञानं च न विदुः । विद्या-अभिमानः तु प्रायतः यन्वदेतुः ।...
 तस्मात् विद्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तान् सारोत्तरं गिह्म जीवतः
 आवि विदुषः असरोत्तरम् । तथा च मन्त्रविन्-विदवा धृतिः ।
 गच्छुः भवतुः इव सृष्टेः भवतुः इव मयात् अयात् इव
 ममनाः अमनाः इव ममानः अप्रानः इव इति च । स्मृतिः
 अपि च । “ विद्यप्रत्यय का भावा ” इत्याद्या विद्यप्रत्य-
 यानि आवधाना विदुषः सर्वप्रज्ञाति-असंबन्धं दशयति ।
 तस्मात् न अज्ञानप्रज्ञाप्रमाणस्य यथापूर्वं संगतिरित्यम् ॥ 1. 1, 4.

Chapter IX.

The Sankhya as ascribed to Kapila.

I.

Let us now pass on to the Sankhya philosophy, as we find it in the sutras (aphorisms) attributed to Kapila. It will be remembered that, according to the Vedanta as expounded by Shankar, the only reality is Brahma ; Atma is the same as Brahma and, therefore, one ; and the world is unreal. In sharp contrast with this doctrine, the Sankhyas maintain that there is no Brahma or Ishvar ; that there is a plurality of Atmas (or Purushas as they call them) ; and that the world (or Prakriti as they call it) is a reality. The important point to notice and to remember is that the Sankhyas assert and maintain this doctrine in conscious and deliberate opposition to the Vedantists. First of all, I shall quote from the sutras of Kapila in support of each of these three points. And first about the unreality of Ishvar :—(ईश्वर-असिद्धेः ॥ I. 92, . that is,) It is not proved that there is Ishvar. Nor can this be proved ; for (मुक्तवद्भयोः अन्यतर-अभावात् न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ I. 93, which means

that) if it were proved, then Ishvar must be either one who was in bondage (बद्ध) but has now become Mukta, or one who is yet in bondage (बद्ध). But in neither case can such a being be recognised as Ishvar. For (उभयथापि असत्करत्वम् ॥ I. 94, *i. e.*,) in each case he would be inefficient (as Ishvar).

Next as to the number of Purushas, the Sutrakar says:—(पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥ I. 149,) That there is a multiplicity of Purushas. For (जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः ॥ I. 149,) on account of the arrangement (व्यवस्था) of the birth of one and the death of another, and so on, we must admit that Purushas are many. If there were only one Purusha, then, when one is born, &c., all should be born, &c. Then the Sutrakar controverts the Vedanta view,—(उपाधिभेदे एकस्यापि नानायोगः ॥ I. 150, that is,) that multiplicity attaches (*i. e.*, seems to attach) to the one Purusha on account of there being a difference of Upadhi (limiting adjuncts), and (उपाधिः भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् ॥ I. 151, *i. e.*,) that Upadhi is different in different cases, not Purusha. Finally, the Sutrakar concludes that, in order to remove the objection,—that infinite contradictory states belong to one Atma,—the Sāukhya

view,—that Purushas are many,—ought to be accepted. To quote his own words:—
(एवं एकत्वेन परित्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्म-अध्यासः॥
I. 152, *i. e.*,) To this (the Sankhya) view, the objection, that on one Atma are imposed contradictory states and attributes, does not apply.

And now as to the Sankhya view about the reality or non-reality of the world, we are told (जगत्सत्यं &c. n VI. 52, that is,) that the world is real. It is not necessary to mention here the reasons, which the Sutrakar gives in support of this assertion.

II.

According to the Sankhya system, then, the whole universe is divided into two parts,—Prakriti and a number of Purushas, Prakriti being as real as each Purusha. Let us now see what the Sankhyas teach about each of them (Prakriti and Purusha).

To take Prakriti first:—The Sankhyas are the Indian Evolutionists. For, according to them, all that exists except Purushas is ultimately to be traced to, or evolved out of, three primary elements, which they call

gunas—Satva, Rajas, and Tamas, with which the reader has already become acquainted in the Gita. The evolution, then, according to this view, starts with the three *gunas*. But the existence of the *gunas* as such is only imaginary. For the three *gunas* must either be in the state of equipoise (साम्यावस्था) or in the opposite state in which one or two *gunas* preponderate over the rest. If they are in the¹ state of equipoise, they constitute what the Sankhyas call Pradhana, Avyakta Prakriti, or, sometimes, even Prakriti. But, as soon as the state of their equipoise ceases, the process of evolution commences. For this reason, we may say that the evolution commences with Pradhana or Prakriti (in this narrow sense),—or, more accurately, the world in its absolutely unevolved state is what is called Pradhana or Prakriti (in the narrow sense). In other words, Pradhana or Prakriti (in the narrow sense) is the mere potentiality of all that exists except Purushas ; and, therefore, everything that exists, except Purushas, is gradually evolved out of this Pradhana or Prakriti.

(¹) सत्त्वरजःतमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः ॥ I. 61.

The order of this evolution, according to the Sankhyas, is as follows:—From Pradhana¹ or Prakriti (in the narrow sense) proceeds Buddhi or Mahat (*i.e.*, the power of decision or judgment); from Buddhi or Mahat is evolved Ahankar (*i.e.*, the power of being conscious of oneself as an individual different from other individuals); from Ahankar proceed (1) the five Tan-matras (तन्मात्राः),—consisting of form (रूप), taste (रस), smell (गन्ध), sound (शब्द), and touch (स्पर्श); and (2) the two kinds of senses (उभयं इन्द्रियं),—the five senses of knowledge, the five senses of action, and manas (मनः); lastly, from the Tan-matras are evolved what are called the Sthulabhutas (स्थूल-भूतः),—consisting of earth (पृथ्वी), water (आप्), light (तेजः), wind (वायु), and ether (आकाश),—by the combination of which the whole material world is formed.

Thus we see that the whole universe,—excluding Purushas, but including what we call the mental faculties and the mental states, not to mention the physical organisms

¹ (1) प्रकृतेः महान्, महतः अहंकारः, अहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राणि उभयं इन्द्रियं, तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि ॥ I. 61.

and the whole material world,—is, according to the Sankhyas, evolved or developed out of, or created by, Pradhana or Prakriti (in the narrow sense) or Avyakta Prakriti or the Avyakta, which is without beginning and without end, and, of course, uncreated. This Pradhana or Prakriti, which is thus the primary cause of everything except Purushas is also the ultimate destroyer of everything. For, according to the Sankhyas, the destruction of a thing simply means the absorption of it into its cause (नाशः कारणलयः ॥ I. 121) ; just as what we call production is, according to them, simply the manifestation of its cause (कारणभावः ॥ I. 118). It is also the supporter of everything, being the material cause. But, in order to be able to understand more about the Sankhya view of Prakriti, the reader must now be introduced to the Sankhya view about Purusha.

III.

The first point, which we have to remember in this respect, is that Purusha is different from the body, &c. (शरीरादिव्यातिरिक्तः पुमान् ॥ I. 139). “The body, &c.” (शरीरादि) includes not only the senses, but also Manas

(मनः), Ahankar (अहंकार), and Buddhi (बुद्धि). We are further told that Purusha is (नित्यशुद्धसुखमनसमायः II. I. 19, that is,) essentially eternal, pure, intelligent, and free.

It will be remembered that Shankar uses this very expression, *i.e.*, essentially eternal, pure, intelligent, and free, to describe the Para Brahma,—the characteristic of being the all-powerful and all-knowing creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world belonging to the Apra Brahma and not to the Para Brahma. And since Atma, according to Shankar, is identically of the same nature as the Para Brahma, it necessarily follows that Shankar's idea of Atma is exactly the same as Kapila's idea of Purusha,—only, according to Shankar, there is only one Atma, while, according to Kapila, there is a plurality of Purushas. Of course, like Shankar's Atma, Kapila's Purusha is all-present (व्यापी), unborn, immortal, and unchangeable.

What then we learn so far about the Sankhya view of Purusha is, that Purusha,—which is distinct from the body, the senses, Manas, Ahankar, and Buddhi,—is essentially eternal (*i.e.*, unborn, immortal, and unchan-

geable), pure, intelligent, and free. The next thing, which we learn about Purusha, is that it is devoid of any agency or capacity for action. This negative characteristic of Purusha is expressed differently in different parts of the Sankhya-sutras. Thus, in one place we read (कर्मणा अन्यधर्मत्वात् ॥ I. 16, *i. e.*,) that action belongs to some thing else than Purusha ? What, then, is it to which action belongs ? We get the answer to this question from the sutra (अहंकारः कर्ता न पुरुषः ॥ VI. 54, that is,) that action belongs, not to Purusha, but to Ahankar, which, as we saw, is, according to the Sankhyas, a part of Prakriti.

It is worth while carefully to try to understand the Sankhya doctrine expressed by the sutra (अहंकारः कर्ता न पुरुषः ॥ *i. e.*,) that action belongs to Ahankar, and not to Purusha. And, therefore, the reader is requested to pay the best of his attention to this point.

We have noticed just now two sutras,—that action belongs to something else than Purusha, and that action belongs to Ahankar and not to Purusha,—from which it clearly follows that, according to the Sankhyas,

agency does not belong to Purusha or Atma. Yet we read, in another sutra (द्रष्टृत्वादिः आत्मनः, करणत्वं इंद्रियाणां ॥ II. 29, that is,) that the fact of being the seer, &c., belongs to Atma or Purusha, and that the instrumentality of seeing, &c., belongs to the senses. Does this mean that the Sankhyas thought in the same way as we do, and that, when they sometimes spoke as if Prakriti or any part of it was the agent and not Purusha, they were simply using convenient, popular, or even careless language ; and that, therefore, we ought not to impose upon them a theory, which they did not hold, and which makes their doctrine seem wrong in the eyes of some of us ? That would be an instance of giving a dog a bad name in order to kill him for having that name.

It must, however, be admitted that the Sankhyas did hold the theory,—whether the theory is right or wrong, is a different question and need not trouble us just now,—the Sankhyas did hold the theory which was above attributed to them, namely, that Purusha or Atma has no agency (कर्तृत्व), and that it, i. e., agency wholly belongs to Prakriti. And what is important to notice

is that the Sutrakar is not even inconsistent when, after having said that action belongs to something else than Atma (कर्मणा अन्यधर्मत्वात्), he says (द्रष्टृत्वादिः आत्मनः करणत्वं इन्द्रियाणाम् ॥) that the fact of being a seer, &c. belongs to Atma. For, according to the Sankhya view, intelligence is not an attribute of Purusha,—for Purusha is without any attribute whatever (निर्गुणत्वात् न चिद्धर्मा),—but intelligence is the nature (स्वभाव) of Purusha; and, therefore, Purusha is, as we saw above, said to be बुद्धस्वभाव, *i. e.*, Purusha is and must ever be a knower. Now, when Purusha is finally freed from the bondage with Prakriti,—*i. e.*, Buddhi, Ahankar, Manas, the senses, &c.,—it knows itself, and nothing else. The same is the case, even while bondage lasts, in the state of what we call absolutely dreamless sleep. But, while bondage lasts, in what we call the states of wakefulness and of dreams, Purusha becomes aware of, or witnesses the objects in what we call the external world. And for its being aware of, or witnessing this the senses are, as was said in the last sutra quoted, the instruments of Purusha. But, on the Sankhya view, the senses are instruments of Purusha, not in the same sense in which we say that they

are, but in quite a different sense. And the difference between our view and the Sankhya view will be understood if we remember that, according to the Sankhya view, Purusha has no control whatever over the senses, &c., which are the instruments of its seeing (द्रष्टृत्व), &c. ; while, according to our view, Atma has control over the senses, through which it perceives.

We may explain this Sankhya idea about the instrumentality of the senses with reference to the seeing (द्रष्टृत्व), &c., of Atma by means of an illustration. Suppose I stand in the front of a door, with my eyes continually open, without the power of shutting them or turning them aside, looking out through the door, opposite to me,—which door, we must also assume, opens and shuts by means of a self-acting machine. Now, under the circumstances supposed, as the door opens, I shall see objects lying outside it, and the door will be rightly called a means (करण) of my being a seer (द्रष्टा) of those objects. But I can be said to have no more agency, with reference to my knowledge of these objects outside the door, than a looking-glass in respect of its reflecting

objects as they come and go. Exactly in the same way, in which I see or rather cannot help seeing objects as the door opens, but have no control over it ; so, on the Sankhya view, Purusha sees, &c., through the senses, without having any control over them. Only, on the Sankhya view, there is one point of connection between Purusha and the movements of its Prakriti. And this point of connection is that Prakriti acts in a particular way in respect of a certain Purusha on account of the particular way in which the man, constituted by the Purusha and Prakriti under consideration, lived in his previous life. Hence the Sutrakar speaks of Purusha as having purchased the particular form of Prakriti at the price of its conduct during the previous life. Thus we read (तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् तदर्थं अभिचेष्टा ॥ II. 46, that is,) that the activity (of Prakriti) is for the sake of this (*i. e.* Purusha), for its having been purchased by its works.

The phrase, “for the sake of it” (तदर्थं), in the above sutra, requires a little explanation. It means—for the benefit of Purusha. But, if action is followed by retribution (भोग), and the necessity of undergoing retribution

requires a new birth (पुनर्जन्म), and thus prevents or postpones Mukti, how is the movement (अभिचेष्टा) of Prakriti for the benefit of Purusha? The answer is that, though action (अभिचेष्टा of प्रकृति) under particular circumstances is the source of a new birth, still, since, before Mukti can be attained, all retribution for past life must be completely undergone, and the movement of Prakriti makes this possible; therefore, the movement of Prakriti is an indirect means for enabling Purusha to attain Mukti. Only the circumstances under which, as was said above, the movements of Prakriti become the cause of re-birth must be prevented. What these circumstances are, and how they are to be prevented, we shall see a little later on.

If we have clearly understood why the Sutrakar says that the movements of Prakriti are for the sake of Purusha (II. 46,) we shall also understand why he says (प्रधानसृष्टिः परार्थम् ॥ III. 58, *i. e.* ,) that it is for the sake of another (*i. e.* , Purusha) that Pradhana creates the world and objects in it; (पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवः...धेनुवत् चत्साय ॥ II. 36-7. *i. e.* ,) that the senses arise for Purusha as the cow for the calf; (सृष्टेः आत्मार्थत्वात् ॥ II. 11, *i. e.* ,) that creation is for Purusha.

Thus, then, I have tried to point out why it must be admitted that, though the senses are called by the Sankhyas the means (करणs) of the seeing, &c. (द्रष्टृत्वादि) which belongs to Atma, yet Atma, according to them, has no agency as we understand it.

Now, as we saw, the Sankhyas divide the senses into two classes,—those of knowledge and those of action. The activities of both are independent of Purusha, except in the sense explained above. But the activities of the senses of knowledge enable Purusha there and then to become a witness of objects in the external world. And so Purusha is so far concerned in the movements of the senses of knowledge, which end in its perception of things ; but only so far as, and not at all more than, a looking-glass is concerned in a reflection of objects being produced in it. While in the movements of the senses of action Purusha is not concerned at all, except that, under particular circumstances to be mentioned hereafter, it will have to undergo retribution on account of those movements in the next life.

Chapter X.

The Sankhya as ascribed to Kapila.—(Continued).

I.

In the last chapter we have seen that Purusha or Atma, according to the Sankhyas, is different from the body, the senses, Manas, Buddhi, and Ahankar (शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः); essentially eternal, pure, intelligent, and free (नित्यशुद्धयुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः); and incapable of action (अकर्ता).

But this view about Purusha necessary raises a question. For, if Purusha is of this nature, how does the Sutrakar say, in the very first sutra, that the¹ complete cessation of pain of three² kinds is the absolute end of Purusha? How can Purusha, which is ever pure, suffer from any pain at all? The answer, that we get from the sutras, is that this pain, to which Purusha is subject,

(¹) त्रिविधदुःख-अत्यन्तनिवृत्तिः अत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ I. 1.

(²) अध्यात्मिक, *i.e.*, due to oneself; अधिर्मात्रिक, *i.e.*, due to the objects in the external world; अधिदैविक, *i.e.*, due to super-natural causes.

is due to bondage (बन्ध). But this answer only gives rise to another question, namely, how can Purusha, which is essentially free (मुक्तस्वभाव), be ever subject to bondage? Or let us first ask,—what is the cause of this bondage? As an answer to this question, the Sutrakar first explains what cannot be the cause of this bondage. Thus we read:—that the bondage¹ of Purusha is not due to its essential nature, for in that case there could be no release,—the nature of a thing being unchangeable; nor can it be² due to its contact with time, for time is associated with all; nor to its connection³ with place for the same reason; nor to any⁴ limiting condition, because that belongs to the body; nor to any⁵ works done, for works belong to something else; nor to the desert⁶ of works, for that too belongs to another; nor to mere⁷ connection

(¹) न स्वभावतः बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधन-उपदेशविधिः ॥ स्वभावस्य अनपायित्वात् ॥ I. 7, 8. (²) न कालयोगतः... सर्वसंबन्धात् ॥ I. 12. (³) न देशयोगतः अपि अस्मात् ॥ I. 13. (⁴) न अवस्थातः देहधर्मत्वात् तस्याः ॥ I. 14. (⁵) न कर्मणा अन्यधर्मत्वात् ॥ I. 16. (⁶) न कर्मणा अपि अतद्धर्मत्वात् ॥ I. 52. (⁷) प्रकृतिनिबन्धनात् चेत् न ॥ I. 18.

with Prakriti ; nor to Avidya¹ or Maya, for what is unreal cannot be the cause of bondage. To what, then, is the bondage of Purusha due ?

In order to understand this, we must remember that though, according to the Sankhyas, Purusha is Akarta, and is incapable of any action which belongs to Prakriti, still they maintain that under particular circumstances, Purusha has to undergo retribution for the acts performed by Prakriti and to be entangled with a body (शरीर). If we ask,—what are these circumstances ? one answer, which we get to this question from the Sankhya-sutras, is that it is not necessary that one, who experiences the fruit of works, should be the agent of those works. For it is well-known that the master or the employer enjoys the fruit of the works done, not by himself, but by his servants (अकर्तुःअपि फलोपभोगः अन्नाद्यवत् ॥ I. 105). And, as we saw above, Purusha buys Prakriti by means of the desert of past life. This explanation, however, is not satisfactory. For, if Purusha is of the

(¹) न अविद्यातःअपि भवस्तु न बन्ध-अयोगात् ॥ I. 20.

nature (स्वभाव) above described, how can the past life and its desert belong to it, with which to buy Prakriti for this life? The analogy of servant and master, therefore, is inapplicable. The comment of Shankar on this point is absolutely true. He says :— The fact, that the responsibility for works done by servants belongs to kings and other employers, is not analogous. For that is due to the relation of servant and master brought about by the payment of money, &c. But, in the case of Atma or Purusha, there is absolutely nothing to establish a similar relation between it and¹ Prakriti.

And the Sutrakar himself sees that the analogy of master and servant does not justify the view that Purusha, though not the agent of works, has to undergo retribution for those works. And he immediately says (अविवेकात् वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुःफलावगमः ॥ I. 106. That is,) that though, as a matter of fact, the agency of works belongs to Prakriti, still Purusha, through want of discri-

(¹) संनिधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वं इति चेत् । न । धनदानादि-उपाजित-भृत्यसंबन्धित्वात् तेषां कर्तृत्व-उपपत्तेः । न तु आत्मनः धनदानादिवत् शरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिसंबन्धनिमित्तं किञ्चित् शक्यं कल्पयितुम् ॥

mination, wrongly thinks that the works are its own ; and, therefore, it has to undergo retribution for those works, as if they were really done by itself.

Thus the answer, which we get from the Sankhya-sutras, is that Purusha has to undergo retribution in another life for the works of Prakriti, if in this life it mistakes Prakriti for itself, and wrongly supposes the works, which really belong to Prakriti, to belong to itself.

But there is yet another explanation contained in the sutras. Since Ahankar is the agent, both the doing of works, and the undergoing of retribution for works, belong to it, *i. e.*, to Ahankar (अहंकारधर्माः हि एते निर्गुणत्वात् ॥ VI. 62) ; but Purusha wrongly thinks that they belong to itself. According to this explanation, the truth of the whole case is that doing and undergoing retribution both belong, in reality, to Ahankar, which is a part of Prakriti. Now Purusha, being, as we saw, essentially intelligent (चिद्रूप), becomes through the senses (करण), aware of Ahankar with its attributes of doing and undergoing retribution (कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व). And since, while it sees these, it is not aware of

itself, therefore, it wrongly thinks Ahankar to be itself, and the attributes of Ahankar to be its own attributes. Consequently, also, though Ahankar suffers pain, Purusha wrongly thinks that it itself is suffering pain. And all this must go on so long as Purusha wrongly thinks Ahankar to be itself, and the attributes of Ahankar to be its own attributes. In other words, Purusha will cease to suffer from all this, when it knows its own true nature, and thus discriminates itself from Ahankar and Prakriti. This we learn from such sutras as the following :— Release follows the knowledge of the cause of bondage. The necessity of undergoing retribution lasts till the attainment of discrimination. When the truth is known, both (agency and retribution) cease. From knowledge follows release, from want of discrimination, bondage. There would actually be neither bondage nor release but for want of discrimination. Though they are the attributes of another, they befall it through want of discrimination. Bondage is due to want of¹ discrimination.

(¹) चिदवसानो भोगः । I. 104 ; न उभयं तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ I. 107 ; विदितवन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्यातद्रूपम् ॥ I. 155 ; ज्ञानात्

The common idea of all these sūtras is, that bondage (बन्ध) is due to want of discrimination (अविवेक). Does this mean that, through or on account of want of discrimination, i.e. on account of wrongly thinking Ahankar to be itself and the attributes of Ahankar to be its own attributes, Purusha gets itself into bondage (बद्ध) in reality? Of course, if Purusha were in bondage from its nature (स्वभाव), there could be no release (मुक्ति) to it on any account; for the nature of a thing is unchangeable. Thus the Sūtrakar says—(न स्वभावतः बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधन उपदेश-विधिः ॥ १७; स्वभावस्य अनपयिष्यत् ॥ १८ 'That is,) there would be no enjoining of the means of liberation to one who is in bondage from nature; for nature is unchangeable. Of what sort then is this bondage to which Purusha, which is ever essentially free (नित्यमुक्तस्वभाव) is subject? To this question the answer of the Sūtra is (जपास्कटिकयोश्च न उपराग किंतु अभिमान ॥ VI 28 'This means) that Purusha is neither really in bondage, i.e. subject to pain, from its nature;

मुक्तिः बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ III 23 १, न एकात्मतः बन्धमोक्षा-
 अविवेकात् ऋते ॥ III 71, परधर्मत्वेऽपि तस्मिन्निहि अविवेकात् ॥
 VI. 11, विपर्ययात् बन्धः ॥ I 56.

nor does it temporarily fall into real bondage on account of some external cause. But, just as a crystal seems to have changed its appearance when something is reflected in it, but really remains the same; in the same way, Purusha seems to itself to be subject to bondage on account, as it were, of the reflection of Ahankar with its attributes of doing and undergoing retribution,—which Purusha wrongly supposes to be itself and its own attributes. So, there is in reality neither essential bondage, nor any temporary bondage due to some external cause. But the idea, that Purusha is in bondage, is simply a fancy on its own part due to want of discrimination (अविवेक).

Further, the Sutrakar maintains (अनादिः अविवेकः अन्यथा दोषद्वयप्रसक्तेः ॥ VI. 12. That is,) that this want of discrimination, through which Purusha wrongly supposes Ahankar to be itself and the attributes of Ahankar (*i. e.*, कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व,) to be its own attributes—this want of discrimination is without a beginning. For if it were not so, this doctrine would have two defects. For, if the Aviveka (अविवेक) had a beginning, then the beginning cannot, on the Sankhya

view about the nature of Purusha, be accounted for ; and secondly, if the Aviveka could occur without any cause, then the Purushas, which have become mukta through discrimination (विवेक), may again become subject to Aviveka, and therefore to bondage also. But the Sankhya view is "once mukta always mukta (न मुक्तस्य पुनः बन्धयोगः ॥ VI. 17)." Therefore, the Aviveka must be regarded as beginningless (अनादि)

But, if the Aviveka must be regarded as beginningless, it must, on the other hand, be supposed to be capable of coming to an end (संत) ; otherwise it could never come to an end ; and, therefore, there could be the possibility neither of attaining discrimination nor of attaining Mukti to any Purusha (न नित्यः स्यात् अन्यथा अनुच्छित्तिः ॥ VI. 13).

II.

If, then, the true end of Purusha is the cessation of all pain, and if all pain is due to bondage, how is this bondage to be got rid of, so as to be completely free from all pain ? But if, as we saw, Aviveka is the cause of bondage, the primary question is,

how is this Aviveka to be got rid of, and Viveka attained? As the first part of the answer to this question, we are told by the Sutrakar:—(न अनुश्रविकात् तत्सिद्धिः । साध्यत्वेन आवृत्तियोगात् अपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ I. 82. That is,) this 'end of Purusha (*i. e.* विवेकप्राप्ति) cannot be achieved through the performance of Scriptural rites, *i. e.* sacrifices, &c. ; for, since there is the possibility of rebirth (पुनर्जन्म) through what is accomplished through works,—this performance cannot be a means to the attainment of Mukti.

Nor can this end be gained by mere listening to teaching (उपदेश) or by study :—(न श्रवणमात्रात् तत्सिद्धिः, अनादिवासनायाः बलवत्त्वात् ॥ II. 3. That is,) the end is not accomplished by mere hearing of advice ; because of the forcibleness of the impressions from eternity. The same idea is expressed in another sutra :—(न उपदेशश्रवणेपि कृतकृत्यता परामर्शात् ऋते ॥ IV. 17) Mere instruction or study is not enough without reflection. For (न मलिनचेतासि उपदेशबीजप्ररोहः ॥ IV. 29) the seed of instruction does not sprout in one whose mind is disturbed. This disturbance, we are told, is caused by desires. And neither can these desires nor the dis-

turbance arising from them, be got rid of, if we pursue those desires (न भोगाद्राग-
क्षांतिः ॥ IV. 27). And hence we are not
surprised to be told that (विरक्तस्य तत्सिद्धेः ॥
II. 2) the end can be achieved only by
one who is free from passion, i. e. desires,
feelings, &c., Therefore a man, who has
attained this state of mind (विरक्ति) has ful-
filled all the negative conditions of success
or सिद्धि (विरक्तस्य हेयहानं उपादेय उपादानम् ॥
IV. 23).

Similarly, we must not allow the mind to
be distracted by external objects ; but must
resort to meditation or concentration (ध्यानं),
which means that the mind must be drawn
away from all external objects (ध्यानं निर्वि-
षयं मनः ॥ VI. 25). And to facilitate this,
it is necessary to concentrate attention on
one object (न एकचित्तस्य समाधिहानिः ॥ IV.
14).

All this practical advice is summed up in
a single sutra :—(तत्त्वाभ्यासात् नेतिनेतित्यागात्
विवेकसिद्धिः ॥ III. 75. That is.) that Viveka
is attained through abandonment of every
thing expressed by no, no, and through the
study of philosophy, of course, of the
Sankhyas.

From the nature (स्वभाव) of Purusha, described above, the following sutras will be easily understood :—(असंगः अयं पुरुषः ॥ I. 15 ; औदासीन्यं च ॥ I. 163 ; that is,) Purusha is indifferent and without attachment.

One more Sankhya doctrine about Purusha must be noticed. Though the Sankhyas hold that Aviveka is the cause of Purusha's fancy about its being in bondage, and Viveka is the cause of the removal of this fancy about bondage ; still all that the Sankhyas assert, with certainty, is that to Purusha, which has attained Viveka, there shall be no rebirth (पुनर्जन्म). However, it does not necessarily follow that the attainment of Viveka will at once put an end to the present life. Nay, they have to admit the fact of what are called Jivan-muktas (जीवन्मुक्तः), that is, those Purushas, which have attained Viveka, and yet have not ceased to live the mortal life. For the Sankhyas say, if the fact of Jivan-muktatva (जीवन्मुक्तत्व) were not admitted, how could we have learnt the true nature of our souls, and the cause of their bondage and the means of putting an end to it (उपदेश्य-उपदेष्टृत्वात् तत्सिद्धिः । III. 79, इतरथा

अंधपरंपरा : III, 81) ? And this fact of Jivan-muktatva is accounted for by the Sāṃkhya as the effect of the impression received previous to the rise of Viveka (संस्कारलेशतः तत्सिद्धिः : III, 83) It should be observed that this view of Jivan-muktatva is exactly like the Gitakar's view about Sthita-prajñatva or Gunatitatva.

Chapter XI.

the Yoga of Patanjali.

I.

Thus, then, we see that, according both to the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya philosophies, the attainment of self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान) is the sole means of securing Mukti after death. But Śaṅkar teaches that, until we attain this self-knowledge, we may live in the saṁsāra state, and do all the duties that are expected of us on account of our living in that state; only at the same time that we do all this, we must study the Vedānta, which, as we saw, is the means of attaining self-knowledge.¹ According to the Sāṅkhya view, which goes a step further, the attainment of self-knowledge requires, not only

(1) It should be noticed, however, that even Śaṅkar, as we saw, says that, though a man living in the saṁsāra state is entitled to the study of the Vedānta, yet, in order that he may secure Mukti, his study of the Vedānta must be accompanied with the renouncement of saṁsāra.

instruction, study, and reflection (परामर्श), which again requires freedom from passion (विरक्ति), meditation (ध्यान), and concentration (एकचित्त); but also absolute renouncement of all works,—including the prescribed religious works. Yet there is no necessity for renouncing sansar and residing in a desert. You may live where you please. If, by observing the Sankhya--precepts, you once attain discrimination (विवेक), you at once become, though not absolutely free (देहमुक्त), at least practically free (जीवन्मुक्त), and the bondage really and finally ceases. For, as the Sutrakar says, (न मुक्तस्य पुनःबन्ध-योगः ॥) one, who has attained freedom, cannot become subject to bondage again.

But here comes in the advocate of the Dhyana-yoga (ध्यानयोग) or the Abhyasa-yoga (अभ्यासयोग) or Samadhi-yoga (समाधि-योग). He agrees that self-knowledge is the sole means of Mukti. But he says that, just as mere instruction or study is not enough for the attainment of self-knowledge; so also a mere momentary glimpse of Atma is not enough. The self-knowledge, once gained, must be retained, if it is to lead to Mukti. And hence it is absolutely necessary that

Now¹ an exposition of Yoga (is to be made). Yoga is the suppression of the transformations of Chitta. Then the seer (Atma) abides in itself. But otherwise it becomes assimilated with the transformations of Chitta. The transformations are five :—Knowledge, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. The suppression² of these is secured by application and non-attachment ; Application is the effort towards fixity. This application becomes a firm habit when practised for a long time with perfect devotion and without intermission. Non-attachment is the consciousness of having mastered every desire. In the³ case of one, the transformations of whose Chitta have been annihilated, there is entire identity with, and complete absorption in, the seer, the sight, and the seen, like a transparent jewel.

(¹) अथ योगानुशासनम् ॥ योगः चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपे अवस्थानम् ॥ वृत्तिसारूप्यं इतरत्र ॥ वृत्तयः पञ्च ॥ प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥ I. 1-6. (²) अभ्यासः वैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥ तत्र स्थितौ यतनः अभ्यासः ॥ सः तु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यसत्कारासेवितः दृढभूमिः ॥ वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥ I. 12-15. (³) क्षीणवृत्तेः अभिजातस्य इव मणेः गृहीतग्रहणग्राह्येषु तत्स्थितदञ्जनता समापत्तिः ॥ I. 41.

having thought and self subdued, renouncing hope and all belongings. Having placed himself in a fixed seat, in a cleanly spot, neither high nor low, and furnished with a cloth, a deerskin, and kusha grass ; there let him have his attention fixed on some one object exclusively, and, having all the workings of the senses and of thought restrained, let him practise devotion for the purification of the soul¹. Holding his body, head, and neck constantly unmoved, gazing steadfastly on the tip of his nose, and looking not around ; tranquil in soul, exempt from fear, steadfast in the vow of a Brahmachari, restraining mind, let him sit in devotion, intently thinking on God². Further let him absolutely renounce all desires and restrain all the

(1) योगी युञ्जीत सततं आत्मानं रहसि स्थितः ।

एकाकी यतचित्तात्मा निराशीः अपरिग्रहः ॥

शुचौ देशे प्रतिष्ठाप्य स्थिरं आसनं आत्मनः ।

नात्युच्छ्रितं न अतिनीचं चैलाजिनकुशोत्तरम् ॥

तत्र एकाग्रं मनः कृत्वा यतचित्तेन्द्रियक्रयः ।

उपविश्य आसने युञ्ज्यात् योगं आत्मविशुद्धये ॥ VI. 10-12

(2) समं कायशिरोग्रीवं धारयन् अचलं स्थिरः ।

संप्रेक्ष्य नासिकाग्रं स्वं दिशः च अनवलोकयन् ॥

senses from all distraction. Thus step by step he may gain repose by the mind being firmly restrained. Then, having caused the mind to remain within itself, let him wholly cease to think¹. As often as the wavering and unsteadfast mind wanders away, so often let him subdue it and bring it back to the control of the soul.² When he is able to fix his well-controlled attention on Atma alone, and is unaffected by every object of desire, then he is called "devoted³,"

प्रज्ञाशान्ता विगतभीः ब्रह्मचारिमेते स्थितः ।

मनः संयम्य गच्छितः युक्तः आसीत मात्सरः ॥ VI. 13-14

(¹) संकल्पप्रभवान् कामान् त्यक्त्वा सर्वान् अशेषतः ।

मनसा एव इन्द्रियग्रामं विनियम्य समंततः ॥

शान्तिः शान्तिः उपरमेत् बुद्ध्या धृतिगृहीतया ।

आत्मसंस्थं मनः कृत्वा न किञ्चित् अपि चिन्तयेत् ॥ VI.

24-25.

(²) यतः यतः निधरति मनः चंचलं आस्थिरम् ।

ततः ततः नियम्य एतत् आत्मनि एव वशं नयेत् ॥ VI.

26.

(³) यदा विनियतं चित्तं आत्मनि एव अवतिष्ठते ।

निःस्पृहः सर्वकामेभ्यः युक्तः इति उच्यते तदा ॥ VI. 18.

The Yogi, thus constantly devout in soul with his mind subdued, attains to peace, the Supreme Nirvana that is in¹ God. The Yogi, who thus ever unites his soul with Brahma, who has ceased from sin, enjoys easily the boundless happiness of union with Brahma².

This recognition of the Samadhi-yoga by the Gitakar as one of the means of attaining self-knowledge should be remembered in connection with what has been pointed out in a previous chapter³, i.e., that, in order to bring about the mental state which is an essential condition, according to the Gitakar, of practising Karma-yoga-bhakti, recourse to the Samadhi-yoga is necessary.

(¹) युंजन् एवं सदा आत्मानं योगी नियतमानसः ।

शांतिं निर्वाणपरमां मत्संस्थानं अधिगच्छति ॥ VI. 15.

(²) युंजन् एवं सदा आत्मानं योगी विगतकल्मषः ।

सुखेन ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शं अत्यंतं सुखं अदनुते ॥ VI. 28.

(³) See above. pp. 95-98.

Chapter XII.

The Gita, the Sankhya, and the Mīmāṃsā.

I.

An attempt has been made in the last six chapters to give a brief, yet clear, account of the teachings of Shrukar, the Sankhyas, and Patanjali. The reader, no doubt, remembers the object with which this account has been given. A consideration of the teaching of the Gita showed that, though the Gitakar insists upon our doing such works as it is our duty to do, yet a portion,—and by far the larger portion,—of his teaching leads to asceticism (वैराग्य), pure and simple. This inconsistency between the two parts of the teaching of the Gita gave rise to the question,—Which of these two parts is acceptable? In order to decide this question, it was necessary to consider the value of each of the two parts. Proceeding to estimate the value of that portion of the teaching of the Gita which leads to asceticism, we found that the best and most convenient way of doing this was first to estimate the value of asceticism itself as a theory of life. This

could not, however, be done satisfactorily unless we had first considered the value of those systems of philosophy on which the Indian Asceticism is, or may be, founded. These systems are the Sankhya as ascribed to Kapila, the Vedanta as expounded by Shankar, and the Yoga of Patanjali. And, as a preliminary to the systematic consideration of their value, we were engaged in studying these systems of philosophy in the last six chapters. Now, therefore, we are prepared to consider their value. Deferring, however, this consideration to a later chapter, it is intended to point out the relation of the teaching of the Gitakar to that of the Sankhyas and of the followers of the two Mimamsas, in this chapter, and the relation of his teaching to that of Shankar in the next chapter¹.

Even a very cursory reading of the Gita is enough to convince those, who are acquainted with the Sankhya system of philosophy, that the Sankhya doctrine existed

(1) In these two chapters I have tried to make the relations clear even at the cost of repeating what was already said.

at the time when the Gita was composed,—though it may not be possible to assert with confidence what its exact form then was. Further, not only did the Sankhya doctrine, in its earliest development, exist at the time when the Gita was composed, but there seems no doubt that the Gitakar accepted a part of the Sankhya doctrine almost without any modification. This part is the Sankhya doctrine about Prakriti and Purusha, explained above in the ninth chapter. For instance, the Gitakar tells us :—That¹ Prakriti and Purusha are both without beginning, and that the modifications and gunas spring from Prakriti. It is easy to see that this passage contains the Sankhya doctrine of creation without modification. Here Prakriti must evidently be taken to mean the Avyakta Prakriti or Pradhana of the Sankhyas.

If the above passage summarises the Sankhya doctrine of creation, the following passage gives expression to the Sankhya

(¹) प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्धि अनादी उर्गा अदि । विकारान् च गुणान् चैव विद्धि प्रकृतेर्लभ्यान् ॥ XIII, 10.

doctrine of destruction as well as the Sankhya doctrine of creation :—All the¹ manifested (*i.e.*, visible) things and beings spring from the Avyakta at the approach of Ahar (*i.e.*, the time of creation) ; they dissolve in the same Avyakta at the advent of Ratri (*i.e.*, the time of dissolution).

The following passage gives a rough account of the constituents of Prakriti,—not the Avyakta Prakriti, but Prakriti in the wider sense :—Earth², water, fire, air, ether, Manas, Buddhi, and Ahankar,—these constitute the eightfold division of Prakriti. Lastly, two slokas³, already quoted, give a full account of the constituents of Prakriti in the wider sense. All the parts mentioned in these two slokas constitute Prakriti and its modifications. Which of them constitute Prakriti and which are the modifications of

(¹) अव्यक्तात् व्यक्तयः सर्वाः प्रभवन्ति अहरागमे । रात्र्यागमे प्रलीयन्ते तत्रैव अव्यक्तसंज्ञके ॥ VIII. 18. (²) भूमिः आपः अनलः वायुः खं मनः बुद्धिः एव च । अहंकारः इति इयं... भिन्ना प्रकृतिः अष्टधा ॥ VII. 4. (³) XIII. 5, 6; quoted on page 24.

Prakriti? We get an answer to this question by a reference to the Sankhya doctrine.¹ For there we learn that Prakriti is constituted by the Avyakta, Buddhi, Ahankara, and the five Tanmatras (form, taste, smell, touch, and sound); while the modifications are sixteen, i. e., the ten senses, Manas, and the five Mahabhutas (earth, water, light, air, and ether). From this we see that the eightfold Prakriti of the Gita is not exactly the same as that of the Sankhyas. The explanation seems to be that the sloka in the Gita, which describes the eightfold Prakriti, contains a popular, or an earlier philosophical, doctrine about Prakriti. For it is conceivable that the mere classification of visible things should have preceded the stage of hypothesis about the Avyakta, and of analysis which reduced the Mahabhutas to Tanmatras. So, at this later stage of analysis and hypothesis, the Tanmatras and the Avyakta would form a part of the eightfold Prakriti, the Mahabhutas being included in the modifications. And by the same process Manas, being regarded simply as an internal sense

(1) See the Sankhya Karikas.

became a modification like the other senses. Of course, the latest stage¹ would be that at which it was recognized that the Avyakta alone was Prakriti, while all the rest were modifications of it. Still, however we may explain it, it must be admitted that the Gitakar's idea of the eightfold Prakriti is different from that which we find in the earliest Sankhya text known to us. As regards the modifications, the Gitakar's list includes all the modifications of the Sankhyas, but he further mentions desire, hate, pleasure, pain, body, consciousness, and retentiveness. This difference, however, is not very important and need not detain us.

So far, then, we are not able to discover any material difference between the Gitakar's idea of Prakriti and that of the Sankhyas. The Gitakar's Prakriti, in its wider sense, has the same constituents as that of the Sankhyas ; while, in its narrower sense, that is, in the sense of the Avyakta Prakriti, the Gitakar's Prakriti, like that of the Sankhyas, is beginningless (अनादि), is the material

(1) This view is found in the Sankhya sutras, see above. p.193.

cause of everything that exists except Purushas, and the creator and destroyer of everything that exists except Purushas. But now we must notice a difference between the doctrine of the Gitakar and that of the Sankhyas about Prakriti. This difference may be indicated by saying that, according to the Sankhyas, nothing exists except Prakriti and its modifications, on the one hand, and Purushas, on the other; and that Prakriti works by itself. While, according to the Gitakar, besides Prakriti and Purushas, there exists Brahman, Ishvar, or God; and Prakriti does not work by itself, but it belongs to God, and so far as creation, &c., is concerned, God works through or by means of Prakriti.

Thus we see that we do not understand the Gitakar's complete and, therefore, true doctrine about creation, &c., from the passages just referred to. But we must take them in connection with other¹ passages in the Gita about creation, &c., which are supplementary to them. And hence, in order to understand the whole and true view of

(1) VII. 10, V. 8, V. 39, —quoted above on page 6

the Gitakar, as well as to see how he differs from the Sankhyas, so far as this point is concerned, we must combine¹ the ideas contained in these two sets of passages,—looking upon Prakriti as belonging to God, and upon God as creating, &c., by means of Prakriti.

From this we see that the Gitakar accepts the Sankhya doctrine about Prakriti so far as its nature and constituents are concerned. But it is also evident that he does not make Prakriti the sole source of the creation, &c., of everything,—as the Sankhyas did,—but only a partner, as it were, in the work of creation, &c., with God, who is the other partner. We also notice that, though, according to the Gitakar, there are two partners, God and Prakriti, in the business of creation, &c., still they are not equal partners. The difference between them is that God is the intelligent and active partner, while Prakriti is the non-intelligent and passive partner, and, therefore, under the control of God. And all the attributes, such as being beneficent, and friendly towards

(1) IX. 10 ; XIV. 3 ; IX. 8 ; XIV. 4 ; XIII. 26 ;—quoted above on page 9.

man,—which were or came to be attributed to Prakṛiti by the Sannyās,—are attributed by the Gītakar¹ to God possessing Prakṛiti.

II.

Here we must notice that, as the Gītakar accepted the idea of Prakṛiti from the Sannyās, and handed it over to God as his passive helpmate, as it were, in the work of creation, &c. ; similarly he seems to have accepted the idea of God from the Sanskrit religious literature as it existed at the time when the Gita was composed. For, whatever the particular date of the composition of the Gita may be, it is certain that the Gita was composed after the R̥gveda, the Purva-Mīmāṃsā or Karma-Kāṇḍa, and the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā or Jñāna-Kāṇḍa had been long in existence, and become authoritative on religious matters. And it is easy to see that, of the three forms of God which we find in the Gita, one must have been taken from the Karma-Kāṇḍa, while another from the Jñāna-Kāṇḍa, i.e., the Dasha-Upniṣads.

(1) See above p. 11.

For even in the Rigveda we meet with an idea of God which is described in such passages as the following :—The one¹ God who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, arms, feet ; who, when producing heaven and earth, shapes them with his arms and wings. Who² is our father, our creator, maker ; who knows every place and every creature ; by whom alone to gods their names are given ; to whom all other creatures go to ask him. He was³ the one born lord of all that is. He established the earth and this sky. He gives life, he gives strength ; his command all the gods revere ; his shadow is immortality, his shadow is death. ¶ He, through his greatness, is the one king of the breathing world, he governs man and beast. Through him the sky is bright, and the earth firm. He is the sole life of gods. He alone is god above all the gods. May he not harm us, who created this earth ; who,

(¹) विश्वतः-चक्षुः उत विश्वतः-मुखः विश्वतः-बाहुः उत विश्वतःपात् । सं बाहुभ्यां धमति सं पतत्रैः यावोभूमी जनयन् देवः एकः ॥ X. 81, 3. (²) यः नः पिता जानीता यः विधाता धामानि वेद भुवनानि विश्वा । यः देवानां नामधा एकः एव सं प्रश्नं भुवना यन्ति अन्या ॥ X. 82, 3. (³) X. 121.

ruling by ordinances, created the heaven; who also created the bright and mighty waters. O Prajapati, with whatever objects in view we may offer you sacrifices, may all those objects be fulfilled, may we be the lords of wealth!

According to this idea of God, God is the omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent creator of the universe, the father and protector of man, and the fulfiller of all the desires of man in return for sacrifices performed by man to him. Now it seems that the authors and the followers of the Purva-Mimamsa simply accepted this idea of God and, without caring to think out the nature of God and man, and their mutual relation further and further, devoted all their attention to the consideration of the means of propitiating God, and thus securing from him the highest objects of desire. And their watch-word was—"he, who is desirous of the heavenly world (सर्ग), should perform sacrifice."

Now, if we set aside the element of Prakriti, it would seem that the Gitakar's idea of God, as we have so far dealt with it in

this chapter, does not, in any way, differ from the idea of God as described in the passages from the Rigveda quoted just now. So far then the Gitakar accepts the idea of God to be found in the Rigveda and the Purva-Mimansa. Now, according to the Rigveda and the Purva-Mimansa, God is to be propitiated by the performance of sacrifices (यज्ञs). And, if we remember that this injunction was meant only for the Brahmanas, —the other classes, of course, being left to perform their ordinary duties—*i. e.*, the Kshatriyas to fight, the Vaishyas to carry on agriculture, trade, and commerce, and the Shudras to serve ; and, if we further notice that these three classes have the same works to perform even according to the Gita ; and, lastly, if we bear in mind that the Gitakar's list of the inevitable duties of man begins with sacrifice (यज्ञ) :—Works¹ of sacrifice, alms, and penance must not be given up, but must needs be done ; sacrifice, alms, and penance are the means of purifying the wise ; —if we remember all this, there seems no

(¹) यज्ञदानतपःकर्म न त्याज्यं कार्यं एव तत् ।

यज्ञःदानं तपः चैव पावनानि मनीषिणाम् ॥ XVIII. 5.

reason to think that even the method, which the Gitakar points out, that is, Karma-yoga-bhakti, in any way essentially differs from the way to be found in the Karma-Kanda except that, according to the Gitakar, these duties are to be done without any desire for fruit, which must be absolutely given up, and, together with desire for fruit, must be given up also all desire, greed, anger, love, hate, joy, sorrow, grief, fear, friendship, attachment, hope, belongings, and ownership (ममत्त्व). And evidently this shows the influence of the Uttara-Mimamsa and of the Sankhya view of life upon the Gitakar.

III.

For if, according to the Purva-Mimamsa, the end of man was to secure the heavenly kingdom (स्वर्ग); according to the Uttara-Mimamsa and the Sankhya doctrine, the end of man was to secure Mukti, that is, freedom from the bondage of sansar (संसार) and rebirth (पुनर्जन्म), and the recovery, as it were, of Atma's original purity and freedom. But since, according to the law of karma or works, a man must undergo retribution in the next life for whatever works he does in this life, the performance of works requires

rebirth and, therefore, prevents or postpones Mukti. The Sankhyas, therefore, taught that, if we want to secure Mukti, we must give up all works, and gain self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान) as the only means of Mukti. So, on the one hand, there were the mere Karma- Margees, *i.e.*, the followers of the Purva-Mimansa, who maintained that God can be propitiated only by means of performing works, and that the end of man is to secure the heavenly kingdom by means of the performance of sacrifices (कर्म). The mere Jnana-Margees, on the other hand, taught that the Atma of man is identical with the highest and truest form of God ; and, therefore, according to them as also according to the Sankhyas, self-knowledge was the sole means required to attain the true end of man, *i. e.*, Mukti, and that works, being the source of bondage and rebirth, must be given up altogether.

Now the Gitakar tries to reconcile these more or less opposite views. But, as it is easy to see from the fourth chapter of this book, he fails, and only effects a sort of compromise in theory, which is incapable of being put into practice. What he does is that he separates himself from the mere Karma-

Margees, so far as they maintain that the end of man is the attainment of the heavenly kingdom (स्वर्ग) ; and accepts the view of the mere Jnana-Margees that the end of man is Mukti as explained above. He also agrees with the mere Jnana-Margees in maintaining that self-knowledge is the true means of attaining Mukti. He also accepts, as we shall see, the Sankhya idea of the nature of the human soul. But he disagrees with the Sankhyas and the mere Jnana-Margees, so far as they hold that works *must* be altogether given up in order to attain self-knowledge. But, even in this respect, the difference between the Gitakar and the mere Jnana-Margees is not essential. For the Gitakar admits that self-knowledge can be attained by means of the Sankhya-yoga ; but he says that that course is extremely difficult for man. He points out, therefore, another way of gaining self-knowledge, which, he says, is much easier than and, therefore, preferable to the Sankhya-yoga. This method is what is known as Karma-yoga-bhakti. This method, as we saw, consists in performing all the works, which we have to do, by giving up all desire for fruit, and dedicating the works done to God. This Karma-yoga-

bhakti, the Gitakar says, has many advantages on its side. First, it is works done with the desire for fruit which, according to the Gitakar, are the source of bondage, and not the works which are done without the desire for fruit. So, Karma-yoga-bhakti, though it requires the performance of works, is not a source of bondage. Secondly, Karma-yoga-bhakti, though it is not the direct means of attaining self-knowledge, is the indirect means of securing this knowledge. For it propitiates God who, through his grace, supplies us with that knowledge. Its result, therefore, is the same as that of the direct pursuit of self-knowledge by means of the Sankhya-yoga. And, thirdly, the Gitakar maintains that this method of Karma-yoga-bhakti, while its result is the same, is much more easy than the Sankhya-yoga.

But, further, the Gitakar maintains that this Karma-yoga-bhakti is the only method possible of attaining self-knowledge and Mukti on account of the nature of Atma,—in the doctrine about which, the Gitakar and the Sankhyas agree. For, as we saw, the Sankhyas hold that Atma is akarta (अकर्ता), and that agency belongs to Prakriti ; and

further, that the Prakriti of an individual in this life works in conformity with the retribution (भोग) which that Atma has to undergo on account of the past life ; and lastly, unless and until all this retribution is undergone, there can be no Mukti. On this theory, all of which the Gitakar accepts, there are two objections to giving up works. The first is that, if all work is stopped in this life, then the retribution for the past life cannot be completed, and, therefore, a new life will be required, and so Mukti will be postponed. But the second, and insuperable, objection to the giving up of all work is that, work being performed independently of Atma by Prakriti, Atma cannot stop¹ it. For these two reasons the Gitakar teaches that, instead of foolishly thinking of giving up all work,—which you cannot do,—unhesitatingly allow every act, that must be done, to be done ; only take care of one thing, namely, do not entertain desire for the fruit of any act which is being done by your Prakriti ; but simply let it be done as a duty, that is, as a part of the retribution for the past life, *i.e.*, as a necessary though indirect means of Mukti *i.e.*, as dedicated to God.

(1) See above, p. 18.

IV.

In order to complete this account, it should be noticed that, just as the Gitakar made a compromise between the methods of propitiating God, taught by the mere Karma-Margees and the mere Jnana-Margees, he also made a compromise between the Karma-Margees' idea of God and the Jnana-Margees' idea of God. And this compromise was that he accepted both the ideas,—God, according to the idea of the Karma-Margees, was to be propitiated by Karma-yoga-bhakti; while God, according to the idea of the Jnana-Margees, was to be propitiated by the attainment of knowledge, *i. e.* true Atma-Jnana alone, which is to be obtained through the Sankhya-yoga. This is the case, if the object of the worshipper be Mukti. But, if the object is something else, *e. g.*, worldly advantage from wealth, health, &c. up to the kingdom of heaven (स्वर्ग), then the worshipper may propitiate the Karma-Margees' God with the desire for fruit, *i. e.*, in conformity with the precepts of the Karma-Kanda. Thus we see that, just as the Gitakar makes room for the mere Jnana-Margees after pointing out that, though the end they seek is right, the method they choose is extremely difficult; exactly

in the same way, he makes room for the mere Karma-Margees after telling them that the end they are seeking is not the true end of man.

It was said above that the Gitakar accepts the Sankhya view about the nature of the human soul, one part of which is that Atma has no agency,—neither by way of doing an act nor preventing it.¹ And, of course, if the human soul has no agency in this sense, then it necessarily follows that it has not what we call freedom of the will. Thus, according to the Gitakar's view, the human soul has neither agency nor freedom as we understand it.

But then it may be asked, if it were the Gitakar's view that Atma has no agency, how could he have also held :—That Parusha² or Atma has to experience pleasure and pain, as retribution (for acts),—especially as this, is the second line of the sloka, the first³ line of which is taken to imply that Atma has no

(1) See pp 25-6

(²) पुरुष सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतु उच्यते ॥ XIII.20.

(³) कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतु प्रकृतिः उच्यते ॥

agency? How would the Gitakar say in the same breath that Atma has no agency, and yet that it has to undergo retribution for acts? The answer is that, though according to the Gitakar, as according to the Sankhyas, Atma has no agency, yet he, like them, holds that Atma wrongly supposes that the acts, which are done by Prakriti, are its own acts. That the Sankhyas maintain this, was shown above,¹—this is included in what they call *Aviveka*. That the Gitakar also holds the same view, is clear from the following passage²:—All works are entirely done by the *gunas* of Prakriti; but Atma, being bewildered by *Ahankar*, thinks “I am the doer.”

And this wrong supposition, on the part of Atma, is the sole cause of the necessity of undergoing retribution to which it is subject according to the Gitakar, as according to the Sankhyas. That this is so, according to the Sankhyas, was shown above.³ That the

(1) See p. 206.

(2) प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।

अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्ता अहं इति मन्यते ॥ III. 27.

(3) See p. 207.

Gitakar holds the same view will be clear if we remember that, on his view, attachment to actions (कर्मसंग), together with the desire for fruit (कर्मफलेच्छा), is the source of bondage and rebirth ; while this attachment (कर्मसंग) and desire (कर्मफलेच्छा) are due to¹ the illusion of Atma just referred to.

Thus, whatever we may think of it, there is, as the Gitakar thinks, no inconsistency between the absence of agency and the necessity of undergoing retribution.

But further it is said, if the Gitakar thought that Atma has neither agency nor freedom of action, how could he have said "do this and do that". For instance, how could he have said :—Seek refuge² in God with all thy soul ; then shalt thou obtain, by his grace, supreme repose, the eternal seat.' How, it is argued, would the Gitakar have asked us to follow the advice contained in this line, unless he thought that we had the power to follow or not to follow this

(1) प्रकृतेः गुणसंमूढाः सज्जते गुणकर्मसु ॥ III.29.

(2) तं एव शरणं गच्छ सर्वभावेन... । तत्प्रसादात् परां शान्तिं स्थानं प्राप्स्यसि शाश्वतम् ॥ XVIII. 62.

advice ? All, that need be said here on this point, is that it is the followers and admirers of the Gita who must answer this question instead of asking it. But it may be pointed out that the Sankhyas also, as we saw above, hold that Purusha is akarta, and yet teach that works, desires, &c. should be given up. And that Shankar goes a step further ; for he tries to reconcile the propriety¹ of giving advice with the akartritva of Atma.

(1) See above, p. 133.

Chapter XIII.

The Gita and the Vedānta.

I.

Let us now pass on to the Vedānta as expounded by Śhrīkar in order to see how its doctrine is related to the teaching of the Gita. We have already seen that the practical precepts of the Vedānta are simply a restatement of the practical teaching of the Gita. For both of them agree that the attainment of self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान) is,—or is the sole means of attaining,—Mukti.¹ Both the Gita and the Vedānta admit the possibility of attaining self-knowledge by means of reading—understanding—reflection through the help of those who have already attained this knowledge,—this method requiring the

(¹) Thus the Gitakar says :—यत् ज्ञात्वा न पुनः मोहं एवं यास्यसि... । येन भूतानि अशेषेण द्रक्ष्यसि आत्मनि अयो मयि ॥ अपि चेत् असि पापिभ्यः सर्वेभ्यः पापकृत्तमः । सर्वं ज्ञानप्लवेन एव वृजिनं संतरिष्यसि ॥ यथा एधांसि समिद्धः आग्निः भस्मसात् कुर्वते... । ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात् कुर्वते तथा ॥ न हि ज्ञानेन सदृशं पवित्रं दृढं विद्यते ॥ IV. 35-38 ; यः तु आत्मरतिः एव स्यात् आत्मतृप्तः च मानवः । आत्मनि

absolute abandonment of all works.¹ Both, however, point out that this method of attaining self-knowledge is too difficult for² man ; and, therefore, teach that, instead of troubling himself with the renunciation of works, a man should do all the works, which constitute his duty both as a man and as a member of a particular caste, only he should give up all the desire for the fruit of those works. Both agree that the performance of all works in this manner will indirectly

एव च संतुष्टः तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥ नैव तस्य कृतेन अर्थः न
अकृतेन इह कश्चन । न च अस्य सर्वभूतेषु कश्चित् अर्थव्यपाश्रयः ॥
III. 17-18 ; यः मां पश्यति सर्वत्र सर्वं च मयि पश्यति ।
तस्य अहं न प्रणश्यामि सः च मे न प्रणश्यति ॥ VI. 30.
As to Shankar, see above, p. 153.

(¹) लोके अस्मिन् द्विविधा निष्ठा पुरा प्रोक्ता... । ज्ञान-
योगेन सांख्यानं कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् ॥ III. 3 ; संन्यासः
कर्मयोगः च निःश्रेयसकरौ उभौ ॥ V. 2 ; ये तु भक्षरं
अनिर्देश्यं अव्यक्तं पर्युपासतो सर्वत्रगं अचिंत्यं च कूटस्थं अचलं
ध्रुवं ॥ ...ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मां एव... ॥ XII. 3-4 ; तत् विद्धि
प्राणिपातेन पारिप्रश्नेन सेवया । उपदेक्ष्यन्ति ते ज्ञानं ज्ञानिनः
तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥ IV. 34. As to the Vedānta, see above,
pp. 165-171. (²) संन्यासः तु...दुःखं आप्तुं अयोगतः ॥
V. 6 ; अव्यक्ता हि गतिः दुःखं देहवाद्भिः अवाप्यते ॥ XII. 5.

contribute to and facilitate the attainment of self-knowledge.¹ Finally, according to both, it is wrong to perform any works from the desire for their fruit ; for such performance, instead of contributing to the attainment of self-knowledge, obstructs and defers it. All this we have already seen. The only thing, therefore, that remains to be considered in this chapter is the relation between the teaching of the Gita and the doctrine of the Vedānta, as expounded by Shankar, regarding the respective natures of the human soul, of God, and of the material world, and their mutual relation.

It may be noticed, in passing, that, at the time when Shankar lived, the Gita had come to be recognised by the Hindus as one of the works of absolute authority in matters of religion and philosophy. So much so that no doctrine of philosophy or religion had any chance of being accepted by the Hindus,

(¹) न हि ज्ञानेन सदृशं पवित्रं इह विद्यतो तत् स्वयं योगसंसिद्धः
कालेन आत्मानि विन्दति ॥ IV. 38 ; योगयुक्तः मुनिः ब्रह्म
न चिरेण अधिगच्छति ॥ V. 6 ; आरुक्षोः मुनेः योगं कर्म
कारणं उच्यते ॥ VI. 3.

if it could be shown to be inconsistent with any portion of the teaching of the Gita. For the same reason, every attempt would be made to show that any doctrine of philosophy or religion, that was intended for the acceptance of the Hindus, was simply the doctrine of the Gita expressed in a clearer or more systematic form. It is no wonder, therefore, that Shankar should, every now and then, quote passages from the Gita in support of the different parts of his doctrine. That is exactly what is to be expected. The point, however, which we have to consider in this chapter, is, not whether Shankar says that his doctrine about man, God, and the world, is supported by, or is to be found in, the Gita ; but whether it is really supported by, or is to be found in, the Gita.

And in considering this question, in order to do justice to Shankar, we must bear in mind that Shankar was looking at the Gita, and everything said in it, as of absolute authority. In other words, he started with the assumption, not open to any doubt, that the Gita contained all that could be truly said, and nothing but what could be truly said, on matters of religion and philosophy.

His work being only to show that the several parts of the teaching of the Gita were consistent with one another, that they constituted a system, and that, in order that they might be seen to do so, they must be interpreted in a particular way. It is not to be expected, therefore, that those among us, who are ready, if necessary, to give up any portions of the teaching of the Gita as erroneous, can look with much sympathy upon the procedure, which Shankar adopts to show that the teaching of the Gita is self-consistent, and that there is nothing in it which is erroneous; or upon the doctrine which Shankar puts forth in order to make room for every portion of the teaching of the Gita. Shankar's method is to be compared to the method of those philosophers who, regarding both science and religion,—treaching respectively of nature and God, matter and mind,—as true, try to find out a system of knowledge or a doctrine of reality which will be consistent with the truth both of science and religion, or will make room for both forms of reality,—nature and God, matter and mind; even though that may require a reinterpretation of our ideas about nature and God, matter and mind; and even

though that reinterpretation be such that the new ideas, which we have to form about the universe, seem to be more or less opposed to the ideas which are formed on the first or superficial view of the universe.

This analogy also teaches us that we cannot give up Shanakr's interpretation of the Gita, simply because it seems to be different from or even opposed to what others think to be the predominant or the general teaching of the Gita. For, to return to the analogy, who, that insists that the ordinary view of the universe is the true view, will admit ideas like the following?—"No creature's made so mean but that, some way, it....fulfils... its momentary task, gets glory all its own, tastes triumph in the world, pre-eminent, alone": "What began best, can't end worst:" "God's in his heaven—all's right with the world": "This world's no blot for us, no blank; it means intensely and means good": "O world, as God has made it! All is beauty": "All's love and all's law": "the thing that seems mere misery, under human schemes, becomes, regarded by the light of love,...quite as good a gift as joy before". And will not even those, who admit or insist

upon such doctrines, confess that they are the generalisations regarding the universe from the experiences of an extremely few men during extremely rare moments of their lives; and that they are, not only quite unlike, but quite opposed, not only to the ordinary view of the universe, but also to the view of the universe which ordinarily presents itself even to these few men? If, then, there ought to be no objection to generalise, with respect to the whole experience of all men and of the whole universe, from the few momentary glimpses of an extremely few individuals, why should it be objectionable to take a principle, embodied, it may be, in a few passages of a book,—believed to contain Divine Revelation,—as the fundamental principle of the doctrine contained in that book, and then to try to interpret all other portions of the book so as to be consistent with that principle, even if such an interpretation tends to reduce what is ordinarily taken to be the most predominant or principal teaching of the book to a subordinate position?

With this preliminary remark, let us now proceed to consider the relation between the

teaching of the Gita and the doctrine of Shankar's Vedanta so far as they refer to man, God, and the material world.

II.

We have seen, in the last chapter, that the Gitakar accepts the idea of Mukti,—as taught by the Jnana-Margees,—in opposition to the idea of Svarga,—as taught by the Karma-Margees,—to be the ultimate or supreme end (परमार्थ) of man. Shankar also, as we saw, speaks of Mukti, in opposition to Svarga, as the supreme end of man. But Shankar, as we know, means by Mukti the complete experience by the individual soul of its real nature,—which is eternal, pure, free intelligence,—to the exclusion of everything else. In order, therefore, to see whether Shankar's idea of Mukti is the same as that of the Gitakar, let us consider what the latter must be taken to mean.

The first point, which we must notice in this connection, is that, as the Gitakar emphatically teaches, the attainment of self-knowledge (आत्मज्ञान) is the sole direct means of securing Mukti, and that this self-knowledge, once attained, will last as long as

Mukti, once gained, lasts, i. e., eternally. So far, then, we see that the two ideas of Mukti have at least this element in common, i. e., that the mukta soul will eternally possess self-knowledge without any interruption whatsoever. Let us now see what this self-knowledge will include and what it will exclude, according to the teaching of the Gitakar.

Now, the Gitakar points out that there are three different methods of attaining self-knowledge: (1) the Dhyana-yoga as explained in the sixth chapter of the Gita; (2) the Sankhya-yoga, as taught by the Sankhyas,—which is also spoken of as the Jnana-yoga or the Sannyasa-yoga; (3) the Karma-yoga, as taught by the Gitakar himself, which is sometimes called the Bhakti-¹ yoga. The Gitakar further admits that the self-knowledge, attained by means of every one of these different methods, is the same;—this he expressly maintains with reference

(¹) ध्यानेन आत्मनि पश्यन्ति केचित् आत्मानं आत्मना ।
अन्ये सांख्येन योगेन कर्मयोगेन च अपरे ॥ XIII. 24.

to the Sankhya-yoga and the Karma-yoga.¹ Now, as we² saw, the nature of Purusha or Atma, according to the Sankhyas, is eternal, pure, free intelligence. Hence the self-knowledge, resulting from the Sankhya-yoga, is the complete experience, on the part of the individual soul, of this its real nature. And since, as the Gitakar says, the self-knowledge, gained through both the methods, is the same, it necessarily follows that the self-knowledge, which according to him is the sole direct means of Mukti and which the mukta Atma ever retains, is the experience of self as eternal, pure, free intelligence. This then is another element possessed in common by the idea of Mukti as taught by the Gitakar, and the idea of Mukti as taught by Shankar.

Further, from the description of the Dhyana-yoga, given in the sixth chapter of the Gita³, it is clear that, during the state of self-knowledge, Atma cannot possibly be aware of anything else than its own nature. For it is necessary for the rise and continu-

(1) V. 4-5. (2) See above, p. 195. (3) See above, pp 222-224.

ance of self-knowledge, through this method, that the Yogi should absolutely cease to be conscious of anything else but *Atma*. And the test of having completed this Yoga is that this state, *i.e.*, the state in which *Atma* is conscious of nothing but itself, should be constantly possessed, and should never be interrupted. Self-knowledge, therefore, according to the *Gita* and the *Sankhyas* equally with *Shankar*, absolutely excludes all consciousness of anything whatever other than the real nature of *Atma*,—which according to both, as we saw, is eternal, pure, free intelligence.

There is another reason also why the *mukta Atma* should not possibly be conscious of anything except its real nature. For, when self-knowledge is attained,—either through the *Sankhya-yoga*, the *Dhyana-yoga*, or the *Karma-yoga*,—the state of *Sthita-prajñatva* or of *Jivan-muktatva* is passed, and the state of *Mukti* is reached, then the *mukta Atma* is never again to be born, or possessed of *Prakriti* or any part of it. In other words, the *mukta Atma* is never again to possess *Buddhi* (*i.e.*, the power of decision or judgment), *Manas* (*i.e.*, the

power of thinking about anything), the senses, *i.e.*, not the external physical organs, but the powers of perceiving or being aware of anything,—not to speak of the physical limbs and organs. Now, it is only by means of the powers of *Buddhi*, *Manas*, and the senses,—that it becomes possible for the individual human soul to be conscious of,—to perceive, to imagine, to think of,—anything other than its real nature. It inevitably follows that the *mukta Atma*, being without, and absolutely free from, the means and powers of being conscious of anything else except its real nature, can and must be conscious of its real nature,—which is eternal, pure, free intelligence,—to the absolute exclusion of anything else.

Thus, we now see that the Gitakar's idea of *Mukti* is the same as that of Shankar in all respects. In the same way it can be shown that the Sankhya and the Vedanta agree on this point.

III.

The result then is that, according to the Gitakar as well as Shankar, the real nature of the individual human soul is eternal, pure,

free intelligence, and that the mukta soul is, without any interruption, conscious of this its real nature to the exclusion of anything else. But from this follows an important corollary. For the mukta Atma is a being that has attained perfect knowledge. To a being of perfect knowledge, therefore, on the view of the Gitakar, everything other than its real nature—as defined above—*i. e.*, the world of difference (जगत्) is absolutely unknown and unknowable. But, if the world of difference and multiplicity is unknowable to a being of perfect knowledge, does it not necessarily follow that the world of difference and multiplicity, as we know it, is simply non-existent from the point of view of a being of perfect knowledge, or of a being that has attained the highest end or Mukti(परमार्थतः)? But, if that world is thus non-existent from the point of view of the mukta Atma, is not what we call our knowledge of it, during the embodied state, simply ignorance or illusion from the same point of view?

This, then, is a third point of agreement between the views of the Gitakar and Shankar,—*i. e.*, that the world of difference and multiplicity (जगत्) is really non-existent

(सिद्ध्या) from the point of view of the mukta Atma (परमार्थतः). The same consequence must evidently follow from the Sankhya view of Mukti.

But does the world of difference and multiplicity simply vanish, leaving nothing behind, from the point of view of the mukta Atma? In order to answer this question, according to the teaching of the Gita, we must remember that, on the theory of the Sankhyas as admitted and supplemented by the Gita-kar, the whole of what we call the world of difference and multiplicity is the result of an evolving process, the starting point of which is Brahma possessing Prakriti, and the order of which is as follows:—From Brahma possessing Prakriti is produced Buddhi; from Buddhi, Ahankar; from Ahankar, the ten senses together with Manas and the five Tan-matras; from the Tan-matras, the five Mahabhutas,—from which all the material things, that make up what we call the world of difference and multiplicity, take their rise. It follows from this that Brahma possessing Prakriti is the ultimate cause of the world and everything in it. Now, it is a fundamental principle of all the Indian philosophy

that what is called an effect is really identical with its cause. All the things, therefore, from Buddhi to the individual material objects, being effects, must be, in reality, identical with their cause, *i.e.*, with Brahma possessing Prakriti. But, though the whole world is thus really identical with Brahma possessing Prakriti, it cannot be denied that, as a matter of fact, we do perceive or think of the world as being different from its cause, *i. e.*, Brahma possessing Prakriti. What, then, are we to think of the world so far as we perceive it to be different from Brahma possessing Prakriti? And here another fundamental principle of all the Indian philosophy comes to our help,—namely, that that which is real can never go out of existence, while that which is unreal can never come into existence¹. From this principle it follows, conversely, that, if anything that seems to exist goes or is to go out of existence, then it was always unreal, and has no existence even when it seems to exist. By applying this principle we find that the world of difference and multiplicity,—so far as we

(¹) न असतः विद्यते भावः न अभावः विद्यते सतः ॥ II.16.

perceive or think of it to be different from its cause, *i.e.*, Brahma possessing Prakriti,—which comes into existence and goes out of it,—is unreal and has no existence; but what seems to us to be this world is, in reality or from the point of view of the mukta Atma, Brahma possessing Prakriti. And this is one more point of agreement between the Gitakar and Shankar, the proposition, *i.e.*, that all that exists is Brahma (सर्वं ब्रह्म इदं ॥). Only in order to understand how complete this agreement is, it is necessary to bear in mind that, even on the Gitakar's view, Brahma is to be regarded as possessing Prakriti, only when looked upon as the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world of difference and multiplicity. If, therefore, the world as such is simply unknowable and non-existent from the point of view of the mukta Atma, the possession of Prakriti on the part of Brahma must also be unknowable and, therefore, unreal from the same point of view.

IV.

Let us now consider how the human Atma must, according to the teaching of the Gitakar, be regarded as related to Brahma. It

was shown above that, according to the Gitakar, there are three forms of God,—one of these being that of Nirguna¹ Brahma, i.e., that form of God in reference to which the Gitakar agrees with the mere Jnana-Marggees, namely, that form under which God is to be propitiated directly by means of the Jnana-yoga or Saunhyasa-yoga. Now, it can be shown that it is a legitimate inference from the teaching of the Gita (1) that the human Atma is, in reality, one with God under this form, and (2) that Mukti consists in the attainment of the complete experience, on the part of the individual soul, of this sameness.

To take the second of these two points first,—there are some passages in the Gita, which do not seem to support this idea of Mukti. Thus we are told :—After the close of this life, such an individual human soul will have no rebirth, but will *reach*² God. Having attained the Saunhyasa-yoga, and being released from bondage, such an individual soul will *reach*³ God. Living in this

(1) See above, p. 5.

(2) त्यक्त्वा देहं पुनर्जन्म न एति मां एति सः ॥ IV. 9.

(3) संन्यासयोगयुक्तारमा विमुक्तः मां उषेयसि ॥ IX. 28.

way, you will certainly *go to* God¹. When an individual soul *reaches* God, it ceases to be subject to being born² again. According to the literal sense of these passages, the individual human soul, when released from bondage, is said *to go to*, or *reach* God. It is clear, however, that the passages cannot be literally interpreted. For, according to the teaching of the Gita, God and Atma are both omnipresent.³ The *mukta* Atma, therefore, as Shankar points out, cannot be said *to go to*⁴ God. In the above passages, therefore, the phrase, “going to God” or “reaching God,” must have a figurative sense.

(¹) मां एव एष्यसि युक्त्वा एवं आत्मानं मत्परायणः ॥ IX.

34. (²) मां उपेत्य तु...पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥ VIII. 16.

(³) सर्वभूतस्थं आत्मानं सर्वभूतानि च आत्मनि ईक्षते योगयुक्तात्मा
... ॥ यः मां पश्यति सर्वत्र सर्वं च मयि पश्यति ॥ VI. 29-

30. (⁴) यत् सर्वगतं सर्वान्तरं सर्वात्मकं परं ब्रह्म तस्य गंतव्यता
न कदाचित् अपि उपपद्यते । न हि गतं एव गम्यते ॥ IV. 3, 14.

This argument applies to the Gitakar's idea of the highest form of God even though that idea may not be the same as Shankar's idea of Para Brahma,—a point to be considered in the following section of this chapter.

Perhaps we shall be better able to find out the real meaning of these passages, if we take into consideration other passages like the following:—Performing all works without attachment, the individual soul *attains* the¹ highest. Through the grace of God, you will *attain* the supreme peace and the eternal² seat. Through God's grace, such an individual soul will *attain* an eternal seat which can never be lost or altered.³ That is the highest seat of God, having *attained* which no one has to⁴ return. Becoming freed from ignorance, such individual souls *attain* that seat, which is never to be⁵ lost. In these passages, the verbs may be taken to mean either "going to," "reaching," or "obtaining." As, for the reason given above, they cannot be taken to mean "going to" or "reaching," let us take them to mean

(¹) अमक्तः हि आचरन् कर्म परं आप्नोति पुरुषः ॥ III. 10. (²) तत्प्रसादात् परं शान्तिं स्थानं प्राप्स्यसि शाश्वतम् ॥ XVIII. 62. (³) तत्प्रसादात् अयाप्नोति शाश्वतं पदं अव्ययम् ॥ XVIII. 56. (⁴) यत् गत्वा न निवर्तन्ते तत् धाम परमं मम ॥ XV. 6. (⁵) गच्छन्ति अमूढाः पदं अव्ययं तत् ॥ XV. 5.

“obtaining.” But what is this highest seat which is said to be obtained by the mukta Atma? The following passage contains the answer to this question:—That which is called the Avyakta and Akshara is the highest seat of God, on attaining which no one has to¹ return. Now, what is called the Avyakta and Akshara is the Nirguna Brahma. And, therefore, all the above passages must be taken to mean that the mukta soul reaches *i.e.* attains *i.e.* becomes the Nirguna Brahma. For the Gitakar expressly says this in several passages. Thus we read:—Those, who resorting to this knowledge become Brahma, are not born again nor do they ever² die. He (a right-seeing person) becomes³ Brahma.

(¹) अव्यक्तः अक्षरः इति उक्तः तं आहुः परमां गतिम् । यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तत् धाम परमं मम ॥ VIII. 21.

(²) इदं ज्ञानं उपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यं आगताः । सर्गे अपि न उपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति ते ॥ XIV. 2.

(³) न अन्यं गुणेभ्यः कर्तारं यदा द्रष्टा अनुपश्यति । गुणेभ्यः च परं वेत्ति मद्भावं सः अधिगच्छति ॥ XIV. 19.

Such a one becomes fit for becoming Brahma¹. Such a Yogi, becoming Brahma, obtains the highest and eternal bliss.²

From these passages it is quite clear that the mukta Atma becomes Brahma under the Nirguna form. And, therefore, all the ambiguous passages, mentioned above, must be interpreted so as to convey this meaning. Perhaps it will be said that, even if the above line of argument be accepted, yet all that is made out is that, for the sake of consistency, the teaching of the Gita must be taken to mean that the mukta Atma becomes Brahma. But it is not proved that, on the Gita's view, the mukta Atma becomes one with Brahma, so that there can be only one Atma and that one Atma no other than Brahma,—this being what Shankar maintains. The question, therefore, which we have now to consider is,—can the teaching of the Gita be so interpreted as to mean that the mukta

(¹) अहंकारं यत्तु दृष्टं कामं मोक्षं परिमदम् । विमुच्य निर्ममः
ज्ञानः ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥ XVIII. 53 ; मां च
यः अज्यमिचारेण भावितयोगेन हेषते । सः गुणान् सम-
र्पय पतान् ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥ XIV. 26.

(²) यः अन्तःगुणः अन्तःपारमः तया अन्तर्ज्योतिः एव च । सः
योगी ब्रह्मनिर्वाणं ब्रह्मभूतः अभिगच्छति ॥ V. 21.

Atma becomes Brahma, and yet continues to have a separate existence? The first objection to such an interpretation of the teaching of the Gita is, that those who accept that interpretation will have to recognise the existence of, and to worship a plurality of Brahmas. For, as the Gitakar assures us, Janaka and others have attained Mukti, and each of them, therefore, has become Brahma. And it will not be right to treat unequally two or more beings that are now equal simply because they were unequal at one time in the past. Secondly, suppose that there is a plurality of mukta Atmas; still no one mukta Atma can possibly be aware of any other mukta Atma, for the same reasons for which the mukta Atma cannot know the world of difference and multiplicity. This means that the plurality of mukta Atmas is unknown and unknowable to the mukta Atma. The plurality of Atmas, therefore, is non-existent from the point of view of perfect knowledge, and hence unreal.

For these reasons the proposition,—that the individual soul, when released from bondage, becomes Brahma,—must be taken to mean that it *becomes one with* Brahma.

The only difficulty that remains yet to be explained is this:—Since, as the Gitakar teaches, Atma is unchangeable (अविकार्य), how can it *become* one with Brahma, if it is not Brahma before the attainment of Mukti? The answer is that Atma has always been one with Brahma; only, on account of Avidya, it wrongly thinks otherwise. And, therefore, the phrase,—becoming Brahma,—must be taken to mean *becoming aware of itself as Brahma*. And hence the importance, according to the Gitakar no less than to Shankar, of self-knowledge as being the sole and direct means of Mukti. Thus we see that the doctrine of Shankar,—i. e., that Atma is Brahma and nothing else than Brahma, and that Mukti simply consists in the attainment on the part of Atma of the complete consciousness of its sameness with Brahma,—necessarily follows from the teaching of the Gita.

V.

Now only one point remains to be considered, namely, the relation between Shankar's doctrine about the true form of God and that of the Gitakar. There can be no doubt that both, disagreeing with the Sankhyas, maintain that there is God, and that

there are two forms of God (we are not concerned here with the third form of God which we find in the Gita),—one form being Brahma possessing Prakriti, the other form being Brahma without Prakriti. Both also agree that it is under the first of these two forms that God is the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world. Again, according to both, God under this form is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent,—in the ordinary sense of these terms. Further, it is God under this form that, according to both, is the object of worship (Bhakti), with or without the desire for fruit,—during the state of Avidya or ignorance (मूढत्व). Besides, both the Gitakar and Shankar agree in attributing what they call Maya to God under this form in addition to Prakriti or Upadhi. Lastly, according to both, God under the other form is the object of knowledge and not of Bhakti. It is, however, evident that God under this latter form is, according to Shankar, higher than God under the former form. And the question, now to be considered, is—Is Shankar supported by the Gita in maintaining this view ?

So far as the express statement in the Gita is concerned, the following passages

bear on this point:-The end attained by practising the Sankhya-yoga is as well attained by means of the Karma-yoga¹. Sannyasi and the Karma-yoga both equally are the means of attaining the highest² goal. They also, who worship the Nirguna Brahma, reach the same³ God. From these and such other passages it would seem that, since the end attained by propitiating God under either form is the same, therefore, according to the Gitakar, there is no difference, as regards superiority (परत्व) and inferiority (अपरत्व), between the two forms of God. This is so far as the express statement in the Gita is concerned. Let us, however, consider if we get any premisses from the teaching of the Gita, from which an inference can be deduced in respect of the question under consideration.

The first of these premisses is that the end attained in each case is the same as that

(1) यत् सांख्यैः प्राप्यते स्थानं तत् योगैः अपि गम्यते ॥ V. 5 (2) संन्यासः कर्मयोगः च निःश्रेयसकरौ उभौ ॥ V. 2. (3) ये तु अक्षरं अनिर्देश्यं अव्यक्तं पश्यन्ति । सर्वत्रगं अक्षितं च कूटस्थं अचलं ध्रुवम् ॥...ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मां एव... ॥ XII.

in the other. Another premiss is that, according to the Gitakar, the method of propitiating God without Prakriti, *i.e.*, the Jnana-yoga, is much more difficult than the method of propitiating God with¹ Prakriti, *i.e.*, the Karma-yoga. It follows, from this latter premiss, that those, who succeed by means of the more difficult method of the Jnana-yoga, must be better qualified than, or superior to those who, in order to succeed, are required to have recourse to the easier method of the Karma-yoga. And this is what the Gitakar actually says. For a reference to the list of the duties of each of the four castes to be found in the Gita² will clearly show that, according to the Gitakar, the direct pursuit of knowledge is included among the duties of the Brāhmanas alone,—who form the highest caste,—and of no other caste. In other words, according to the Gitakar, the Brahmanas alone are qualified to follow the method of propitiating God without Prakriti, while

(¹) संन्यासः तु...दुःखं आप्तुं अयोगतः ॥ V. 6 ; क्लेशः अधिकतरः तेषां अव्यक्तासक्तचेतसां । अव्यक्ता हि गतिः दुःखं देहवाद्भिः अवाप्यते ॥ XII. 5. (²) See above, p. 105.

the members of the other castes must follow the method of propitiating God with Prakriti. From this it follows that, according to the teaching of the Gitakar, the Brahmanas are better qualified than and, therefore, superior to, the other castes ; and that Brahma without Prakriti or Upadhi is the God of the Brahmanas alone, while Brahma with Prakriti or Upadhi is the God of the lower classes. The necessary inference from this is that, if there is to be a difference of superiority and inferiority between the two forms of God, then Brahma without Prakriti must be higher than Brahma with Prakriti. But so far there is nothing to justify such a distinction.

There is, however, one more premiss to be found in the Gita which justifies the view that, according to the teaching of the Gita, Brahma without Prakriti is higher than Brahma with Prakriti. For, as we saw above,¹ the mukta Atma, according to the teaching of the Gita, cannot even be conscious of the world of difference and multiplicity and whatever is presupposed by it. Hence it

(1) See p. 257.

follows that the mukta Atma cannot know Brahma with Prakriti *i. e.*, Brahma as the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world of difference and multiplicity ; but only Brahma without Prakriti. But, if Brahma as possessing Prakriti is unknowable to the mukta Atma,—*i. e.*, to a being of perfect knowledge,—then Brahma as possessing Prakriti cannot be a reality. On the other hand, Brahma without Prakriti, being known to the mukta Atma,—*i. e.*, a being of perfect knowledge,—is a reality in the truest sense. The inevitable consequence is that Brahma without Prakriti or Upadhi must be regarded, on the view of the Gitakar, as incomparably superior to Brahma with Prakriti or Upadhi. Thus Shankar is justified, on the teaching of the Gita, in maintaining that Brahma without Prakriti or Upadhi is the higher (पर), while Brahma with Prakriti or Upadhi is the lower (अपर), of the two forms of God.

This also enables us to decide the question as to the difference, as regards superiority and inferiority, on the view of the Gitakar, between the Jnana-yoga and the Karma-yoga. For, since the Jnana-yoga is the method to

be pursued by better qualified men, and since the object of that method is God under the highest form ; since, on the other hand, the Karma-yoga is the method to be pursued by less qualified men, and since the object of this method is God under the lower form ; therefore, there can be no doubt that, consistently with the teaching of the Gita, the Jnana-yoga must be regarded higher, though more difficult, than the Karma-yoga. It is true that the Gitakar himself sometimes expressly says that the Karma-yoga is less difficult, and hence higher than, the Jnana-yoga.¹ But, in such cases, "higher" must be taken to mean "more desirable." In this sense we can say that to a beginner the first standard in a school is higher, i. e. more desirable, than the second standard, supposing he could join either freely at his choice. That the Gitakar uses the word "higher," in respect of the Karma-yoga as contrasted with the Jnana-yoga, in this sense, will be evident from the following passages :—Concentrate all your attention on God ; make God the object of your Buddhi. If, however,

(1) तयोः तु कर्मसंन्यासात् कर्मयोगः विशिष्येत ॥ V 2.

you cannot steadily make God the object of your attention, then try to do so by practising the Abhyasa-yoga. But if you are unable even to practise the Abhyasa-yoga, then do all your works dedicating them to God. And, if you cannot do even this, then do all your works only giving up desire for their fruit¹. From these passages it is evident that, according to the Gitakar, the Karma-yoga stands at the bottom, the first step with which to begin in case no higher step be possible. And yet he says that Jnana excels Abhyasa, Dhyana excels Jnana, and the Karma-yoga excels Dhyana².

(¹) मयि एव मनः आधत्स्व मयि वृद्धिं निवेशय ॥ अयं चित्तं समाधातुं न शक्नोमि मयि स्थिरं । अभ्यासयोगेन ततः मां इच्छ आप्तुं... ॥ अभ्यासे अपि असमर्थः असि मत्कर्मपरमः भव... ॥ अथ एतत् अपि अशक्तः असि कर्तुं मद्योगं आश्रितः । सर्वकर्मफलत्यागं ततः कुरु यत-आत्मवान् ॥ XII. 8-11.

(²) श्रेयः हि ज्ञानं अभ्यासान् ज्ञानात् ध्यानं विशिष्यते । ध्यानात् कर्मफलत्यागः ... ॥ XII. 12. Whatever the meaning of this passage may be, still two points are clear: (a) that this passage contains the different alternatives mentioned in the preceding four slokas, the alternative of the Karma-yoga being mentioned last in each case; and (b) that, in the preceding slokas, the reader is asked to have recourse to the alternative of the Karma-yoga only if he is

VI.

Thus, then, we see that there is a complete agreement between the Gitakar and Shankar in teaching that, from the point of view of a being of perfect knowledge or of the mukta Atma, Brahma without Prakriti or Upadhi is the only reality, that the human Atma is identical with this Brahma, that everything else (*i. e.*, the जगत्) is unreal, and consequently what we think to be our knowledge of this जगत् is simply illusion or Avidya.

This is the proper place to notice a charge which is sometimes brought against Shankar, *i. e.*, that he teaches that the world of

unable to follow any of the other alternatives mentioned. It is also worth noticing, in this connection, that, in some passages, the Gitakar expressly says that the Karma-yoga is simply the means of the Jnana-yoga :—आदृक्षोः मुनेः योगं कर्म कारणं उच्यते ॥ VI. 3 ; संन्यासः तु... दुःखं आप्तुं अयोगतः ॥ V. 6. When, therefore, notwithstanding all this, the Gitakar says that the Karma-yoga is superior to the Jnana-yoga, all that he means must be that it is more suited, and so more desirable, to the beginner.

difference and multiplicity is unreal, not simply from the point of view of the mukta Atma, but that all men are to regard it as unreal and live as if it were so. And the wonder is that this charge is repeated, and passes current in high places, even though Shankar himself has anticipated this charge; stated it in its clearest and strongest form in more places than one, and given it a most emphatic and unmistakable denial. Let us first notice some of the passages in which Shankar states this objection:—If the doctrine¹ of absolute unity (or non-difference) be true, an opponent may say, the ordinary means of knowledge,—perception, &c.,—become invalid. For the absence of all difference and multiplicity deprives them of all their objects just as the supposition of a man (formed by mistaking a post for a

(¹) ननु एकत्व-एकान्त-अभ्युपगमे नानात्व-अभावात् प्रत्यक्षादीनि लौकिकानि प्रमाणानि व्याहन्येरन् निर्वपयत्वात् स्थाण्वादिषु इव पुरुषादिज्ञानानि । तथा विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रं अपि भेदापेक्षत्वात् तत्-अभावे व्याहन्येत । मोक्षशास्त्रस्य अपि शिष्यशास्त्रादिभेदापेक्षत्वात् तत्-अभावे व्याघातः स्यात् । कथं च अनृतेन मोक्षशास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितस्य आत्मैकत्वस्य सत्यत्वं उपपद्येत इति ॥ II. 1, 14.

man) becomes invalid after the right idea of the post has presented itself. Moreover, all the sacred texts, embodying injunctions and prohibitions, will lose their purpose, if all distinction, on which their validity depends, does not exist in reality. And, further, the entire body of doctrine, which teaches the means of attaining Mukti, will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil,—on which it depends,—is not real. And, if this doctrine about Mukti is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of Atma on the authority of that same doctrine of which it is a part ?

The same objection is stated, in different language, thus :—The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well-known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being the intelligent, embodied souls, while sounds and the like (*i. e.*, forms, tastes, sights, smells) are the objects of enjoyment. But the distinction between the two would vanish, if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, or the object of enjoyment into the enjoyer. And this passing over of each of them into the other would actually result from the Vedānta doctrine, that the world

is non-different from Brahma. But the denial of this well-established distinction is not proper. Hence, in order that this distinction may not be denied, the Vedanta doctrine must be given up as wrong.¹

Shankar expresses the same objection in a different form as follows:—The Vedanta doctrine must be wrong,—an objector may allege,—for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering, are different kinds of beings. For those, who maintain that Brahma is the self of everything, must admit that the two attributes,—i.e., the capacity for causing suffering and the capacity for undergoing suffering,—belong to the one supreme Brahma. If, however, these two attributes belong to one and the same Atma, it can never free itself from them, and

(¹) प्रासिद्धः हि अयं भोक्तृभोग्यविभागः लोके भोक्ता चेतनः शरीरः भोग्याः शब्दादयः विषयाः इति ।...तस्य च विभागस्य अभावः प्रसज्येत यदि भोक्ता भोग्यभावं आपद्येत भोग्यं वा भोक्तृभावं आपद्येत तयोः च इतरेतरभावापत्तिः परमकारणात् ब्रह्मणः अनन्यत्वात् प्रसज्येत । न च अस्य प्रासिद्धस्य विभागस्य वाधनं युक्तम् ॥ ...तस्मात् प्रासिद्धस्य अस्य भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्य अभावप्रसंगात् अयुक्तं इदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणं इति ॥ II. 1, 13.

thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For a lamp, as long as it subsists as such, is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. But, in fact, that which causes suffering and that which suffers, constitute different kinds of beings ; and that this is a fact, is well-known from ordinary experience¹.

Similarly, the person desiring and the thing desired, are known to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being a desirer could not be ascribed to the latter ; because the object, with reference to which alone he could be called a desirer, would already belong

(¹) ननु औपनिषदानां अपि असंजगं एव दर्शनं तप्यतापकयोः जात्यन्तरभाव-अनभ्युपगमात् । एकं हि ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकं सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य कारणं अभ्युपगच्छतां एकस्य एव आत्मनः विशेषी तप्यतापकौ न जात्यन्तरभूता इति अभ्युपगन्तव्यं स्यात् । यदि च एतां तप्यतापकौ एकस्य आत्मनः विशेषी स्यातां सताभ्यां तप्यतापकाभ्यां न निर्मुच्यते इति तापोपशान्तये सम्यग्-दर्शनं उपदिशत् शास्त्रं अनर्थकं स्यात् । न हि औप्यप्रकाशधर्मकस्य प्रदीपस्य तदवस्थस्य एव ताभ्यां निर्मोक्षः उपपद्यते ।...प्रसिद्धं च अयं तप्यतापकयोः जात्यन्तरभावः लोके ॥ II. 2, 10.

tō him. In the same way, the object of desire also would cease to be an object of desire for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case. For the two ideas,—the object of desire and the desiring person,—imply a relation, and a relation can exist between two things, and not in one alone. Hence, the desiring person and the object of desire must be regarded as separate existences. But they cannot be so recognised on the Vedānta doctrine, that Brahma alone is real and that everything else is unreal except the human Atma which is nothing but Brahma. The Vedānta doctrine, therefore, must be wrong¹.

(¹) तथा हि अर्थो च अर्थः च अन्योन्यभिन्नौ लक्ष्येते । यदि आर्थिनः स्वतः अन्यः अर्थः न स्यात् यस्य अर्थिनः यत्-विषयं आर्थत्वं सः तस्य अर्थः नित्यसिद्धः एव इति न तस्य तत्-विषयं आर्थत्वं स्यात्... । अप्राप्ते हि अर्थे अर्थिनः आर्थत्वं स्यात् इति । तथा अर्थस्य अपि अर्थत्वं न स्यात् यदि स्यात् स्वार्थत्वं एव स्यात् । न च एतत् अस्ति । संबन्धिद्वौ हि एतौ अर्थो च अर्थः च इति । द्वयोः च संबन्धिनोः संबन्धः स्यात् न एकस्य एव । तस्मात् भिन्नौ एतौ अर्थोऽर्थिनौ ।...तयोः तत्प्यताप-कयोः एकात्मतायां मोक्षानुपपत्तिः । जात्यन्तरभावे तु तत्संयोग-देतुपरिहारान्न स्यात् अपि कदाचित् मोक्षोपपत्तिः इति । II. 2, 10.

Now every one of these objections would be fatal to the doctrine, contained in the famous line,—Brahma alone is real, the world is unreal, and the human Atma is Brahma and nothing else (*ब्रह्म सत्यं जगत् मिथ्या; महमा ब्रह्म एव न शरदः*)—if that doctrine were to be regarded as true, not simply from the point of view of the mukta Atma, but of any and every human being. Shankar points out, in a most clear and unmistakable language, that it is not so. Thus he says :—This objection does *not* apply. For, on the Vedānta theory, the entire world of difference and multiplicity is to be considered as real as long as the knowledge or experience of Brahma being the Atma of all has not been attained ;—in the same way in which the phantoms of a dream cannot but be considered as real until the sleeper wakes. For, as long as a man has not reached the knowledge of the unity of Atma, so long it cannot occur to him that the world with its means and objects of knowledge and the results of actions, is unreal. He rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on the world and its objects as forming a part of, or belonging to, his self, forgetful of Brahma being in reality the Atma of all. Hence, as

long as the knowledge of reality does not arise, it is necessary and fit that the ordinary course of secular and religious life should hold on undisturbed. The case is similar to that of a dreaming man who, in his dream, sees manifold things and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be a mere appearance. Hence, before the knowledge of the unity of Atma has been reached, the whole course of ordinary life,—worldly as well as religious,—must go on unimpeded.¹

Thus Shankar explains and justifies the validity as well as the necessity of the ordinary means of knowledge, the parts of

(¹) न एषः दोषः । सर्वव्यवहाराणां एव प्राक् ब्रह्मात्मता-
विज्ञानात् सत्यत्व-उपपत्तेः स्वप्नव्यवहारस्य इव प्राक् बोधात् ।
यावत् हि न सत्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपात्तिः तावत् प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु
विकारेषु अनृतत्वबुद्धिः न कस्यचित् उत्पद्यते विकारान् एव तु
अहं मम इति अविद्यया आत्मात्मयोगेन भावेन सर्वः जन्तुः प्रति-
पद्यते स्वाभाविकीं ब्रह्मात्मतां हित्वा । तस्मात् प्राक् ब्रह्मात्मताप्रति-
बोधात् उपपन्नः सर्वः लौकिकः वैदिकः च व्यवहारः । यथा
सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य स्वप्ने उच्चावचान् भावान् पश्यतः
निश्चितं एव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं विज्ञानं भवति प्राक् बोधात् । न च

Scripture embodying precepts of injunctions and prohibitions, and those other parts which contain the doctrine of Mukti ; and, further, the validity and necessity of the distinction between teacher and pupil, the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment, that which suffers and that which causes suffering, the person desiring and the object desired, &c. Thus we are told with reference to the distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment :—Even on our view, the distinction does exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, &c. and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other. And again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from

प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायः तत्काले भवति तद्वत् ।... प्राक् च आत्मिक-
त्व-भरणेः अन्यादतः सर्वेः सायानृतन्यवहारः संकिञ्चः पैदिकः
च ॥ II. 1, 14.

the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from¹ Brahma.

In respect of the distinction between that which suffers and that which causes suffering, Shaunkar points out that the two attributes cannot really belong to Brahma or Atma which is absolutely one. The relation, therefore, exists between the living body and some other object, that is, within the world of difference and multiplicity which is due to Maya ; and, therefore, lasts and must last, in respect of any individual human soul,

(¹) उपपद्यते एव अयं अस्मत्-पक्षे अपि विभागः । एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात् । तथाहि समुद्रात् उदकात्मनः अनन्यत्वे अपि तद्विकाराणां फेनवीचीतरंगबुब्बुदादीनां इतरेतरविभागः इतरेतरसंश्लेषादिलक्षणः च व्यवहारः उपलभ्यते । न च समुद्रात् उदकात्मनः अनन्यत्वे अपि तद्विकाराणां फेनतरंगादीनां इतरेतरभावापत्तिः भवति । न च तेषां इतरेतरभाव-अनापत्तौ अपि समुद्रात्मनः अन्यत्वं भवति । एवं इह अपि न च भोक्तृभोग्ययोः इतरेतर-भावापत्तिः । न च परस्मात् ब्रह्मणः अन्यत्वं भविष्यति ।... इत्यतः परमकारणात् ब्रह्मणः अनन्यत्वे अपि उपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणः विभागः समुद्रतरंगादिन्यायेन ॥ II. 1, 13.

until self-knowledge is attained. To quote his own words:—All this reasoning is futile, for, on account of the unity of *Ātma*, the relation,—whose two terms are that which suffers and that which causes suffering,—cannot exist in *Ātma*. The Vedānta doctrine would be liable to this objection, if that while causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same *Ātma*, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only ; how can the one unchangeable *Brahma* enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer ? Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed exist ? That, we reply, is not difficult to see. The living body, which is (*e. g.*) the object of burning, is the sufferer, while the sun is the cause of suffering.... But perhaps you will say that, after all, suffering on the part of the individual soul is real. But in that case *Mukti* would be impossible. Hence, the relation of sufferers and causes of suffering

is not real (*i. e.*, does not exist from the point of view of reality), but is the effect of Avidya (and so will last so long as Avidya lasts).

This same point,—namely, that Shankar teaches that the world of difference and multiplicity is unreal, only from the point of view of the mukta Atma, and not from the point

(¹) अत्र उच्यते । न । एकत्वात् एव तप्यतापकभाव-
अनुपपत्तेः । भवेत् एषः दोषः यदि एकात्मतायां तप्यतापकौ
अन्योन्यस्य विषयविषयिभावं प्रतिपद्येयातां । न तु एतत् अस्ति
एकत्वात् एव । न हि अग्निः एकः सन् स्वं आत्मानं दहति प्रकाश-
यति वा सति अपि औष्ण्यप्रकाशादिधर्मभेदे परिणामित्वे च । किं
कूटस्थे ब्रह्मणि एकास्मिन् तप्यतापकभावः संभवेत् । क्व पुनः
अयं तप्यतापकभावः स्यात् इति । उच्यते । किं न पश्यासि कर्म-
भूतः जीवत्-देहः तप्यः तापकः सविता इति ।...अथ पार-
मार्थिकं एव चेतनस्य तप्यत्वं अभ्युपगच्छसि तत्र एव सुतरां
अनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्येत ।...औपनिषदस्य तु आत्मैकत्व-अभ्युपगमात्
एकस्य च विषयविषयिभाव-अनुपपत्तेः विकारभेदस्य च वाचारं-
भणमात्रत्वश्रवणात् अनिमोक्षशंका स्वप्ने अपि न उपजायते ।
व्यवहारे तु यत्र यथा दृष्टः तप्यतापकभावः तत्र तथा एव सः
इति न चोदयितव्यः परिहर्तव्यः वा भवति ॥ II. 2, 10.

The same answer applies to the distinction between that which desires and that which is desired.

of view of all embodied individual souls or of all human beings,—this point can be proved indirectly by Shankar's emphatic rejection of two doctrines, *i. e.*, (1) the *Shunya-vada* (शून्यवाद), which practically maintains the very doctrine which the opponents of Shankar attribute to him ; and (2) the *Vijnana-vada* (विज्ञानवाद), according to which what we regard as the external or objective world of difference and multiplicity, is simply an internal or subjective world of our mental ideas, having no external objects corresponding to them. Shankar rejects the former view as too evidently erroneous and too contradictory of all human experience to require any refutation¹. He rejects the latter view, because he says that even those, who maintain it, have, as a matter of fact and inevitable necessity, to believe and act as if the world of external objects were real, and that, therefore, their denial of it is similar to, and as trustworthy

(¹) शून्यवादिपक्षः तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्धः इति तत्-
निराकरणाय न आदरः क्रियते । न हि अयं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धः
लोकव्यवहारः अन्यत्-तत्त्वं अनधिगम्य शक्यते अपन्होतुं अप-
वाद-भ्रमात्रे उत्सर्ग-प्रसिद्धः ॥ II. 2, 31.

as, the denial of the feeling of hunger and satisfaction on the part of a man who is feeling hungry, who is eating, and who is thereby experiencing satisfaction.¹ Thus, since Shankar maintains that it is wrong to say that the external world is absolutely non-existent and that it is also wrong to say that what is regarded as the external world of difference and multiplicity is simply a mental world of difference and multiplicity ; therefore, it inevitably follows that, on Shankar's view, the world of difference and multiplicity does exist, and it does exist externally to the individual souls who are, or may become, conscious of it.

(1) तस्मिन् च विज्ञानवादे बुद्ध्यारूढेन रूपेण अतस्थः एव प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारः सर्वः उपपद्यते ।... कथं पुनः असति बाह्यार्थे प्रत्ययवैचित्र्यं उपपद्यते । वासनावैचित्र्यात् इति आह । अनादौ हि संसारे बीजांकुरवत् विज्ञानानां वासनानां च अन्योन्यनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन वैचित्र्यं न विप्रतिषिध्यते ॥ II.2,28. एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः । न खलु अभावः बाह्यस्य अर्थस्य अध्यवसातुं शक्यते । कस्मात् उपलब्धेः । उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं बाह्यः अर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्यं पटः इति । न च उपलभ्यमानस्य एव अभावः भवितुं अर्हति । यथा हि कः-चित् भुञ्जानः भुजिसाध्यायां तृप्तेः स्वयं अनुभूयमानायां एवं ब्रूयात् न अहं भुञ्जे न वा तृप्यामि इति तद्वत् इन्द्रियसंनिकर्षेण स्वयं उपलभमानः एव बाह्यं अर्थं न

Though, however, in this way, Shankar, maintains that the world of difference and multiplicity,—together with all that it involves, presupposes and necessitates,—cannot but be taken as real during the state of Avidya, yet as soon as complete self-knowledge is attained, all this must vanish without leaving even a trace of memory in the consciousness of the mukta Atma¹. And just as, according to Shankar, the जगत् must be, because it cannot but be, regarded as if real, during the state of Avidya, so also:

अहं उपलभे न च सः अस्ति इति भ्रुवन् कथं उपादेयवचनः स्यात् । ननु न अहं एवं ब्रवीमि न कंचित् अर्थ उपलभे इति किंतु उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकं न उपलभे इति ब्रवीमि । यादं एवं ब्रवीमि निरंकुशत्वात् ते तु षष्ठस्य । न तु युक्ति-उपेतं ब्रवीमि । यतः उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकः अपि यत्नात् अर्थस्य अभ्युपगंतव्यः उपलब्धेः एव । न हि कंचित् उपलब्धे एव स्तम्भः 'कुल्यं च इति' उपलभते । उपलब्धिविषयत्वेन एव तु स्तम्भकुल्यादीन् सर्वे लौकिकाः उपलभन्ते ।...तस्मात् यथानुभवं तत्त्वं उपगच्छद्भिः बहिः एव अवभासते इति युक्तं अभ्युपगन्तुम् ॥ II. 2, 28.

! (1) . तस्मात् अहं ब्रह्म अस्मि इति एतत्-अवधानाः एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि च इतराणि प्रमाणानि ॥ I. 1, 4 ; न च विद्यदादि-सर्गस्य आत्यंतिकं सत्यत्वं अस्ति प्रतिपादितम् । समस्तस्य प्रपंचस्य मायामात्रत्वात् । प्राक् तु ब्रह्म-आत्मत्वदर्शनात् विद्यदादिप्रपंचः व्यवास्थितरूपः भवति ॥ III. 2, 4.

a plurality of souls and their sansar-state, must be, and cannot but be, regarded as real until self-knowledge is attained.¹

Thus, if we simply bear in mind that, according to Shankar, the test of having attained self-knowledge is that the individual soul, that has attained it, has ceased to be

(¹) उपाधिनिमित्तः एव अयं आत्मभेदः स्वतः तु ऐकात्म्यं एव ॥ अतः च स्वाभाविकत्वात् अभेदस्य अविद्या-कृतत्वात् च भेदस्य, विद्यया अविद्यां विधूय जीवः परेण आत्मना एकतां गच्छति ॥ III. 2, 25-6. पारमेश्वरं एव हि शारीरस्य पारमार्थिकं स्वरूपं । उपाधिकृतं तु शारीरत्वम् ॥ आत्मा इत्येव परमेश्वरः प्रातिपत्तव्यः । लक्षणभेदः अपि अनयोः उपाधिनिमित्तः एव ॥ जीवः परमात्मांशः एव, सांस्तिरस्कृतज्ञान-ऐश्वर्यः भवति ।...सः अपि तु जीवस्य ज्ञान-ऐश्वर्यतिरोभावः देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनादियोगात् भवति ॥ III. 2, 6; संसारिणः संसारित्व-अपोहेन ईश्वरात्मत्वं प्रतिपिपादायिपितम् । प्राक् प्रबोधात् संसारित्व-अभ्युपगमः ॥ तत्-विषयत्वात् च प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्य । प्रबोधे तु प्रत्यक्षादि-अभावः ॥ IV. 1, 3. यावत् अयं आत्मा संसारी भवति, यावत् अस्य सम्यग्दर्शनेन संसारित्वं न निवर्तते, तावत् अस्य बुद्ध्या संयोगः न शाम्यति । यावत् एव च अयं बुद्धि-उपाधि-संबन्धः, तावत् जीवस्य जीवत्वं संसारित्वं च । परमार्थतः तु न जीवः नाम बुद्धि-उपाधिपरि-कल्पितस्वरूप-व्यतिरेकेण अस्ति । न हि नित्यमुक्तस्वरूपात् सर्वज्ञात् ईश्वरात् अन्यःचेतनः ॥ II. 3, 30.

an individual soul and has reached the state of Mukti as above defined ; and that, conversely, so long as this state has not been reached by an individual soul,—*i.e.*, so long as it is embodied,—it cannot be said to have attained self-knowledge; and that, during all this state of Avidya,—which coincides with the state of being embodied,—it is inevitable for the individual soul to regard the world as real ; if we bear this in mind, we shall find no difficulty in admitting that the whole doctrine of the Vedānta, as expounded by Shankar, is to be found in, or can be legitimately deduced from, the teaching of the Gita.

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Chapter XIV.

Shankar's Refutation of the Sankhya.

I

We have seen, in the last chapter, that the doctrine of the Vedanta, as expounded by Shankar, is to be found, or can be logically deduced from what is found, in the Gita,—both in its theoretical and practical aspects. Both of them agree in consciously or unconsciously teaching that, from the point of view of reality and perfect knowledge, the Nirguna Brahma alone, with its nature of eternal, pure, free intelligence, exists. Both the Gita and the Vedanta teach that the Atma of man is nothing but this Brahma ; that that, of which we are conscious as the world of difference and multiplicity, is simply unreal or non-existent ; and that, therefore, our consciousness of such a world is mere ignorance or illusion, due to our being subject to Upadhi which itself is the effect of Maya. Both of them maintain that it is for man's guidance, during this state of ignorance (मूढत्व or अविद्या), that he is provided with the various Scriptural works,

which deal with injunctions and prohibitions (about कर्म or भक्ति), and which speak as if the world were real, as if there were a real plurality of souls, as if the soul were really an agent and enjoyer or sufferer, as if God were really the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world. Both of them agree in holding that, during this state of ignorance, man cannot help thinking that he is an individual like other individuals, that he is an agent, enjoyer, or sufferer, that he has or has lost or has gained or wants this or that, that the world of difference and multiplicity,—with all that it contains, presupposes, or gives rise to,—is real. Both of them teach that those, who wish to attain Mukti, ought not to be attached to, or have desire for, any being or work or thing, but will or ought to live in conformity with the ideal indicated by Sthita-prajnatva or Gunatitatva. Both agree that Mukti consists in the complete attainment of self-knowledge; that the superior, though extremely difficult, method of attaining self-knowledge is the Jnana-yoga; that those, who are unable to practise the Jnana-yoga, should practise the Karma-yoga as a preparation for being able to practise the Jnana-yoga; and that all

works, that are not done strictly in accordance with the principles of the Karma-yoga, are a source of bondage to the doer of them.

Thus, then, we see that there is no difference whatever between the teaching of the Gitakar and that of Shankar, so far as the *matter* of their teaching is concerned. The only difference between their teachings is one of *form*. The Gitakar speaks in verse and as a preacher, who is not under any necessity of showing that all he says is systematic or self-consistent, or of justifying what he says by a chain of arguments. Shankar, on the other hand, writes in prose and as a philosopher, who is bound to show that his doctrine is self-consistent, and to support it by a chain of reasoning. But, besides this difference of mere form and expression, there is no difference whatever between the teaching of the Gitakar and that of Shankar,—most of the conclusions and some of the arguments of Shankar being already contained in the Gita, and those which are not contained in the Gita are capable of being deduced from those which are contained in it.

But, if the doctrine of the Vedanta, as expounded by Shankar, is identical with the

teaching of the Gitakar, there is, as we saw,¹ a fundamental difference between the doctrines of the Gita and the Vedanta, on the one hand, and the doctrine of the Sankhya philosophy, on the other. Even this difference, however, is reducible to one single point. For it is evident, or it can be shown by arguments similar to those used in the last chapter, that the Sankhyas agree with the Gitakar and Shankar in their doctrine about (1) the nature of the human soul, (2) the nature of the world of difference and multiplicity, (3) the state of Mukti, (4) the nature, the cause and the consequences of bondage. It is true that the Sankhyas differ from the Gitakar and Shankar in maintaining that all performance of works,—whether done in conformity with, or in violation of, the principles of the Karma-yoga, is a source of bondage; and that, therefore, it must altogether be given up. But this difference is not essential. For both the Gitakar and Shankar admit the Sankhya-yoga, taught by the Sankhyas, as one of the methods,—and even as the highest of all the methods,—of attaining Mukti. Not only this, but the Gitakar and Shankar teach that the pursuit of the Karma-yoga is

(1) See chapter XII.

simply meant to purify the mind, and thus to prepare it for pursuing the Sāukhya-yoga properly. The only point of fundamental difference, then, between the Gitakar and Shankar, on the one hand, and the Sāukhyas on the other, comes to this:—That the Gitakar and Shankar maintain that Brahman,—as defined above,—is the creator, supporter, and destroyer of the world; while the Sāukhyas hold that the non-intelligent Pradhāna is the cause of the production, sustenance, and destruction of the world. And, even in this respect, we must note that the Sāukhyas agree with the Gitakar and Shankar that the cause of the world is eternal, free, and omnipotent. The sole point of controversy, therefore, between them is, whether the cause of the world is intelligent or non-intelligent,—the Gitakar and Shankar holding that it is intelligent, the Sāukhyas maintaining that it is non-intelligent. Of course, if the Sāukhyas can somehow be brought to admit that the cause of the world is intelligent, then, by the line of argument, described in the previous¹ chapter, they can be forced to admit that Brahman is the cause of the world;

(1) See above, pp. 254-262.

and thus the whole controversy would cease. It is for this reason that Shankar has said:— If the Sankhyas admit that the cause of the world is intelligent, then they will cease to be the opponents of the Vedanta.¹ It is also for this reason that Shankar devotes all logic, grammar, and eloquence to prove that, whether the Sankhyas depend, for their doctrine on Scripture or on reasoning, they must admit that the cause of the world is intelligent.

II.

Let us first consider why Shankar takes so much trouble, and thinks it so very important, to refute the Sankhya-doctrine that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world. This is fully explained by Shankar himself. The first reason, which Shankar gives, for justifying his undertaking to refute the Sankhya, is general, and applies equally to the refutation of any other doctrine which differs from the Vedanta as well as of the objections that may be raised

(¹) ज्ञशक्तिं तु अनुमिमानः (सांख्यः) प्रतिवादित्वात् निवर्तेत । चेतनं एकं अनेकप्रपञ्चस्य जगतः उपादानं इति ब्रह्मवादप्रसंगात् ॥ II. 2, 9.

against the Vedānta. This reason is that, by refuting the doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, Shankar is able to render his own doctrine more clear, definite, and convincing. Thus he says :—If it be objected that, since we have repeatedly shown and since Scripture also teaches that Brahman is the cause of the world, there is no necessity of refuting objections. The answer is that the refutation is useful for confirming the same¹ doctrine. Another reason of the same kind is that the Sankhya doctrine is one of those which, being opposed to the Vedānta, may, if it is left unrefuted by the teachers of the Vedānta, become an obstacle in the way of attaining self-knowledge and Mukti.²

A third reason is this :—That Shankar maintains that, according to Scripture,

(¹) ननु तत्र तत्र प्रमाथिनं एतत् अधिकं भवेत्तारि मद्म
जगत्-कारणं तत् एव न संसारिणः आत्मनः पारमार्थिकं स्वरूपं
उपनिषत्सु उपदिश्यते इति । तत्र प्रमाथितम् । तस्य एव तु स्थूला-
विश्वाननवत्...आक्षेपममापने क्रियेते दात्र्याय ॥ III. 4, 2.

(²) यद्यपि इदं वेदान्तवाक्यानां ऐदम्पर्य निरूपयितुं शक्यं
प्रवृत्तं, न तर्कसाधकत्वेन केवलाभिः युक्तिभिः कंचित् सिद्धान्तं साध-
यितुं शक्यं वा प्रवृत्तम् । तथापि वेदान्तवाक्यानि व्याख्यानैः

Brahma is the cause of the world. Now there are some passages in Scripture which *seem* to lend support to the view that the Pradhana is the cause of the world. Hence, Kapila and others maintain that the Sankhya doctrine is based upon Scripture. Until, therefore, it is proved that none of these passages supports the Sankhya view, and that every one of them supports the Vedanta doctrine, the Vedanta doctrine cannot be said to be established. For every passage in Scripture is authoritative. It must be shown, therefore, that there is no passage in Scripture which supports the Sankhya, or that the Sankhya is wrong according to every part of Scripture¹.

A further reason is the danger that some, happening to read the works of the San-

सम्यक्-दर्शनप्रतिपक्षभूतानि सांख्यादिदर्शनानि निराकरणी-
यानि... ॥ II. 2, 1. (1) यत् उक्तं प्रधानस्य अशङ्कत्वं
तत् असिद्धं, कासु-चित् शाखासु प्रधानसमर्पणाभासानां शङ्कानां
श्रयमाणत्वात् । अतः प्रधानस्य कारणत्वं वेदसिद्धं एव महद्भिः
परमर्षिभिः कपिलप्रभृतिभिः परिगृहीतं इति प्रसज्यते । तत् यावत्
तेषां शङ्कानां अन्यपरत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते तावत् सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगतः
कारणं इति प्रतिपादितं अपि आकुलीभवेत् । अतः तेषां अन्य-
परत्वं दर्शयितुं परः संदर्भः अवर्तते ॥ I. 4, 1.

khyas, and having very little critical power, may wrongly think that a study of those works is the means of attaining self-knowledge, simply on the ground that those profound works are accepted by some great men, and are intended to supply perfect knowledge; and may come to have faith in them, considering them to be the works of omniscient sages on account of the deep argumentation to be found in those works. It is, therefore, necessary to show that these arguments are not valid.

This same reason is expressed a little differently in the following passage :—If it be asked why we have chosen, for refutation, the Sankhya and the Yoga alone out of so many systems, each of which teaches a peculiar method of attaining Mukti, the answer

(¹) ननु मुमुक्षूणां मोक्षसाधनत्वेन सम्यक्-दर्शननिरूपणाय स्वपक्षस्थापनं एव केवलं कर्तुं युक्तं किं परपक्षनिराकरणेन पर-द्वेषकरणे । यादं एवम् । तथापि महाजनपरिगृहीतानि मतानि सांख्यादितंत्राणि सम्यक्-दर्शन-अपदेशेन प्रवृत्तानि उप-टभ्य भवेत् केषांचित् मंदमतीनां एतानि अपि सम्यक्-दर्शनाय उपादेयानि इति अपेक्षा । तथा युक्तिसादृश्यसंभवेन सर्वज्ञभा-पितत्वात् च भ्रद्धा च तेषु इत्यतः तत्-भ्रष्टारता-उपपादनाय प्रयत्नते ॥ II. 2, 1.

is that these two are famous for being the means of attaining self-knowledge, and are accepted as such by some men of authority.¹

One more reason, which Shankar gives to show the necessity of refuting the Sankhya, is that it resembles the Vedanta in so many points that it is necessary, in order to prevent confusion, to show that the Sankhya is wrong in those parts in which it differs from the Vedanta. The following passage points out all these characteristics of the Sankhya,—which require its refutation,—and also indicates the high esteem in which it was held by Shankar :—So far we have answered objections against the Vedanta, arising from the Sankhya doctrine,—that Pradhana is the cause of the world,—inasmuch as this doctrine is very close to the Vedanta, is supported by profound arguments, and is partly accepted by some great men of authority, who are themselves followers of the Vedanta. We now proceed to refute

(¹) सतीषु अपि अध्यात्मविषयासु बर्हीषु स्मृतिषु सांख्य-
योगस्मृत्योः एव निराकरणे यत्नः कृतः । सांख्ययोगौ हि परम-
पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ श्रेष्ठैः च परिगृहीतौ... ॥
II. 1, 3.

objections against the Vedanta, which might be raised by men of dull intellect with the help of the atomic doctrine, and apply the refutation of the former objections to the latter in the same way in which, when the chief athlete is thrown down, the inferior ones may be regarded as already thrown¹ down.

Of course, as a reasonable opponent, Shankar has no objection to accept those portions of the Sankhya, in which it agrees with the Vedanta,—for instance, the Sankhya doctrine about the nature of the human² soul. Shankar, however, can make

(1) वैदिकस्य दर्शनस्य प्रत्यक्षमत्रात् गुह्यतरतर्कलोपेतत्वात्
मंदानुमादिभिः च कैः-चित् शिष्टैः केनचित् अंशेन परिगृहीतरात्
प्रधानकारणवाद् तत्र च न्यपात्रित्य यः ...आक्षेपः वेदान्तवाक्ये-
षु उद्भाषितः सः परिहृतः । इदानीं अण्णादिवादन्यपात्रयेन
अपि कैः-चित् मन्दमतिभिः वेदान्तवाक्येषु पुनः ...आक्षेपः
आशङ्क्यते । इत्यतः प्रधानमत्र-निरहणन्यायेन अतिदिशति ॥
II. 1, 12.

(2) येन तु अंशेन न विख्याते तेन इष्टं एवं सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योः
सावकाशाशयम् । तत् यथा “असंगः हि भयं पुरुषः” इति एवं-
आदिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धं एव पुरुषस्य विशुद्धत्वं निर्गुणपुरुषनिरूपणेन
सांख्यैः अभ्युपगम्यते ॥ II. 1, 3.

no concession whatsoever to the Sankhyas so far as they teach, in opposition to the Vedanta, that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world.

The following passage may be inserted here in order to make clear the sense in which, according to the Vedanta, Brahma is the cause of the world :—Brahma has been defined as the cause of the production, sustenance, and reabsorption of the world.¹ Now, it may be asked whether Brahma is the material cause of the world as gold is of golden ornaments, or it is the efficient cause of the world as the goldsmith is of golden ornaments². To answer this question we must first remember that Brahma is not the efficient cause *merely*. This view, that Brahma is the efficient cause *merely*, may plausibly be maintained on three grounds. Firstly, Scripture says that Brahma first reflected and then created. But reflection is

(1) See above, p. 116.

(2) ब्रह्म “जन्मादि अस्य यतः” इति लक्षितं । तच्च लक्षणं घटरुचकादीनां मृत्सुवर्णादिवत् प्रकृतित्वे कुलालसुवर्णकारादिवत् निमित्तत्वे च समानं इत्यतः भवति विमर्शः । किं-आत्मकं पुनः ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वं स्यात् इति ॥ I. 4; 23.

possible to an efficient cause only. Secondly, Brahman is said to be the supreme sovereign of the world. But all sovereigns, that we know, are efficient causes only. And, thirdly, the world is different in its nature from Brahman; for it is non-intelligent and impure, and consists of parts. But this is possible only if Brahman were the efficient cause, not the material cause, of the world.¹

This view, however, though plausible, is wrong. For all that follows from the first two of these three arguments is that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world. But these arguments do not prevent Brahman from being the material cause as well. But there

(1) तत्र निमित्तकारणं एव तावत् केवलं स्यात् इति प्रति-
भाति । कस्मात् । ...ईक्षापूर्वकं हि प्रधानः कर्तृत्वं अवगम्यते...
धुनिभ्यः । ईक्षापूर्वकं च कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेषु एव कृत्स्नादिषु
दृश्यम् । ...ईश्वराणां हि...निमित्तकारणत्वं एव केवलं प्रतीयते
तद्वत् परमेश्वरस्य अपि निमित्तकारणत्वं एव युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुम् ।
कार्यं च इदं जगत् सावयवं अनेतनं अनुदं च ददयेत् । कारणेन
अपि तस्य तादृशेन एव भवितव्यं कार्यकारणयोः साहचर्यदर्शनात् ।
मदा च न एवं-लक्षणं अवगम्यते । पारिदोष्यात् प्रधानः अन्यत्
उपादानकारणं अनुद्धि-आदिगुणकं स्मृतिप्रामेदं अभ्युपगन्तव्यं ॥
I. 4, 23.

are other reasons why Brahma must be regarded as the material cause. For Scripture says that Brahma being known everything else also becomes known, just as iron being known everything that is made of iron becomes known. But this is possible only if Brahma is regarded, not only as the efficient cause, but also the material cause of everything. Another reason, why Brahma must be regarded as the material cause of the world, is that the world is said to be reabsorbed into it. This also is possible if Brahma were the material cause. For we know, by experience, that effects, *e.g.* golden ornaments, are reabsorbed into gold, *i.e.*, the material cause, and not into the goldsmith who is their efficient cause. Of course, it cannot be maintained that Brahma is only the material cause of the world. For, if Brahma were the material cause merely, something else would be required to be the efficient cause. But nothing exists except Brahma. If, however, anything else were supposed to exist to serve as the efficient cause of the world, then that something else could not be known when Brahma is known. But if so, then, Scripture, saying that when Brahma is known everything else becomes

known, would be wrong,—which cannot be. Brahma, therefore, must be regarded as both the efficient cause and the material cause of the¹ world.

(¹) एवं प्राप्तं प्रमः । प्रकृतिः च उपादानकारणं च महा
अभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च । न केचिन्निमित्तकारणं एव ।
कस्मात् । प्रतिशादयान्त-अनुपरोधात् । “ आत्मनि यत्तु अरे
रष्टे भूते मते विज्ञाते सर्वं इदं विदितम् । ” “ यथा सीम्य एकेन
मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात् पाचारम्भणं विहारः नाम-
भयं मृत्पिका इत्येव गत्यं, ” “ एकेन लोहमणिना सर्वं लोह-
मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्, ” “ कारिमन् नु भगवःविज्ञाते सर्वं इदं विज्ञातं
भवति ” । तत्र एकेन विज्ञातेन सर्वं अन्यत् अपिज्ञातं अपि
विज्ञातं भवति इति प्रतीयते । तत् च उपादानकारणविज्ञाने सर्व-
विज्ञानं संभवति उपादानकारण-अव्यतिरेकात् कार्यस्य । निमित्त-
कारण-अव्यतिरेकः तु कार्यस्य न अस्ति लोके तद्विषयः प्रासाद-
व्यातिरेकदर्शनात् । एवं यथासंभवं प्रतिवेदान्तं प्रतिशादयन्ती
प्रकृतित्वसाधनौ प्रत्येतव्यौ ॥ I. 4, 25 ; इतः च प्रकृतिः
महा यत्-कारणं साक्षात् महा एव कारण उपादाय सर्वा प्रभव-
प्रलया आम्नायेते ।...यत् हि यस्मात् प्रभवति यस्मिन् च प्रली-
यते तत् तस्य उपादानं प्राप्तिदं । यथा मीदियवादीनां पृथिवी ॥
I. 4, 25 ; निमित्तत्वं आधिष्ठातृ-अन्तर-अभावात् अधिगन्त-
व्यम् । यथादि लोके मृत्सुवर्णादिकं उपादानकारणं कुलालसुवर्ण-
कारादीन् आधिष्ठातृन् अपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते न एवं मद्यणः उपादान-
कारणस्य सतः अन्यः आधिष्ठाता अपेक्ष्यः अस्ति । प्राक्
उत्पत्तेः एकं एव आद्वितीयं इति अवधारणात् आधिष्ठातृ-अन्तर-
अभावः अपि प्रतिशादयान्त-अनुपरोधात् एव उदितः वेदितव्यः ॥

Nor is it right to say, as the last of the above three arguments alleges, that the world has not Brahma for its material cause, because the world is different from Brahma. For, as a matter of fact, an effect is not absolutely identical with its material cause, as in that case the two would be indistinguishable from each other. All that can be said, therefore, is that an effect and its material cause possess some characteristic in common. And this is true of the world and Brahma, in so far as each of them possesses¹ existence.

III.

The first part of Shankar's refutation of the Sankhya doctrine,—that the non-intelli-

अधिष्ठातारि हि उपादानात् अन्यस्मिन् अभ्युपगम्यमाने पुनः
अपि एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानस्य असंभवात् प्रतिज्ञा-दृष्टान्त-
उपरोधः एव स्यात् । तस्मात् आधिष्ठातृ-अन्तर-अभावात्
आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं उपादान-अन्तर-अभावात् च प्रकृतित्वम् ॥ I.
4, 23.

(¹) यत् तु उक्तं “ विलक्षणत्वात् न इदं जगत् ब्रह्मप्रकृति-
कम् ” इति । न अयं एकान्तः ।...अत्यन्तसारूप्ये ...प्रकृति-
विकारभावः एव प्रलीयेतुः ।...ब्रह्मणः ...सत्तालक्षणः स्वभावः
आकाशादिषु अनुवर्तमानः दृश्यते । न हि असति आतिशये प्रकृति-
विकारः इति भवति ॥ II. 1, 6.

gent Pradhana is the cause of the world,—consists in showing that this doctrine is not consistent with Scripture. For Scripture teaches that the cause of the world is omniscient and omnipotent, and, therefore, essentially intelligent. Thus Shankar begins :—The Sankhya hypothesis, that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world, cannot be based upon Scripture. For it is directly inconsistent with Scripture. For we find it frequently stated in Scripture that the original cause of the world first *thought* within itself that it should become many, and then created the world¹. The original cause of the world, therefore, to which, according to Scripture, the characteristic of reflection and omniscience belongs, must be regarded as essentially intelligent. Hence

• (1) न सांख्यपरिचलितं भवेतनं प्रधानं जगतः कारणं
 शक्यं वेदान्तेषु आधयितुम् । अशङ्क हि तत् । कथं अशङ्क्यम् ।
 ईक्षितव्यवणात् कारणस्य । “ सत् एव सांख्य इदं अमे आसीत्
 एक एव अद्वितीय ” इति उक्तम् “ तत् ऐक्षत षट् संया प्रजा-
 येय इति तत् तेजः असृजत ” । तत्र इदं-सत्त्वव्यवस्थां नामरूप-
 व्याकृतं जगत् प्राक् उत्पत्तेः सत्-आत्मना अवधार्य तस्य एव
 प्रकृतस्य सत्-सत्त्वव्यवस्था इक्षगपूर्वकं तेजःप्रभृतेः सृष्टृत्वं
 दर्शयति । तथा अन्यत्र अपि ईक्षापूर्वकं एव सृष्टिं आचष्ट ।
 I. 1, 5.

the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be the original cause of the world.

But the Sankhyas may try to obviate this objection by maintaining that the characteristics of omnipotence and omniscience can be attributed even to the non-intelligent Pradhana. It can be spoken of as omnipotent, because it modifies itself into everything else. It can also be called the supreme ruler, for it is the source of all its modifications. It can even be regarded as omniscient, because it consists of the three *gunas*, satva, rajas, and tamas, and knowledge results from the Satva-guna. Thus, the Satva-guna being always present in the Pradhana, even before the beginning of the world, the non-intelligent Pradhana can appropriately be spoken of as all-knowing. All the Scriptural passages, therefore, above referred to, are applicable to the non-intelligent Pradhana¹.

(¹) तत्र सांख्याः प्रधानं त्रिगुणं अचेतनं जगतः कारणं इति मन्यमानाः आहुः । यानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेः ब्रह्मणः जगत्कारणत्वं दर्शयन्ति इति अवोचः तानि प्रधानकारणपक्षे अपि योजयितुं शक्यन्ते । सर्वशक्तित्वं तावत् प्रधानस्य अपि स्वविकारविषयं उपपद्यते । (तस्य अपि नियन्त्रित्वं सर्वविकारकारणत्वात् उपपद्यते ॥ I. 2, 19.) एवं सर्वज्ञत्वं अपि

This, however, says Shankar, cannot be maintained. For, during the Pradhana-state, all the three *gunas* being in equipoise, no knowledge can arise. Nor is it right to say that the Pradhana should be regarded as possessing omniscience, even when the three *gunas* are in equipoise, because even then it possesses the satva-guna and hence the capacity of knowledge. For if the Pradhana is to be regarded as possessing omniscience simply on account of its possessing the mere capacity for it, then it will have to be regarded, at the same time, as possessing no knowledge, on account of its possessing the rajas-guna and the tamas-guna which are the source of all ignorance. Besides, the state of possessing the satva-guna, unconnected with the power of cognition,

उपपद्यते । कथम् । यत् तु ज्ञानं मन्यसे सः सत्त्वधर्मः “सत्त्वात् संजायते ज्ञानं” इति स्मृतेः । तेन च सत्त्वधर्मेण ज्ञानेन कार्य-
करणवन्तः पुरुषाः सर्वज्ञाः योगिनः प्रसिद्धाः सत्त्वस्य हि निर-
तिशय-उत्कर्षं सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसिद्धम् । न केवलस्य अकार्यकरणस्य
पुरुषस्य उपलब्धिमात्रस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं किञ्चित्-ज्ञत्वं वा कल्पयितुं
शक्यम् । त्रिगुणत्वात् तु प्रधानस्य सर्वज्ञानकारणभूतं सत्त्वं प्रधान-
अवस्थायां अपि विद्यते इति प्रधानस्य अचेतनस्य एव सतः
सर्वज्ञत्वं उपचर्यते वेदान्तवाक्येषु ॥ I. 1, 5.

cannot be called knowledge; and the Pradhana does not possess the power of cognition, since it is non-intelligent. Hence it is not right to attribute omniscience to the Pradhana. If it be said that the Pradhana possesses knowledge on account of some principle of cognition outside it, as iron possesses the power of burning on account of fire; then the proper course is to regard this principle of cognition, *i. e.*, Brahma,—on account of which the Pradhana possesses knowledge,—to be the cause of the world¹.

(¹) यत् तु उक्तं सत्त्वधर्मेण ज्ञानेन सर्वज्ञं प्रधानं भविष्यति इति । तत् न उपपद्यते । न हि प्रधान-अवस्थायां गुणसाम्यात् सत्त्वधर्मः ज्ञानं संभवति । ननु उक्तं सर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वेन सर्वज्ञं भविष्यति इति । तत् अपि न उपपद्यते । यादि गुणसाम्ये सति सत्त्वव्यपाश्रयां ज्ञानशक्तिं आश्रित्य ज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वेन सर्वज्ञं प्रधानं उच्येत कामं रजः-तमः-व्यपाश्रयां अपि ज्ञानप्रतिबन्ध-शक्तिं आश्रित्य किञ्चित्-ज्ञं उच्येत । अपिच न असाक्षिका सत्त्व-वृत्तिः जानाति न अभिधीयते । न च अचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य साक्षित्वं अस्ति । तस्मात् अनुपपन्नं प्रधानस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं । योगिनां तु चेतनत्वात् सत्त्वोत्कर्षनिमित्तं सर्वज्ञत्वं उपपन्नं इति अनुदाहरणम् । अथ पुनः साक्षिनिमित्तं ईक्षितृत्वं प्रधानस्य कल्पयेत् यथा अग्नि-निमित्तं अयःपिण्डादः दग्धृत्वम् । तथा सति यत्-निमित्तं ईक्षितृत्वं प्रधानस्य तत् एव सर्वज्ञं मुख्यं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं इति युक्तम् ॥ I. 1, 5.

Perhaps the Sankhyas may now argue thus :—You say that the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because Scripture speaks of that cause as capable of reflection. But we can get rid of this difficulty if we remember that sometimes non-intelligent things are figuratively spoken of as if they were intelligent. For instance, seeing the bank of a river about to fall, we say that the river-bank is *inclined* to fall. In the same way, the Pradhana, though non-intelligent, can be figuratively spoken of as reflecting at the moment when the creation was just about to take place. Or just as a man decides that, after having taken his bath and food, he will go to a village in the afternoon, and then does exactly as he intends ; in the same way, since the Pradhana regularly modifies itself into Buddhi, &c., it may be figuratively spoken of as if acting with a purpose like an intelligent¹ being. But Shankar has no difficulty in showing that this cannot help

(¹) अत्र भाह । यत् उच्यते न अचेतनं प्रधानं जगत्-कारणं इक्षितृत्वध्वजात् इति । तत् अन्यथा अपि उपपद्यते अचेतने अपि चेतनवत् उपचाददर्शनात् । यथा प्रत्यासन्नपतनतां

the Sankhyas to remove the objection. For Scripture does not simply speak of the cause of the world as reflecting before creation, but also speaks of it as Atma or Jiva. Now the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be called Atma or Jiva, because Atma or Jiva is essentially intelligent. But if we take Brahma to be the cause of the world, then the term Atma can be applied¹ to it.

नद्याः कूलस्य आलक्ष्य कूलं पिपातिषति इति उपचारः, तद्वत् अचेतने अपि प्रधाने प्रत्यासन्नसर्गे चेतनवत् उपचारः भविष्यति “ तत् ऐक्षत ” इति । यथा लोके कः चित् चेतनः स्नात्वा भुक्त्वा च अपराण्हे ग्रामं रथेन गामीष्यामि इति ईक्षित्वा अनन्तरं तथा एव नियमेन प्रवर्तते । तथा प्रधानं अपि महदादि-आकारेण नियमेन प्रवर्तते । तस्मात् चेतनवत् उपचर्यते ॥ I. 1, 5.

(¹) यत् उक्तं प्रधानं अचेतनं सत्-शब्दवाच्यं तास्मिन् औपचारिके ईक्षतिः इति ..तत् असत् । कस्मात् । आत्मशब्दात् । “ सत् एव सौम्य इदं अग्रे आसीत् ” इति उपक्रम्य “ तत् ऐक्षत तत् तेजः असृजत ” इति च तेजः-अप्-अन्नानां सृष्टिं उक्त्वा तत् एव प्रकृतं सत् ईक्षितुं तानि च तेजः-अप्-अन्नानि देवता-शब्देन परामृश्य आह “ सा इयं देवता ऐक्षत ” “ हन्त अहं इमाः तिस्रः देवताः अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ” इति । तत्र यदि प्रधानं अचेतनं गुणवृत्ति ईक्षितुं कल्पेयत तत् एव प्रकृतत्वात् सा इयं देवता इति परामृश्येत । न तदा देवता जीवं आत्मशब्देन अभिदध्यात् । जीवः हि नाम चेतनः शरीराध्यक्षः प्राणानां धारयिता तत्प्रसिद्धेः निर्वचनात् च ।

But the Sankhyas might meet this difficulty by saying that just as a man, who executes the purposes of another man, is figuratively spoken of as the Atma of that man ; in the same way, the Pradhana can be spoken of as Atma, since it executes all the purposes of Purusha, by way of contributing to its enjoyment and release.¹ Or the Sankhyas may assert that the same term Atma is used, at one time, in the sense of an intelligent being, and, at another time, in the sense of a non-intelligent being.² Shankar, however, points out that neither of

यः कथं अचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य चेतनःजीवःस्वरूपं भवितुं अर्हति ।
अथ तु चेन्न प्रधानं मुक्तं ईक्षित् पारंगृह्येन तस्य जीवविषयः
आत्मशब्दप्रयोगः उपपद्यते । तथा “ सः यः एषः अणिमा
एवम् आत्मा इदं सर्वं तत् सत्यं सः आत्मा तत्त्वं अस्मि
श्वेतकेतो ” इति अत्र सः आत्मा इति प्रकृतं सत् अणिमानं
आत्मानं आत्मशब्देन उपादिश्य, तत्त्वं अस्मि श्वेतकेतो इति
चेतनस्य श्वेतकेतोः आत्मत्वेन उपादिशति ।...अतः आत्मशब्दात्
न गौणं ईक्षित्वम् इति उक्तम् ॥ I. 1, 6.

(1) See above, p 201.

(2) अथ उच्येत अचेतने अपि प्रधाने भवति आत्मशब्दः
आत्मनः सर्वार्थकारित्वत् यथा राज्ञः सर्वार्थकारिणि भृत्ये भवति
आत्मशब्दःमम आत्मा भद्रमेतः इति । प्रधानं हि पुरुषस्य आत्मनः
भोगापवर्गां कुरीत् उपकरोति राज्ञः इव भृत्यः संधिविप्रहादियु

these two devices can be of any use to the Sankhyas in the present case. Not the first. Because the cause of the world, which is spoken of as Atma, is, in the same passage, said to be identical with the Atma of man. If, therefore, the Sankhya view were true, then we shall have to suppose that Scripture, which cannot err and which must always be taken to be the source of truth, taught that the human soul, which, as Scripture itself teaches, is essentially intelligent, was non-intelligent,—thus causing confusion and preventing the possibility of Mukti, instead of supplying self-knowledge and contributing to the attainment of Mukti. This, however, cannot be admitted. Hence it follows that, in the above passage, Atma means intelligence and, therefore, cannot be taken to be applied to the non-intelligent Pradhana¹. From

वर्तमानः । अथवा एकः एव आत्मशब्दः चेतन-अचेतनविषयः भविष्यति ... यथा एकः एव ज्योतिः-शब्दः क्रतुज्वलनाविषयः ॥
1 1, 7.

(¹) तत्र कुतः एतत् आत्मशब्दात्-ईक्षतेः अगौणत्वं इति अतः उत्तरं पठति । न प्रधानं अचेतनं आत्मशब्दालंघनं भवितुं अर्हति । “सः आत्मा” इति प्रकृतं सत् अणिमानं आदाय “तत् त्वं असि श्वेतकेतो” इति चेतनस्य श्वेतकेतोः मोक्षाय-

speech. Lastly, it is not right to say that the word Atma is used in Scripture in two primary meanings, simply because some other words have been so used. But even supposing that the word Atma also has been used in two senses, we can decide in which of the two senses it is used in a particular passage only by taking into consideration the context in which it is used. And we have shown above that, in the present case, the context requires that the word Atma should be taken in the sense of intelligence. The conclusion, therefore, is that the cause of the world, which is spoken of in Scripture as Atma *i. e.*, as essentially intelligent, cannot be the non-intelligent Pradhana¹.

उपपन्नः गौणः आत्मशब्दः मम आत्मा भद्रसेनः इति । अपि च क्वचित् गौणः शब्दः दृष्टः इति न एतावता शब्दप्रमाणके अर्थे गौणी कल्पना न्याय्या सर्वत्र अनाश्वासप्रसंगात् ॥ I. 1, 7.

(¹) यत् तु उक्तं चेतन-अचेतनयोः साधारणः आत्मशब्दः क्रतुज्वलनयोः इव ज्योतिः-शब्दः इति । तत् न । अनेकार्थत्वस्य अन्याय्यत्वात् । तस्मात् चेतनविषयः एव मुख्यः आत्मशब्दः ... । साधारणत्वे अपि आत्मशब्दस्य न प्रकरणं उपपदं वा किञ्चित् निश्चायकं अन्तरेण अन्यतरवृत्तिता निर्धारयितुं शक्यते । न च अत्र अचेतनस्य निश्चायकं किञ्चित् कारणं अस्ति । प्रकृतं तु सत्-ईक्षितृ-संनिहितः चेतनः श्वेतकेतुः । नहि चेतनस्य श्वेतकेतोः

must be regarded simply as the capacity for all knowledge, and not actual omniscience. Besides, before creation Brahma has no means of acquiring knowledge. How then can its knowledge be eternal? Lastly, how can the modification of Brahma, which is pure, begin at all? This difficulty does not arise with reference to the Pradhana, which, being of a composite nature, is always capable of modification. In short, as to the teaching of Scripture, that the cause of the world is omniscient, the Vedanta meets with the same difficulty as the Sankhya; but the Vedanta has to meet other difficulties which do not arise on the Sankhya¹ view.

The following passage contains Shankar's answer to this objection:—Why cannot

(¹) अवश्यं च त्वया अपि सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म अभ्युपगच्छता सर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वेन एव सर्वज्ञत्वं अभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । नहि सर्वविषयं ज्ञानं कुर्वत् एव ब्रह्म वर्तते । तथाहि । ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वे ज्ञानक्रियां प्रति स्वातंत्र्यं ब्रह्मणः हीयेत । अथ अनित्यं तत् इति ज्ञानक्रियायाः उपरमेत अपि ब्रह्म । तदा सर्वज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वेन एव सर्वज्ञत्वं आपतति । अपि च प्राक् उत्पत्तेः सर्वकारकशून्यं ब्रह्म इष्यते त्वया । न च ज्ञानसाधनानां शरीर-इन्द्रियादीनां अभावे ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः कस्याचित् उपपन्ना । अपिच प्रधानस्य अनेकात्मकस्य परिणामसंभवात् कारणत्व-उपपत्तिः मृदादिवत् । न असंहतस्य एकात्मकस्य ब्रह्मणः इति ॥ I. 1, 5.

attributed to Brahma, because it possesses no means of knowing before creation, the explanation is that the nature of Brahma being intelligence, it requires no external means of knowledge¹. As to the assertion, that the Pradhana being of composite nature is always capable of modification, but Brahma does not possess this capacity as its nature is pure, Shankar refuses to consider its

(¹) यत् पुनः उक्तं ब्रह्मणः अपि न मुख्यं सर्वज्ञत्वं उपपद्यते नित्यज्ञानक्रियत्वे ज्ञानक्रियां प्रति स्वातंत्र्य-असंभवात् इति अत्र उच्यते । इदं तावत् भवान् प्रष्टव्यः । कथं नित्यज्ञानक्रियत्वे सर्वज्ञत्वहानिः इति । यस्य हि सर्वविषय-अवभासनक्षमं ज्ञानं नित्यं अस्ति सः सर्वज्ञः इति विप्रतिपिद्धम् । अनित्यत्वे हि ज्ञानस्य कदाचित् जानाति कदाचित् न जानाति इति असर्वज्ञत्वं अपि स्यात् न असौ ज्ञाननित्यत्वे दोषः अस्ति । ज्ञाननित्यत्वे ज्ञानविषयः स्वातंत्र्यव्यपदेशः न उपपद्यते इति चेत् । न । प्रतत-औष्ण्य-प्रकाशे अपि सवितरि दहति प्रकाशयति इति स्वातंत्र्य-व्यपदेशदर्शनात् । ननु सवितुः दाह्यप्रकाश्यसंयोगे साति दहति प्रकाशयति इति व्यपदेशः स्यात् न तु ब्रह्मणः प्राक् उत्पत्तेः ज्ञान-कर्मसंयोगः अस्ति इति विषमः दृष्टान्तः । न असति अपि कर्मणि सविता प्रकाशते इति कर्तृत्वव्यपदेशदर्शनात् एवं असति अपि ज्ञानकर्मणि ब्रह्मणः तत् ऐक्षत इति कर्तृत्वव्यपदेश-उपपत्तेः न वैषम्यम् । कर्म-अपेक्षायां तु ब्रह्मणि ईक्षितत्वश्रुतयः सुतरां उपपन्नाः । किं पुनः तत् कर्म यत् प्राक् उत्पत्तेः ईश्वरज्ञानस्य विषयः भवति इति । तत्त्व-अन्यत्वाभ्यां अनिर्वचनीये नामरूपे अव्याकृते व्याचिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः । ...यत् अपि उक्तं प्राक्

value, because he has shown that the Sankhya view has no foundation in Scripture,—which is here the relevant¹ point. Shankar, therefore, concludes that, according to Scripture, the omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, and not the non-intelligent Pradhana².

IV.

So far then we have seen how Shankar proves that the Sankhya doctrine, that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world, is not supported by Scripture and is, therefore, invalid, by showing that Scripture speaks of the cause of the world as omniscient,—that is, as possessed of intelligence, and hence cannot be taken to teach that this cause is the non-intelligent Pradhana³.

उत्पत्तेः प्रवृत्तः शरीरादिमन्वन्धं अन्तरेण ईक्षित्वानुपपन्नं
इति । न तत् चोद्यं भवन्नस्ति । प्रवृत्तः शानस्वरूपानित्यत्वे शान-
साधन-अपेक्षानुपपत्तेः ॥ I. 1, 5.

(¹) यत् अपि उक्तं प्रधानस्य अनेकात्मकत्वात् कारणत्व-
उपपत्तिः, न भगवत्तस्य प्रवृत्तः इति । तत् प्रधानस्य अशब्द-
त्वेन एव प्रत्युक्तम् ॥ I. 1, 5. (²) तस्मात् सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म
जगतः कारणं न. अचेतनं प्रधानं ... इति सिद्धम् ॥ I. 1, 11.
(³) आकाशादेः समस्तस्य जगतः जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म इति

But the Sankhyas are not convinced or silenced by this line of argument. For now they appeal to certain Scriptural texts, asserting that each of these texts defines the non-intelligent Pradhana as the cause of the world.

The first of these texts is as follows :—
 “That is the higher kind of knowledge by which is known the indestructible. The wise regard that to be the cause of the world which cannot be seen nor touched, which is without any origin or attributes, which is without eyes and ears, hands and feet, which is eternal, omnipresent, all-pervading, infinitesimal, and imperishable.” Now the Sankhyas maintain that, since all the characteristics, mentioned in this passage, belong to the Pradhana, and there is no characteristic mentioned therein which cannot be attributed to the Pradhana, therefore, this Scriptural text supports their view,—that

उक्तम् । तस्य समस्तजगत्कारणस्य ब्रह्मणः व्यापित्वं नित्यत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं सर्वात्मत्वं इति एवं-जातीयकाः धर्माः उक्ताः एव भवन्ति । अर्थान्तर-प्रसिद्धानां च केषांचित् शब्दानां ब्रह्माविषयत्वे हेतु-प्रतिपादनेन कानिचित् वाक्यानि स्पष्टब्रह्मलिंगानि संदिह्यमानानि ब्रह्मपरतया निर्णीतानि ॥ I. 2, 1.

the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world.¹

Shankar, however, points out that even this text cannot be taken to support the Sankhya doctrine. For of the same cause of the world, of which the attributes, mentioned in the passage quoted above, are predicated, is predicated omniscience in another passage immediately following. Hence, even the above passage must be taken to refer to Brahma, and not to the non-intelligent Pradhana.² There is another reason also, says Shankar, why Brahma, and not the Pradhana, must be taken to be the cause of the world. For, in the passages under consideration, the cause of the world is said to

(¹) “अथ परा यया तत् अक्षरं अधिगम्यते,” “यत् तत् अद्वैतं अप्राप्तं अगोत्रं अवर्णं अचक्षुः-श्रोत्रं तत् अपाणिपादं नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुगूढं तत् अव्ययं यत् भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः” इति श्रूयते । तत्र संशयः । किं अयं अद्वैतत्वादिगुणकः भूतयोनिः प्रधानं स्यात् उत...परमेश्वरः इति । तत्र प्रधानं अवेतनं भूतयोनिः इति युक्तम् ।...इह.. अद्वैतत्वादयः धर्माः प्रधानं संभवन्ति । न च अत्र विद्वद्यमानः धर्मः कश्चित् अभि-
रूप्यते ॥ (²) एव प्राप्ते अभिधीयते । यः अयं अद्वैतत्वा-
दिगुणकः भूतयोनिः सः परमेश्वरः एव स्यात् न अन्यः इति ।

be different from and “higher than the high imperishable.” That is to say, the cause of the world, according to these Scriptural texts, is to be regarded as different from and higher than the indestructible yet unmanifested potentiality of name and form,—which abides in Brahma, constitutes its limiting adjunct, and is higher than all the modifications which constitute the entire created or manifested world of difference and multiplicity. This cause, therefore, must be meant to be Brahma. Of course, there is no objection to supposing that, since this potentiality is later on manifested as the world of difference and multiplicity, it is, in this sense, the cause of the world, and that

कथं एतत् अवगम्यते । धर्मोक्तेः । ... यत्कारणं अक्षरात् संभवति
 इह विश्वं इति प्रकृतं भूतयोनिं इह जायमानप्रकृतित्वेन निर्दिश्य
 अनन्तरं अपि जायमानप्रकृतित्वेन एव सर्वज्ञं निर्दिशति । “यः
 सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः” इति । तस्मात् निर्देशसा-
 म्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् प्रकृतस्य एव अक्षरस्य भूतयोनेः
 सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्ववित्त्वं च धर्मः उच्यते इति गम्यते । परमेश्वरस्य
 हि धर्मः इह उच्यमानः दृश्यते । यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् इति ।
 न हि प्रधानस्य अचेतनस्य ... सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्ववित्त्वं वा संभवाति ।
 ... तस्मात् अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकः भूतयोनिः परमेश्वरः एव ॥
 1. 2, 21,

it should be recognised by the name Pradhana. But then, we must not forget that this Pradhana has no existence independent of or separate from Brahma ; and that the causality of the world really belongs, not to this Pradhana as such, but to Brahma as possessing this Pradhana¹. Shankar has no objection to this view, because, as we know, it is his own view.

Another text, quoted by the Sankhyas, is from the Kathaka Upanishad, in which we read :—Avyakta is beyond Mahat, Purusha is beyond Avyakta. Now the Sankhyas argue that this text refers to their own doctrine, because we recognise in it the three

(¹) इतः च परमेश्वरः एव भूतयोनिः न ...प्रधानं . । कस्मात् । ...प्रधानात् अपि प्रकृतं भूतयोनिं भेदेन व्यपदिशति "अक्षरात् परतः परः " इति । अक्षरं अव्याकृतं नामरूपवोज-शाक्तिरूपं भूतसूक्ष्मं ईश्वराश्रयं तस्य एव उपाधिभूतं सर्वस्मात् विकारात् परतः परः अविकारः तस्मात् परतः परः इति भेदेन व्यप-देशात् परमात्मानं इह विवक्षितं दर्शयति । न अत्र प्रधानं नाम किञ्चित् स्वतंत्रं तत्त्वं अभ्युपगम्यते .. । किं तर्हि यदि प्रधानं अपि कल्प्यमानं भूति-अविरोधेन अव्याकृतादिशब्दवाच्यं भूतसूक्ष्मं परिकल्प्येत कल्प्यताम् । तस्मात् भेदव्यपदेशात् परमेश्वरः भूत-योनिः इति एतत् इह प्रातिपाद्यते ॥ I 2, 22.

forms of existence,—Mahat, Avyakta, Purusha,—expressed by the same names and in the same order, as they are in the Sankhya Smriti. Hence the Sankhyas conclude that it is wrong to say that the doctrine,—that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world,—is not supported by Scripture¹.

Shankar says that this argument is not valid. For the text, quoted above, does not refer to the existence of the forms of reality spoken of as Mahat and Avyakta in the Sankhya Smriti. We do not recognise, in the text, any mention of the Pradhana, made up of the three *gunas*, as the independent cause of the world. All that we find in the text is the presence of the word Avyakta. That word simply means that which is not vyakta or manifested. It is, therefore, applicable to anything which is subtle and

(¹) ...प्रधानं एकेषां शाखिनां शब्दवत् उपलभ्यते । काठके हि पठ्यते “महतः परं अव्यक्तं अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः” इति । तत्र ये एव यन्नामानः यत्-क्रमाः च महत्-अव्यक्तपुरुषाः स्मृति-प्रसिद्धाः ते एव इह प्रत्यभिज्ञायन्ते । तत्र अव्यक्तं इति... स्मृतिप्रसिद्धं प्रधानं अभिधीयते । तस्य शब्दवत्त्वात् अशब्दत्वं अनुपपन्नम् ॥ I. 4, 1.

imperceptible. Nor is it ordinarily used to denote the Sankhya Pradhana. It is, of course, used in this sense by the Sankhyas. But the language of Scripture cannot be said necessarily to possess the technical meaning of a particular school of philosophy. Nor does the order, in which the words are used in the Scriptural text quoted above necessarily give the Sankhya sense to the word, simply because their order is the same as that in which the words occur in the Sankhya Smriti. No sensible man would call a cow a horse, simply because it stands in the place of a horse. Since then the word *Avyakta* simply means that which is not manifested, and can, therefore, be used to denote anything that is subtle and invisible; it is the context that must determine what the particular subtle and invisible thing is which the word *Avyakta* denotes in any given case. And Shankar maintains that, in the present case, the context shows that the word *Avyakta* is used in the sense of the body. The text, therefore, does not support the Sankhya¹ doctrine.

(1) न एतत् एवम् । न हि एतत् काठकाक्षयं स्मृति-
प्रसिद्धयोः महत्-अव्यक्तयोः अस्तित्वपरम् । न हि अत्र यादृशं

But if Shankar admits that, in the above passage, Avyakta means something that is subtle and imperceptible, how can he, the Sankhyas may object, interpret it in the sense of the body, which is gross, and is, therefore, better expressed by the word vyakta? The answer is that Shankar does not interpret Avyakta as the gross body, but as the subtle body, from which the gross body is evolved¹.

स्मृतिप्रसिद्धं स्वतंत्रं कारणं त्रिगुणं प्रधानं तादृशं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । शब्दमात्रं हि अत्र अव्यक्तं इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । सः च शब्दः न व्यक्तं अव्यक्तं इति यौगिकत्वात् अन्यास्मिन् अपि सूक्ष्मे सुदुर्लक्ष्ये च प्रयुज्येत । न च अयं कस्मिन् चित् रूढः । या तु प्रधानवादिनां रूढिः सा तेषां एव पारिभाषिकी सती न वेदार्थनिरूपणे कारणभावं प्रातिपद्यते । न च क्रममात्रसामान्यात् समानार्थप्रातिपात्तिः भवति असति तत्-रूपप्रत्याभिज्ञाने । न हि अश्वस्थाने गां पश्यन् अश्वः अयं इति अमूढः अध्यवस्यति । प्रकरणनिरूपणायां च अत्र न परपरिकल्पितं प्रधानं प्रतीयते । ...शरीरं हि अत्र रथरूपकविन्यस्तं अव्यक्तशब्देन परिगृह्यते ।...एवं पूर्वापरालोचनायां न अस्ति अत्र परपरिकल्पितस्य प्रधानस्यैव अवकाशः ॥ I. 4, 1.

(¹) उक्तं एतत् ...शरीरं अव्यक्तशब्दं न प्रधानं इति । इदं इदानीं आशङ्क्यते । कथं अव्यक्तशब्द-अर्हत्वं शरीरस्य यावता स्थूलत्वात् स्पष्टतरं इदं शरीरं व्यक्तशब्दाहं अस्पष्टवचनः तु अव्यक्तशब्दः इति । अतः उत्तरं उच्यते । सूक्ष्मं तु इह कार-

But is not this equivalent to admitting the Sankhya view that the word *Avyakta*, in the text under consideration, denotes the *Pradhana*? For by the *Pradhana* the Sankhyas mean the same thing as Shankar means by the subtle body, namely, the original state of the created world¹.

Shankar replies that, though there is no difference between the meanings of the subtle body (as he uses it) and the *Pradhana* (as the Sankhyas use it), still the fundamental difference between the Vedanta doctrine and the Sankhya doctrine remains. For the Sankhyas regard the *Pradhana* as the independent and sole cause of the world; while

णात्मना शरीरं विवक्ष्यते सूक्ष्मस्य अव्यक्तशब्दादित्वात् । यद्यपि स्थूल इदं शरीरं न स्वयं अव्यक्तशब्दं अर्हति । तथापि तस्य तु आरम्भकं भूतसूक्ष्मं अव्यक्तशब्दं अर्हति । प्रकृतिशब्दः च विफारे दृष्टः ॥ I. 4, 2.

(¹) अत्र आह । यदि जगत् इदं अनाभिव्यक्तनामरूपं बीजात्मकं प्राक् अवस्थं अव्यक्तशब्दाहं अभ्युपगम्येत तत् आत्मना च शरीरस्य अपि अव्यक्तशब्दादित्वं प्रतिज्ञायेत सः एव तर्हि प्रधानकारणवादः एवं सति आपयेत । अस्य एव जगतः प्राक्-अवस्थायाः प्रधानत्वेन अभ्युपगमात् इति ॥ I. 4, 3.

the Vedantists regard the subtle body as absolutely dependent upon; Brahma for all the modifications which it undergoes. With this essential difference, Shankar maintains the necessity of the subtle body or Avyakta as strongly as the Sankhyas. For, without it, Brahma cannot be the creator of the world. Only, in order that Mukti may be possible, this Avyakta must be regarded as due to Avidya, capable of being got rid of through the attainment of self-knowledge. It may be regarded as a kind of sleep, in which all human souls, subject to the sansar state, fall, having forgotten their real nature. This same Avyakta,—the potentiality of the whole universe of difference and multiplicity,—is spoken of in Scripture sometimes as Akasha, sometimes as Akshara, sometimes as Maya. And this potentiality is appropriately expressed by the word Avyakta, for it is neither real nor unreal. For these reasons the text, quoted above, does not support the Sankhya doctrine about the Pradhana¹.

(¹) अत्र उच्यते । यदि वयं स्वतंत्रां कांचित् प्राक्-अवस्थां जगतः कारणत्वेन अभ्युपगच्छेम प्रसंजयेम तदा, प्रधानकारण-वादम् । परमेश्वराधीना, तु इयं अस्माभिः प्राक्-अवस्था जगतः

Another text, quoted by the Sankhyas, to disprove the assertion,—that their doctrine is not supported by Scripture,—is as follows : There is an *Aja* (a female unborn being) with the characteristics of red, white, and black, which is the origin of a multitude of creatures of a uniform nature.} One *Aja* (a male unborn being) loves her and keeps company with her.} Another leaves her after having enjoyed her. The Sankhyas argue that the female *Aja*, with the three characteristics mentioned in this text, is the Sankhya *Prakriti*, which is constituted by the three *gunas*, which is the origin of all the world, to which some *Purushas* are attached

अभ्युपगम्यते न स्वतंत्रा । सा च अवश्यं अभ्युपगन्तव्या ।
 अर्थवती हि सा । न हि तया विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिध्यति ।
 शक्तिरहितस्य तस्य प्रशक्ति-अनुपपत्तेः । मुक्तानां च पुनः अनु-
 त्पत्तिः । कुतः । विद्यया तस्याः बीजशक्तेः दाहात् । अवि-
 द्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देष्टव्या परमेश्वराश्रया
 मायामयी महासुप्तिः यस्यां स्वरूपप्रतिबोधरहिताः शेरते संसारिणः
 जीवाः । तत् एतत् अव्यक्तं क्वचित् आकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टम् ।
 क्वचित् अक्षरशब्दोदितम् । क्वचित् माया इति सूचितम् । अव्यक्ता
 हि सा माया तत्त्व-अन्तर्त्वानिरूपणस्य अशक्यत्वात् ॥ I. 4, 3 ;
 तस्मात् न प्रधानस्य अत्र ज्ञेयत्वं अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्दिष्टत्वं वा ॥
 I. 4, 5.

through their ignorance and with which on that account they are in bondage, through contact with which they are able to experience retribution for past life, and some of them thus become able through self-knowledge to distinguish themselves from Prakriti and to attain Mukti. The Sankhyas conclude, therefore, that their doctrine about the Pradhana is based upon Scripture¹.

Shankar's reply to this is that, if we take the text without its context, then, of course, it can be so interpreted that the Sankhya

(¹) पुनः अपि प्रधानवादी अशब्दत्वं प्रधानस्य असिद्धं इति आह । कस्मात् । मंत्रवर्णात् अजां एकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बव्हीः प्रजोः सजमानां सरूपाः । अजः हि एकः जुषमाणः अनुशेते जहाति एनां भुक्तभोगां अजः अन्य इति । अत्र हि मंत्रे लोहितशुक्लकृष्णशब्दैः रजःसत्त्वतमांसि अभिधीयन्ते ... । न जायते इति च अजा स्यात् मूलप्रकृतिः अविकृतिः इति अभ्युपगमात् । ... सा च बव्हीः प्रजाः त्रैगुण्य-अन्विताः जनयति । तां प्रकृतिं अजः एकः पुरुषः जुषमाणः प्रीयमाणः ... अनुशेते । तां एव अविद्यया आत्मत्वेन उपगम्य सुखी दुःखी मूढः अहं इति अविवेकतया संसरति । अन्यः पुनः अजः पुरुषः उत्पन्नविवेकज्ञानः विरक्तः जहाति एनां प्रकृतिं भुक्तभोगां कृतभोगापवर्गां परित्यजति मुच्यते इत्यर्थः । तस्मात् श्रुतिमूला एव प्रधानादिकल्पना कापिलानां इति ॥ I. 4, 8.

doctrine can be based upon it. But then it is also equally possible to interpret it so as to found any doctrine upon it. No text, however, can be interpreted properly apart from its context. And, according to its context, in the text under consideration, *Aja* means, not *Prakriti* as the Sankhyas define it, but *Prakriti* which is constituted by light, water, and so on, which arose from God, and from which all beings arise¹.

Driven from one stronghold, the Sankhyas take refuge in another. For now they quote the following text in support of their

(1) एवं प्राप्ते मूमः । न क्षणेन मंद्रेण भृतिमस्त्रं मादय-
मादस्य क्षयं च आध्विनमुम् । न हि भवं मंद्रः स्वानन्देन क्षयिन्
अपि यादं ममर्थायिन् उरुदत्तं । मन्त्रं भवि यया कयापित्
कन्यनया अजायादिदेवसादन-उपवसोः । मादय्यादः एव इह
अभिप्रेतः इति विवेच-अवधारणकारण-अभावात् । ...इह पुनः
का इयं अजा प्रतिपत्तय्या इति ॥ I. 1, 8. अत्र मूमः ।
परमेश्वरात् उरुमा उपोतिःप्रमुखा तेजः-अप्-अमलक्षणा चतु-
र्विधस्य भूतप्रामस्य प्रकृतिभूता इयं अजा प्रतिपत्तय्या । ...
भूतप्रयलक्षणा एव इयं अजा विवेचया न मुनप्रवटक्षणा । परमात् ।
तथा हि एकं सागितनः तेजः-अप्-अप्रानां परमेश्वरात् उत्पासि
आप्राय तेषां एव रोहितादिरूपतां आगमन्ति “ यत् ओं रोहितं
स्य तेजसः तत् रूपं यत् शुक्रं तत् अर्पां यत् कृष्णं तत् अमस्य ”

doctrine :—That alone I believe to be Atma in which “twenty-five people” and ether are comprehended. The Sankhyas maintain that the twenty-five people, mentioned in this text, are the twenty-five categories of their theory¹. And hence, they say, the Sankhya doctrine about the Pradhana is authorised by Scripture².

In connection with this, Shankar, in a long discussion, establishes the following points :—(1) There is nothing in the Sankhya doctrine about their twenty-five categories by which they can be arranged into

इति । तानि एव इह तेजः-अप्-अन्नानि प्रत्यभिज्ञायन्ते रोहि-
तादिशब्दनामान्यात् ॥ I. 4, 9. (1) See above, p. 193.

(2) एवं परिहृते अपि अजामंत्रे पुनः अन्यस्मात् मंत्रात्
सांख्यः प्रवर्तते । “यास्मिन् पंच पंचजनाः आकाशः च
प्रतिष्ठितः । तं एव मन्ये आत्मनः...” इति । आस्मिन् मंत्रे पंच
पंचजनाः इति पंचमंश्याविषया अग्रा पंचसंख्या श्रूयते पंचशब्द-
द्वयदर्शनात् । ते एते पंचपंचकाः पंचविंशतिः संपद्यन्ते । तथा
पंचविंशतिमंश्या यावन्तः संश्लेषाः आकाशयन्ते तावन्ति, एवं
च तत्त्वानि सांख्यः संख्यायन्ते ... । तथा श्रुतिप्रसिद्ध्या पंच-
विंशतिमंश्या तेषां स्मृतिप्रसिद्धानां पंचविंशतितत्त्वानां उपसंग्र-
हात् प्राप्तं पुनः श्रुतिमत्त्वं एव प्रधानादीनाम् ॥ I. 4, 11.

five groups of five each¹. (2) the words in the text cannot be interpreted to mean twenty-five.² (3) Even supposing that they can be taken to mean "twenty-five people,"

(1) तान् मूनाः । न ईशान-उपसंहारान् अपि प्रथमादीनां
 पुनरिदं प्रत्य भागा वर्तमाना वस्तुतः । नानाभाषणं । नानादि
 एतानि पंचवर्गान्तराणि न एतां पञ्चमःपञ्चमः साधारणःपञ्चः
 आदि येन पञ्चोपासनेः अन्तर्गते एताः पंचपंचकस्याः निवेदिताः ।
 न हि एतन्निबन्धनं अन्तरिणं नानाभूतान् द्विवादिषाः भेदनाःनि-
 विद्यन्ते ॥ I. 1, 11.

(2) अथ उपसंहारं पञ्चविंशतिर्मुखा एव इयं अवयवद्वारेण
 स्यादने । यथा "पंच एव न वर्तते न च पंचे दानमृतः" इति द्वाद-
 शवाचिकी भनायाः पञ्चमः सङ्गः इति । तन् अपि न उपरुद्धे ।
 अथ पंचमः सङ्गः समस्तदेन समस्तः पञ्चमः इति । ...ममस्त-
 त्पत् न न चोपा पंच पंच इति । न च पंचवद्वयमद्वयं पंच पंच
 इति । न च पंचमंस्याः एतस्याः पंचमंस्याः परया विशेषणं
 पंच पंचकाः इति । उपसंहारस्य विशेषेण अमेयोगात् । ननु
 आपदपंचमंस्याः जनाः एव मूनाः, पंचमंस्याः विशेष्यमाणाः
 पञ्चविंशतिं प्रत्येकम् । यथा पंच पंचमः इति पञ्चविंशतिपदाः
 प्रतीकम् । न इति मूनाः । युक्तं यत् पंचमंस्याः सङ्ग-
 हाराभिप्रायवान् कर्तानि मया भेदाकांक्षायां पंच पंचमः इति
 विशेषणम् । इह तु पञ्च जनाः इत्यादिनःपञ्च भेदोपादानात् कर्तानि
 अगत्या भेदाकांक्षायां न पंच पंचमः इति विशेषणं भवेत् ।
 भवान् अपि इह विशेषणं पंचमंस्याः एव भवेत् तत्र च उक्तः
 दोषः । तस्मात् पंचपंचमः इति न पञ्चविंशतिवत्त-अभिप्रायः ॥
 I. 4, 11.

still there is nothing in the text which justifies us in regarding the phrase "twenty-five people" as denoting the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas.¹ (4) Further, the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas include everything that exists ; while from the "twenty-five people,"—supposing that the text can be taken to mean this,—are excluded Purusha and ether. Besides, according to the Sankhya doctrine, Purusha, being one of the twenty-five categories, cannot be spoken of, as the text under consideration does, as being the abode of the twenty-five categories. If, in order to avoid this objection, Purusha be excluded from the categories, then the teaching of the Sankhyas, that the categories are twenty-five (in support of which the present text is brought forward), will have to be given² up. For these reasons the text does not support the Sankhya doctrine. .

(¹) कथं च संख्यामात्रश्रवणे सति अश्रुतानां पंचविंशति तत्त्वानां उपसंग्रहः प्रतीयेत । जनशब्दस्य तत्त्वेषु अरूढत्वात् ॥ I. 4, 11.

(²) अतिरेकात् च न पंचविंशतितत्त्वाभिप्रायम् । अतिरेकः हि भवति आत्माकाशाभ्यां पंचविंशतिसंख्यायाः । आत्मा तावत्

Shankar, of course, knows that it is not enough for him to show that a particular Scriptural text, quoted by the Sankhyas in support of their doctrine, cannot be interpreted so as to justify their doctrine, but that he must further show what the correct interpretation of the text is, and how it supports the Vedānta doctrine. In the present case he points out that, according to the rules of grammar, the words in the text do not mean "twenty-five people", but simply "five people;" and that, according to the context, the phrase five people denotes the

इह प्रतिष्ठा प्रति अन्तर्गत निरुद्धः । ...आत्मा च वेदनः
पुरुषः । नः च पंचविंशती भूतमयः एव इति न तस्य एव आ-
धारमभ्युपगम्यं च युज्यते । अर्थांतरपरिमदे च तत्त्वमस्यातिरेकः
विद्वान्निर्विद्वदः प्रसज्यते । तथा आकाशः च प्रतिष्ठितः इति
आकाशस्य अति पंचविंशती भूतमयत्वनं नृपद् उपादानं न्याय्यम् ।
अर्थांतरपरिमदे च उक्तं दृष्टव्यम् ॥ १. १, ११.

(1) कथं तदिदं पंच पंचजनाः इति । उच्यते "दिक्कर्मण्ये
मंशायां" इति विशेषस्मरणान् मंशायां एव पंचजन्दस्य जन-
संवेदनं मनासः । ततः च सृष्ट्याभिप्रायेण एव केचित् पंचजनाः
नाम विषयस्ते न शोभयन्त्याभिप्रायेण । ते कर्ताति अस्मां आ-
लोकायां पुनः पंच इति प्रयुज्यते । पंचजनाः नाम ये केचित्
ते च पंच एव दृश्यः । उच्यते तस्य इति तथा ॥ १. १, ११.

powers of breathing, seeing, hearing, nourishing, and thinking. It is true that the word *jana* is not usually used to denote these powers. But neither is it usually used to denote the categories. And hence this difficulty is not peculiar to the Vedanta-interpretation of the text. But grammar and the context justify that interpretation. The text, therefore, supports the Vedanta doctrine, at the same time that it does not refer to the Sankhya view¹.

V.

But now the Sankhyas will say that, if the Sankhya doctrine,—that the Pradhana is the cause of the world,—is wrong because it is not consistent with the Shrutis, then the Vedanta doctrine,—that Brahma is the cause

(¹) के पुनःते पंचजनाः नाम इति तत् उच्यते । यास्मिन् पंच पंचजनाः इति अतः उत्तरास्मिन् मंत्रे ब्रम्हस्वरूपनिरूपणाय प्राणादयःपंच निर्दिष्टाः । प्राणस्य प्राणं उत चक्षुषःचक्षुःउत श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं अन्नस्य अन्ने मनसः ये मनः विदुः इति । ते अत्र वाक्य-शेषगताः सन्निधानात् पंचजनाः विवक्ष्यन्ते । कथं पुनःप्राणादिषु जनशब्दप्रयोगः । तत्त्वेषु वा कथं जनशब्दप्रयोगः । समाने तु प्रसिद्धि-अतिक्रमे वाक्यशेषवशात् प्राणादयः एव ग्रहीतव्याः भवन्ति जनसंबन्धात् च प्राणादयः जनशब्दभाजः भवन्ति ॥ I. 4, 12.

of the world,—also is wrong, because, though consistent with the Śruti, it is not consistent with the Smṛiti. It is true that the Vedānta doctrine is not inconsistent with all the Smṛitis. For it makes room for such Smṛitis as deal with practical religion. But it leaves no room for Smṛitis like that of Kapila, which teach that the non-intelligent Pradhāna is the sole cause of the world. Since, however, these Smṛitis are intended to supply self-knowledge,—which is the means of Mukti,—the Vedānta doctrine, which also has the same object in view, must be so interpreted as to make it consistent with the teachings of these Smṛitis.¹ This same objection may be expressed in a different form as follows:—Since the Smṛitis

(¹) ननु उक्ते "मदा एव सर्वं जगतः कारणं" इति ननु अपुत्रम् । युतः । मृति-अनवज्ञातादौ प्रत्यगात् ।... तासु हि भवेत्तत्र प्रधान एव जगतः कारणं उपनिषद्येन । मन्वादि-सृष्टयः तासु प्रोदनादधमेन ... प्रत्यगात्मेन अपेक्षितं अपि समर्प-यन्त्यः सावकाशाः भवन्ति ।... न एव कपिशादिमृतीनां अनुपेक्षे विषये अवकाशः भवति । मोक्षसाधने एव हि मन्वादिभ्यो अधिष्ठत्य ताः प्रयत्नाः । यदि तत्र अपि अनवज्ञाताः स्युः आनर्थक्यं एव भवती प्रसज्येत । तस्मात् तत्-अविरोधेन वेदान्ताः व्याख्या-तव्याः ॥ II. 1, 1.

like that of Kapila do not teach anything new, *i. e.*, anything which is not already contained in the Shrutis, there would be no necessity to pay attention to what the Smritis say, if every one were able to understand the Shrutis without any external help. Evidently, however, as a general rule, people cannot understand the Shrutis, and, therefore, have to depend upon the Smritis,—which are the works of eminent men,—in order to make out the meaning of the Shruti-texts. And, since people feel great respect for the authors of these Smritis, they will not attend to what we say if our doctrine be inconsistent with the teaching of the Smritis. It must also be remembered that the knowledge of men like Kapila was perfect, and that, therefore, their teaching cannot be wrong. Hence the Vedanta-texts must be explained in conformity with the Smritis.¹

(¹) कथं पुनः ब्रह्म एव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणं इति अवधारितः श्रुति-अर्थः स्मृति-अनवकाशदोषप्रसंगेन पुनः आक्षिप्यते । भवेत् अयं अनाक्षेपः स्वतंत्रप्रज्ञानात् । परतंत्रप्रज्ञाः तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातंत्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थं अवधारयितुं अशक्नुवन्तः प्रख्यातप्रणेतृकासु स्मृतिषु अवलंबेरन् । तद्वद्वेन श्रुत्यर्थं प्रतिपित्सेरन् । अस्मत्कृते च व्याख्याने न विश्वस्युः बहुमानात् स्मृतीनां प्रणेतृषु ।

Shankar's answer to the above objection is to the following effect :—This objection has no value, because it is not possible for any doctrine to be in conformity with all the Smritis. For there are some Smritis according to which, as the Sankhyas contend, the Pradhana is the cause of the world ; while there are others which teach that Brahma is the cause of the world. If, therefore, we try to conform to the former, we cannot but go against the latter ; and if we try to conform to the latter, then we must go against the former. Since, however, we cannot conform to all the Smritis, the question arises,—to which of the Smritis we ought to conform, and which we must reject ? Or which Smritis are authoritative, and which have no authority ? Now it is admitted by all that the Shrutis are of absolute authority in matters of religion and self-knowledge and Mukti. And we have

कापिलप्रभृतीनां च 'आर्यं ज्ञानं अप्रतिहतम् ... । तस्मात् न एवं मतं अयथार्थं शक्यं संभावयितुम् ।...तस्मात् ...स्मृतिवलेन वेदान्ताः व्याख्येयाः इति पुनः आक्षेपः ॥ II 1, 1.

seen that the Vedanta doctrine is in conformity with the teaching of the Shrutis, and that there is no part of the Shrutis with which it can be shown to be inconsistent. Now if a doctrine, which is wholly consistent with the Shrutis, conflicts with the teaching of any of the Smritis, then it necessarily follows that the teaching of these Smritis must be inconsistent with the Shrutis, and, therefore, must be rejected as wrong. The first question then, in every case, is,—whether a particular doctrine is in conformity with the teaching of the Shrutis. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it cannot be rejected simply because it is inconsistent with any of the Smritis. For these Smritis being, as just shown, inconsistent with the Shrutis, can be of no authority in the matter. According to this general rule it is clear that, since it is proved that the Vedanta doctrine,—that Brahma is the cause of the world,—is wholly in conformity with the teaching of the Shrutis, if the Sankhyas assert that this Vedanta doctrine is inconsistent with the teaching of the Smriti attributed to Kapila, then they must admit that the teaching of that Smriti,—that is, the Sankhya doctrine, that the Pradhana is

the cause of the world,—is inconsistent with the Shrutis, and, therefore, wrong¹.

As to the argument,—that Kapila, being a sage of perfect knowledge, cannot teach what is wrong,—it is enough to say that, since there have been many such sages, if they contradict each other,—as the authors of the various Smritis do,—we have no other course open to us but to follow those whose teaching is in conformity with the teaching of the Shrutis and to ignore all others ; and we have seen that the teaching attributed to Kapila, as to the Pradhana being the cause of the world, is not consistent with what the Shrutis teach on that point. With regard

(¹) तस्य समाधिः न अन्यस्मृति-अनवकाशदोषप्रसंगात् इति । यदि स्मृति-अनवकाशदोषप्रसंगेन ईश्वरकारणवादः आक्षिप्येत एवं अपि अन्याः ईश्वरकारणवादिन्यः स्मृतयः अनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन् । ...अनेकशः स्मृतिषु अपि ईश्वरः कारणत्वेन उपादानत्वेन च प्रकाशयते । स्मृतिबलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानस्य स्मृतिबलेन उत्तरं बक्ष्यामि इत्यतः अयं अन्यस्मृतिअनवकाशदोष-उपन्यासः । दाशैतं तु श्रुतीनां ईश्वरकारणवादं प्रति तात्पर्यम् । विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनां अवश्यकतया अन्यतरपरिग्रहे अन्यतरपरित्यागे च श्रुति-अनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः प्रमाणं अनपेक्ष्याः इतराः ...॥ II. 1, 1.

to the argument based upon the inclinations of ordinary men, Shankar says that it is wrong for any teacher to conform to the doctrine of any man or book because people are likely to accept it ; but his duty rather is to place the truth before men, and try his best to persuade them to accept it, and act up to it. And that cannot be true which contradicts the teaching of the Shrutis. Hence it is not right to say that we must conform to the Smṛiti of Kapila in order to make our teaching acceptable to the people. For Kapila contradicts the Shrutis when he maintains that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world, and that there is a plurality of Atmas.¹

(¹) सिद्धव्यपाश्रयकल्पनायां अपि बहुत्वात् सिद्धानां प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां न श्रुतिव्यपाश्रयात् अन्यत् निर्णयकारणं अस्ति । परतंत्रप्रज्ञस्य अपि न अकस्मात् स्मृतिविशेषविषयः पक्षपातः युक्तः । कस्याचित् क्वचित् पक्षपाते सति पुरुषमतिवैश्वरूप्येण तत्त्व-अव्यवस्थानप्रसंगात् । तस्मात् तस्य अपि स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्ति-उपन्यासेन श्रुति-अनुसार-अननुसार-विषय-विवेचनेन च सन्मार्गे प्रज्ञा संग्रहणीया । ...कपिलः हि न सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनं अनुमन्यते आत्मभेदभ्रम्युपगमात् । ...श्रुतिः च सर्वात्मतायां भवति ...। अतः च सिद्धं आत्मभेदकल्पनया अपि कपिष्ठस्य तंत्रं वेदाविरुद्धं न च केवलं स्वतंत्रप्रकृतिकल्पनया एव इति ॥ II. 1, 1.

Chapter XV.

Shankar's Refutation of the Sankhya (continued).

I.

We have seen, in the last chapter, the exact point of difference between the Vedanta and the Sankhya. It amounts simply to this : —That, according to the Vedanta, the cause of the world is omniscient intelligence ; while, according to the Sankhya, that cause is non-intelligent. In all other respects, the Sankhya agrees with the Vedanta or can be made to do so, if it could be made to recognise the Vedanta doctrine, that the cause of the world is omniscient intelligence or Brahma. Now the Sankhya being the greatest and most influential rival of the Vedanta, the greatest triumph for the Vedanta as well as the best way of proving the truthfulness and acceptability of the Vedanta, must consist in demonstrating that the Sankhya is wrong exactly in those points in which it differs from the Vedanta, and that the Vedanta is right even in those points. It is no wonder, therefore, that Shankar,—the greatest teacher of the Vedanta as a

texts, if properly interpreted, uniformly teach the Vedānta doctrine and thus disprove the Sāṅkhya doctrine¹ ; and (5) that it is absolutely of no avail to the Sāṅkhyas to say that their doctrine is in conformity with the Smṛiti of Kāpila, while the Vedānta contradicts that Smṛiti. This, though it is a fact, cannot help the Sāṅkhyas, because the Smṛiti of Kāpila, since its doctrine admittedly contradicts the teaching of the Śrūtis, can have no authority in the matter.

Supposing that the Sāṅkhyas admit all this, and yet are not ready to give up their doctrine,—that the non intelligent Pradhāna is the cause of the world,—then the only course, now open to them, is to throw overboard all the Śrūtis and such of the Smṛitis as follow the Śrūtis in teaching—that Brahman is the cause of the world, and to maintain that reasoning is the sole test of

(1) यदि वेदान्तेषु भिन्ना कारणावगतिः अभविष्यत् षचित् चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत् कारणं षचित् अचेतनं प्रधानं षचित् अन्यत् एव इति। ततः कदाचित् प्रधानकारणादानुरोधेन अपि ईक्षत्यादिश्रवणं भवत्यपिष्यत् । न तु एतत् अस्ति । समाना एव हि सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु चेतनकारणावगतिः ॥ I 1, 10

truth, and that even the teaching of Scripture must be given up if it contradicts facts and the conclusions of reasoning. Shankar, of course, cannot admit that we can learn anything about Atma or Brahma through the senses and understanding independently of Scripture. Yet he is so convinced about the truthfulness of the teaching of Scripture, that he has no objection to consider if the teaching of Scripture is inconsistent with facts or the conclusions of reasoning, as well as if the Sankhya doctrine, so far as it contradicts the Vedanta, is based upon valid reasoning. In this chapter we are not concerned with the former¹ aspect of this question. Let us, therefore, see how Shankar attempts to prove that the Sankhya doctrine,—that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world,—cannot be supported even by pure reasoning.

Before proceeding to do this, however, it is worth while to be acquainted with the arguments, which Shankar puts forth, in order to show that it is through Scripture

(1) This aspect has been considered in chapters VII and XIII of this book.

alone that we can hope to gain the knowledge which is the direct means of attaining Mukti, both according to him and the Sankhyas.

II.

Now the knowledge, which is required for the attainment of Mukti, is twofold ; namely, (1) the knowledge as to what works ought to be done and what works ought not to be done,—which includes all practical religious knowledge ; and (2) self-knowledge,—which includes all theoretical or philosophical knowledge. And Shankar insists that, in both these cases, it is through Scripture alone that the required knowledge can be attained.

As regards the necessity of Scripture for the practical religious knowledge, Shankar says :—‘The knowledge of what is duty and of what is contrary to duty depends on Scripture, Scripture is the only means of knowing that this line of conduct is right, that that line of conduct is wrong. For the rightness and wrongness of conduct cannot be the object of perception. Besides, the rightness or wrongness of a particular line of conduct is

not fixed by general rules, but is determined by its own time, place, and circumstances. The same line of conduct, which is right in respect of any given place, time, and circumstances, becomes wrong if pursued in another place, at another time, or under different circumstances. It is not possible, on this account, for any one to get the knowledge of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done except through Scripture.¹

Thus, according to Shankar, Scripture alone is of absolute authority on any question about right and wrong. But this is not all. He further maintains that man has no means, other than Scripture, by which he can get the knowledge about his own real nature and that of God. He, therefore, opposes those who, like the Sankhyas, try or profess to attain this knowledge exclusively through

(1) शान्नेहेतुत्वात् धर्म-अधर्मविज्ञानस्य । अयं धर्मः अयं अधर्मः इति शास्त्रं एव विज्ञाने कारणम् । अतीन्द्रियत्वात् तयोः । अनियतदेशकालनिमित्तत्वात् च । यास्मिन् देशे काले निमित्ते च यः धर्मः अनुष्ठीयते सः एव देशकालनिमित्तान्तरेषु अधर्मः भवति । तेन न शास्त्रात् कृते धर्माधर्मविषयं विज्ञानं कस्यचित् अस्ति । III. 1, 25.

reasoning. Shankar supports his position by the following arguments :—It is not right to have recourse to mere reasoning in matters which should be learnt from Scripture alone. For there is no fixity about the conclusions arrived at through mere reasoning independently of Scripture, inasmuch as there are no settled principles which can control or guide thought. It is on account of this want of fixity, which characterises the conclusions of mere reasoning, that the results, thought out with great efforts by some men of great ability and skill, are shown to be erroneous by others of greater ability and skill. And the conclusions proved by these are, in their turn, disproved by other thinkers. In this way, it is impossible to admit that the conclusions arrived at by mere reasoning stand upon any sure foundation. Nor is it possible to maintain that the conclusions, in which eminent sages like Kapila agree, should be regarded as based upon a sure foundation. For this cannot supply the want of fixity which belongs to such conclusions, inasmuch as eminent sages like Kapila are known to contradict one another.¹

(1) न आगमगम्ये अर्थे केशलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् ।

At this point Shankar supposes the advocate of mere reasoning to have restated his case in such a way as to evade the objection just mentioned :—Perhaps it will be said that we are not right in saying that there is no reasoning which is finally established. For even this want of finality of reasoning can be established by reasoning alone. Further, because some conclusions from reasoning are not well-established, if we suppose that no such conclusions are well-established,—thus rendering the whole reasoning'process untrustworthy,—then the life of man would become impossible. For we take measures to attain happiness and to avoid misery in the future because we infer that the future will resemble the past.

यस्मात् निरागमाःपुरुष-उत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनाः तर्काःअप्रतिष्ठिताः भवन्ति । उत्प्रेक्षायाः निरंकुशत्वात् । तथाहि कैःचित् अभियुक्तैः यत्नेन उत्प्रेक्षिताः तर्काः अभियुक्तैरैः अन्यैः आभास्यमानाः दृश्यन्ते । तैः अपि उत्प्रेक्षिताःसन्तः ततः अन्यैः आभास्यन्ते इति न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यं आश्रयितुं पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात् । अथ कस्याचित् प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यस्य कपिलस्य च अन्यस्य वा संमतः तर्कः प्रतिष्ठितः इति आश्रयेत । एवं अपि अप्रतिष्ठितत्वं एव । प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यानुमतानां अपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्-प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपात्तिदर्शनात् ॥ II. 1, 11.

Lastly, it is only with the help of reasoning, in the form of determining the meanings of sentences, that we can refute the apparent sense and ascertain the real sense of Scriptural passages which seem to contradict one another.¹

Thus, the advocate of mere reasoning is made to point out that, if we reject the conclusions from reasoning because they are, by their very nature, uncertain, then human life and even the understanding of Scripture would become impossible. But the advocate of mere reasoning does not stop here. He further maintains that the very want of

(¹) अथ उच्येत अन्यथा वयं अनुमास्यामहे यथा न अप्रतिष्ठादोषः भविष्यति । न हि प्रतिष्ठितः तर्कः एव न आस्ति इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । एतत् अपि हि तर्काणां अप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केण एव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते । केषांचित् तर्काणां अप्रतिष्ठितत्वदर्शनेन अन्येषां अपि तत्-जातीयकानां तर्काणां अप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात् । सर्वतर्क-अप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहार-उच्छेदप्रसंगः । अतीतवर्तमान-अध्वसाम्येन हि अनागते अपि अध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानः लोकः दृश्यते । श्रुति-अर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ च अर्थाभास-निराकरणेन सम्यक्-अर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केण एव वाक्यवृत्ति-निरूपण-रूपेण क्रियते ॥ II. 1, 11.

fixity, attributed to mere reasoning by its opponents, so far from being its defect, is its point of excellence. For he says:—What is called the want of finality, as a characteristic of mere reasoning, constitutes the very beauty of reasoning. For it enables us to reject erroneous reasonings and to accept those which are valid,—which we could not do if there were certain accepted propositions which could not be questioned. It is not right that, because our ancestors were stupid enough to accept certain propositions which we think to be objectionable, therefore, we also should stupidly accept them. Hence the want of fixity cannot be an objection to¹ reasoning.

To these arguments in favour of mere reasoning, Shankar makes the following reply :—Though in certain cases the conclusions from mere reasoning may be well-

(¹) अयं एव तर्कस्य-अलंकारः यत् अप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम । एवं हि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यः तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यः भवति । न हि पूर्वजः मूढः आसौत् इति आत्मना अपि मूढेन भवितव्यं इति किञ्चित् अस्ति प्रमाणम् । तस्मात् न तर्क-अप्रतिष्ठानं दोषः ॥ II. 1, 11.

established, still in respect of self-knowledge, mere reasoning cannot be shown to be well-founded, and, therefore, cannot supply us with the knowledge which is the means of Mukti. For it is not possible, without the help of Scripture, even to form a vague idea of the true nature of reality (Brahma or Atma), which is extremely abstruse, and on our knowledge of which the attainment of Mukti depends. As was said above, this subject cannot be the object of sense-perception inasmuch as it is devoid of form, taste, smell, &c. Nor can it be known through inference inasmuch as it possesses no mark from which it could be inferred. On the other hand, all thinkers, who admit the possibility of Mukti, maintain that Mukti can be attained by means of perfect knowledge alone. Since, however, perfect knowledge must be always the same,...it is not possible that men, who had it, would disagree with one another. But it is a well-known fact that those, who depend upon mere reasoning, contradict one another. What is established by one thinker to be perfect knowledge, is pulled down by another as mere illusion ; and what is proved by this latter, is disproved by some other thinker.

Now, how can knowledge, attained through mere reasoning, be perfect knowledge, if it is not even always the same? Nor is it admitted by all advocates of mere reasoning that the Sankhya is the best of them all, so that whatever he teaches may be taken as perfect knowledge. Further, it is not possible to hold a meeting, at one place and time, of all the advocates of mere reasoning of the past, present, and future, so that the opinion, in which they will all agree, may be accepted as perfect knowledge. Scripture, on the other hand, being eternal and being intended to supply man with perfect knowledge, must be regarded as treating of absolute reality. The knowledge, therefore, which we get through Scripture, cannot be denied to be perfect even by all the advocates of mere reasoning of the past, present, and future, joined together. Hence it necessarily follows that Scripture alone is the source of perfect knowledge.¹

(¹) इति चेत् । एवं अपि अविमोक्षप्रसंगः । यद्यपि क्वचित् विषये तर्कस्य प्रतिष्ठितत्वं उपलक्ष्यते तथापि प्रकृते तावत् विषये प्रसज्यते एव अप्रतिष्ठितत्वदोषात् अनिमोक्षः तर्कस्य । न हि इदं अतिगंभीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिवन्धनं आगमं अन्तरेण उत्प्रेक्षितुं

Thus, then, Shankar maintains that, in respect of knowledge about right and wrong, and knowledge about the nature of God and the human soul, Scripture alone is of independent authority. It is, however, necessary

कोपि ज्ञायन् । स्यादि-अनायात् दि न शय अर्थः प्रत्यक्षगोचरः
निगादे-अनायात् च न अनुमानादीनां इति अर्थोक्तम् । अपिच
सम्यक् ज्ञानात् मोक्षः इति सर्वेषां मोक्षादिनां अभ्युत्थानः । तत्
च सम्यक्-ज्ञानं एकरूपं यस्मिन्प्रकारात् एकरूपेण हि अवस्थितः यः
अर्थः सः परमार्थः सोऽहं तत् विषयं ज्ञानं सम्यक्-ज्ञानं इति उच्यते ।
तत्र एवं गतिं सम्यक्-ज्ञानं पुद्गलाणां विप्रतिपत्तिः अनुपपत्ता ।
तत्तज्ज्ञानानां तु अन्योन्यविरोधान् प्रसिद्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः । यत्
हि येनचित् तादृशेण इदं एव सम्यक् ज्ञानं इति प्रतिपादितं तत्
अपरेण व्युत्पाद्यते तेन अपि प्रतिष्ठापितं ततः अपरेण व्युत्पा-
द्यते इति प्रसिद्धं टीके । कथं एकरूप-अनवस्थितविषयं तत्-प्रभवं
सम्यक्-ज्ञानं भवेत् । न च प्रधानपादां तत्तद्विदां उत्तमः इति सर्वैः
तादृशैः परिगृहीतः येन तदीयं मनं सम्यक्-ज्ञानं इति प्रदिश्ये-
मादि । न च साध्ययन्ते अतीत-अनागतवर्तमानाः तादृशकाः एका-
स्मिन् देशे काले च समादृत्य येन तन्मतिः एकरूपा एकार्थविषया
सम्यक्-मतिः इति स्यात् । वेदस्य तु नित्यत्वे विज्ञान-उत्पत्ति-
हेतुत्वे च सति व्यवस्थित-अर्थविवक्षित-उत्पत्तेः । तत्-जनितस्य
ज्ञानस्य सम्यक्त्वं अतीत-अनागतवर्तमानैः सर्वैः अपि तादृशैः
अपन्द्वातुं अशक्यम् । अतः सिद्धं अस्य एव आपत्तिपदस्य ज्ञानस्य
सम्यक्-ज्ञानत्वम् ॥ II, 1, 11.

to notice that, in respect of this authoritative-ness of Scripture, Shankar introduces a difference so as to leave an opening for the admission of reflection in respect of philosophical knowledge. For, just as he disagrees with those who, in religious matters, have recourse to mere reasoning to the exclusion of Scripture ; in the same way, he disagrees also with those, who reject all reasoning as a means of attaining self-knowledge and assert that Scripture alone is the exclusive source of philosophical knowledge as well as of practical knowledge. To quote Shankar's own words :—Scripture alone is not authoritative in matters of self-knowledge or philosophy as it is in matters of practice. But Scripture and experience or intuition, &c., are to be resorted to as occasion requires, both because self-knowledge must ultimately result in experience, and because the object of this knowledge is something that objectively exists. The religious works, which ought to be performed, require no experience. And, for this reason, Scripture alone and exclusively is authoritative in this matter. Further, it depends upon man to bring about whatever he ought to do. It lies in the power of a man to do, not to do,

or to do in any way he likes, any act, whether religious or non-religious. Hence injunctions, prohibitions, alternatives, general rules, and exceptions, have their use here. But the same is not true in respect of the knowledge of what objectively exists. It does not lie in the power of a man to regard an objectively existing thing as being so and so, or as not being so and so, or as not existing at all. What is subject to option depends upon the inclination of man. And, therefore, Scripture is required to direct him aright. The knowledge, however, of the nature of an objectively existing thing does not depend upon the inclination of a man ; it depends solely upon the thing itself. If there is a post, it is no knowledge of its nature to think, according to one's inclination, that it is a post, or a man, or something else. In such a case, the idea—that it is a man or something else—is no knowledge of the thing at all, or is false knowledge. In order to have real knowledge, the conviction must be that it is a post and nothing else. In this way, the real knowledge of objectively existing things is determined by the things themselves. And, for this reason, the knowledge of Brahma or of

Atma depends upon itself, Brahma or Atma being an objectively existing thing.¹

But here the advocate of mere reasoning may ask :—If the knowledge of Atma or Brahma thus depends, like all other knowledge, upon an objectively existing thing, where is the necessity of Scripture to supply us with this knowledge? Why should it not be possible to attain this knowledge, like the knowledge of all other objectively existing things, through the faculties of perception

(¹) न धर्मजिज्ञासायां इव श्रुत्यादयः एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किंतु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयः च यथासंभवं इह प्रमाणं अनुभव-अवसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य । कर्तव्ये हि विषये न अनुभव-अपेक्षा अस्ति इति श्रुत्यादीनां एव प्रामाण्यं स्यात् पुरुष-आधीन-आत्मलाभत्वात् च कर्तव्यस्य । कर्तुं अकर्तुं अन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म... । विधिप्रतिषेधाः च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः विकल्प-उत्सर्ग-अपवादाः च । न तु वस्तु एवं न एवं अस्ति न अस्ति इति वा विकल्प्यते । विकल्पनाः तु पुरुषबुद्धि-अपेक्षाः । न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुष-बुद्धि-अपेक्षम् । किं तर्हि वस्तुतंत्रं एव तत् । न हि स्थाणौ एकस्मिन् स्थाणुः वा पुरुषः अन्यः वा इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति । तत्र पुरुषः अन्यः वा इति मिथ्याज्ञानम् । स्थाणुः एव इति तत्त्वज्ञानं वस्तुतंत्रत्वात् । एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतंत्रम् तत्र एवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानं अपि वस्तुतंत्रं एव भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् ॥ I. 1, 2.

and inference¹ ? The answer, which Shankar gives to this question, is evident from what we have already learnt about his view. His answer in substance is that there would be no necessity to consult Scripture for attaining the knowledge of *Atma* or *Brahma*, if *Atma* or *Brahma* could be an object of the faculties by which we know the other objectively existing things, or,—to express the same thing in another way,—if we had any faculty which would supply us with knowledge of *Brahma* or *Atma* independently of Scripture. The fact, however, is that the only faculties for attaining knowledge, we have got, are the faculties of perception and inference ; and that *Atma* or *Brahma*, being absolutely without any attributes, cannot be known through either or both of these faculties. All that we can learn through these faculties is the created world. But they cannot teach us anything about the nature of the Creator.²

(¹) ननु भूतस्मृत्यै मद्भूतः प्रमाणान्तरादिपयत्वं एव इति नेदान्तवान्यविचारणा अनधिका एव प्राप्ता ॥ I. 1, 2.

(²) न । इन्द्रिय-अविरयदेन संवन्ध-अप्रदृगात् । स्वभावतः विषयविषयाणि इन्द्रियाणि न ब्रह्मविषयाणि । सति हि इन्द्रिय-

Of course, having once learnt, directly or indirectly through Scripture, what the cause of the world is, and what the nature of that cause is, we may make use of the faculties of perception and inference to understand, explain, or justify this teaching of Scripture. But we must remember that these faculties are to be used, not to criticise or contradict the teaching of Scripture, but simply to help and strengthen¹ it. It is in this spirit that Shankar says, in another passage, that he objects to the method of the Sankhyas simply because they set up the logical faculty as if it were the only source of all knowledge including the knowledge required for the attainment of Mukti, and deny the truth of the teaching of Scripture because that teaching conflicts with the knowledge arrived at through the logical faculty. He would not, however, find fault with the Sankhyas if

विषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यं इति गृह्येत । कार्यमात्रं
एव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं किं अन्येन केनचित् वा संबद्धं
इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम् ॥ I. 1, 2.

(¹) सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु...तत्-अर्थग्रहणदाढ्याय अनुमानं
अपि वेदान्तवाक्य-अविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते । श्रुत्या
एव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात् ॥ I. 1, 2.

they were to use the logical faculty, in order to justify and confirm the teaching of Scripture¹

From all these considerations Shankar draws the conclusion that, though Brahma is an objectively existing thing, still its nature is such that it cannot be an object of the faculties of perception and inference. It, therefore, necessarily follows that Brahma, the cause of the world, cannot be known except through Scripture.²

It is, however, yet open to the Sankhyas to say that Shankar is simply begging the question. For the question to be decided is,—what is the cause of the world, the omniscient Brahma or the non-intelligent Pradhana? It was, in connection with the consideration of this question, that the

(1) तानि अपि, तर्क-उपेयसिद्ध्योः तत्त्वज्ञानाय उपयुज्यन्ति इति चेत् । उपयुज्यन्तु नाम । तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्यः एव भवति ॥ II. 1, 3.

(2) न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपतोऽपि प्रत्यक्षादित्ययत्नं ब्रह्मणः ... । तस्मात् सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकृत्यम् ॥ I. 1, 4.

second question arose,—namely, can we know the cause of the world through the logical faculty independently of Scripture?—the Sankhyas contending that we can. Now the main argument, by which Shankar supports his view,—that we cannot know the cause of the world except through Scripture,—is that the nature of the cause of the world is such that it cannot be known through the logical faculty. But the Sankhyas have so far a right to² object that until we have decided the question,—what is the cause of the world,—Shankar is not justified in putting forth the argument, that the cause of the world is such that it cannot be known through the logical faculty. For this argument presupposes the truth of his³ own view,—that Brahma is the cause of the world,—which is exactly the point which the Sankhyas deny, and to prove which this whole discussion has⁴ been undertaken. Shankar, therefore, has to put aside his own view as to the authoritativeness of Scripture, and to fight the Sankhyas with their own weapons, that is, to prove that the Sankhya doctrine,—that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause⁵ of the world,—is wrong even on the grounds of pure reasoning.

There is also another reason why Shankar should feel deeply interested in proving that the Sankhya doctrine is wrong even on the grounds of pure reasoning. For though he maintains, with the greatest sincerity and consistency, that Scripture is the only independent source of self-knowledge, still he is most anxious, throughout his voluminous work on the Vedanta, to show that nothing that is taught by Scripture is or can be inconsistent with the genuine teaching of perception and inference, that is, of the logical faculty. Now, since it is plain that the Sankhyas arrive at their doctrine by means of the logical faculty, that the Sankhyas are deservedly famous for their deep and acute reasoning, and that the doctrine of the Sankhyas, under consideration, contradicts the teaching of Scripture ; therefore, until and unless it is proved that the Sankhya doctrine is not a genuine teaching even of the logical faculty, there remains the possibility of people regarding the Sankhya doctrine as a genuine teaching of the logical faculty and, therefore, as true. And to the same extent, to which they will accept or believe in the Sankhya doctrine as true, they will reject the Vedanta doctrine

as false; and will, therefore, be prevented from attaining Mukti. It is, therefore, necessary even for the sake of the Sankhyas and those who are likely to be misled by them, that Shankar should undertake to demonstrate that the Sankhya doctrine,—that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world,—is wrong even on the grounds of pure reasoning. Let us now proceed to show how he executes this task.

III.

What the Sankhyas assert may be briefly stated thus:—They say that the cause of the world is something that exists objectively and that, therefore, like all other objectively existing things, it must be known by inference from its effect and not through Scripture; they further assert that the cause of the world, as known through inference, is the non-intelligent Pradhana; that, therefore, the Scriptural passages which be said to be properly interpreted only when they are understood to mean that the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhana

so far as³ it is in [contact?] with Purushas.¹ After having shown² that the Scriptural passages cannot be properly³ interpreted so as to support the Sankhya doctrine, Shankar now turns to prove that it is not right to say that the cause [of the world, as known through inference, is the non-intelligent le'radhana.²

h The first argument, by which the Sankhyas try to prove that the non-intelligent le'radhana is the cause of the world, is as follows:—It is well known that jars and other pots, which have the common characteristic of consisting of clay, have clay in general for their cause ; in the same way,

tl (1) सांख्यादयः तु परिनिष्ठितं वस्तु प्रमाणान्तरगम्यं एव
dति मन्यमानाः प्रधानादीनि कारणान्तराणि अनुमिमानाः तत्प-
t'तया एव वेदान्तवाक्यानि योजयन्ति । सर्वेषु एव वेदान्तवाक्येषु
ःतृष्टिविषयेषु अनुमानेन एव कार्येण कारणं लिलक्षयिषितम् ।
प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगाः नित्य-अनुमेयाः इति सांख्याः मन्यन्ते ॥
I. 1, 5.

. (2) सांख्यादयः स्वपक्षस्थापनाय वेदान्तवाक्यानि अपि
उदाहृत्य स्वपक्ष-अनुगुण्येन एव योजयन्तः व्याचक्षते तेषां यत्
व्याख्यानं तत् व्याख्यान-आभासं न सम्यक्-व्याख्यानं इति एता-
वत् पूर्वं कृतम् । इह तु वाक्यनिरपेक्षः स्वतंत्रः तत्-युक्तिप्रति-
षेधः क्रियते ... ॥ II. 2, 1.

all the external and internal phenomena, which possess in common the characteristic of being endowed with pleasure, pain, and dulness, must be regarded to have for their cause some principle constituted by pleasure, pain and dulness, in general, *i. e.*, by the *gunas* of *satva* (from which follows pleasure), *rajas* (from which follows pain), and *tamas* (from which follows dulness)¹. And it is evident that such a principle is nothing but the Pradhana, - which as we saw,² though non-intelligent, possesses the wonderful capacity for modifying itself into the world of difference and multiplicity in order to fulfil the purposes of Purusha or Atma.

Shankar meets this argument by the following remark :—If you intend to support your view by quoting parallel cases only,

(1) See above, p. 37.

(2) See above, p. 200.

(³) तत्र सांख्याः मन्यन्ते । यथा घटशरावादयः भेदाः मृदात्मना अन्वीयमानाः मृदात्मकसामान्यपूर्वकाः लोके दृष्टाः । तथा सर्वे एव बाह्य-आध्यात्मिकाः भेदाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मतया अन्वीयमानाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकसामान्यपूर्वकाः भवितुं अर्हन्ति । यत् तत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं सामान्यं तत् त्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वत् अचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्य अर्थे साधयितुं स्वभावेन एव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्तते इति ॥ II. 2, 1.

then you ought not to ignore such cases as contradict your view ; and the most important of the latter class of cases is that you cannot point out a single instance of a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, of itself produces or does anything for accomplishing the special purposes of some intelligent being. For it is a matter of common experience that horses, palaces, couches, seats, pleasure-gardens, and other things, are constructed for the purpose of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain on proper occasions by skilful, *i. e.* intelligent, workmen. If, then, this whole universe is constituted, on the one hand, by the (mechanical) phenomena made up of the earth and the other elements of various kinds,—which are fitted to be the means for securing to us the fruit of our various works ; and, on the other hand, by the organic phenomena like the bodies of the different orders of living beings, which possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are, therefore, fitted for being the seats of the fruit of our past works. If this universe is so constituted, and if it is further such that it lies beyond even the conception of the most skilful of human intelligent workers,

how can it be proper to say that it is the work of the non-intelligent Pradhana? At least no visible non-intelligent thing, such as a stone or a clod, is known to possess such power. Of course, clay and such other things do undergo special forms and arrangements ; but that is only when they are handled by intelligent beings such as potters and the like. In the same way, there is no objection to saying that the Pradhana also undergoes the various modifications mentioned above, but only when or so far as it is controlled or guided by some intelligent¹ being. Besides, it is not rea-

(1) तत्र वदामः । यदि दृष्टान्तवलेन एव एतत् निरूप्यते न अचेतनं लोके चेतन-अधिष्ठितं स्वतंत्रं किञ्चित् विशिष्टपदार्थनिर्वर्तनसमर्थान् विकारान् विरचयत् दृष्टम् । गेहप्रासादशयन-आसनविहारभूमि-आदयः हि लोके प्रज्ञावद्भिः शिल्पिभिः यथा-कालं सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहारयोग्याः रचिताः दृश्यन्ते । तथा इदं जगत् आखिलं पृथिव्यादि नानाकर्मफलोपभोगयोग्यं बाल्यं आध्यात्मिकं च शरीरादि नानाजात्यान्वितं प्रतिनियत-अवयव-दिन्यासं अनेककर्मफल-अनुभव-अधिष्ठानं दृश्यमानं प्रज्ञावद्भिः संभाविततमैः शिल्पिभिः मनसा अपि आलोचयितुं अशक्यं सत् कथं अचेतनं प्रधानं रचयेत् । लोष्टपाषाणादियु अदृष्टत्वात् । मृदादिषु अपि कुम्भकारादि-अधिष्ठितेषु विशिष्ट-आकारा रचना दृश्यते तद्वत् प्रधानस्य अपि चेतन-अन्तर-अधिष्ठितत्वप्रसंगः ॥ II. 2, 1.

sonable for us to take into consideration, in deciding the question about the nature of the first cause, only the material like clay of which things are made ; but we must also take into consideration the external agents like the potters. Not only is there nothing to prevent us from doing this, but, if we do so, we shall arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the world is intelligent, and thus shall have Scripture to support our view. For this reason it is not right to conclude that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the cause of the world. It is, moreover, wrong to assert that all phenomena, external as well as internal, have the common characteristic of consisting of pleasure, pain, and dulness. For it is the characteristic only of the internal phenomena ; while the external phenomena do not consist of pleasure, pain, or dulness, but constitute their cause. It must also be remembered that the same external phenomenon produces in one case pleasure, in another case pain. We cannot, therefore, say that it consists of pleasure, pain, or dulness ; for if it were so, it must always produce the same effect.¹

(¹) न च मृदादि-उपादानस्वरूपव्यपाश्रयेण एव धर्मेण मूल-कारणं अवधारणीयं । न ब्राह्मकुम्भकारादिव्यपाश्रयेण इति किञ्चित्

So far, says Shankar, about the order in the world. But it must now be noticed that, in order that this order may be produced, the three constituents of the Pradhana,—i.e., Satva, Rajas, and Tamas,—must pass out of the state of equipoise, and enter into the condition of mutual predominance and subjection, so as to be able to produce particular effects or to undergo special modifications. But the non-intelligent Pradhana does not by itself possess the activity required for this passing out of the state of equipoise. For such activity is not seen to be possessed by any other non-intelligent object such as clay or a chariot. If, however, no non-intelligent thing, that we know, such as clay or a chariot, acquires of itself,—i.e., without its being handled or controlled by some intelligent being such as a potter or a horse,—

नियामकं अस्ति । न च एवं सति किञ्चित् विरुध्यते प्रत्युत श्रुतिः अनुगृह्यते चेतनकारणसमर्पणात् । अतः ...न अचेतनं जगत्-कारणं अनुमातव्यं भवति । ...न हि बाह्य-आध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया अन्वयः उपपद्यते । सुखादीनां च आन्तरित्वप्रतीतिः । शब्दादीनां च अतत्-रूपत्वप्रतीतिः । तत्-निमित्तत्वप्रतीतिः च । शब्दादि-अविशेषे अपि च भावनाविशेषात् सुखादिविशेष-उपलब्धेः ॥ [I. 2, 1.

the activity required for doing certain work; then the same thing must be regarded as true of other non-intelligent things that do not come under our observation. Thus it follows that, since the non-intelligent Pradhana is not capable of the activity required for production or evolution and hence cannot account for it, therefore, it cannot properly be inferred to be the cause of the world.¹

Here, however, the Sankhyas may retort that, just as no non-intelligent thing is known of itself to possess any activity, in the same way it is contrary to all experience that mere intelligence should of itself possess any activity :—meaning, of course, that, for the same reason for which Shankar says that the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be taken to be the cause of the world, even

(¹) आस्तो तावत् इयं रचना । तन्-सिद्ध्यर्थं या प्रवृत्तिः साम्यावस्थानात् प्रच्युतिः सत्त्वरजः-तमसां अंगांगिभावस्यापत्तिः विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तिता सा अपि न अचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतंत्रस्य उपपद्यते मृदादिषु अदर्शनात् रथादिषु च । न हि मृदादयः रथादयः वा स्वयं अचेतनाः सन्तः चेतनः कुलालादिभिः अश्वादिभिः वा अनधिष्ठिताः विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तयः दृश्यन्ते । दृष्टात् च भट्टसिद्धिः । अतः प्रवृत्ति-अनुपपत्तेः अपि हेतोः न अचेतनं जगत्-कारणं अनुमातव्यं भवति ॥ II. 2, 2.

Brahma, which is mere intelligence, cannot be taken to be the cause of the world. Now Shankar admits that it is true that no mere intelligence can of itself possess any activity. But he points out that, though the combination of intelligent and non-intelligent beings is required to make activity possible, yet activity is produced in the non-intelligent thing when in contact with an intelligent being, and not in the intelligent being when in contact with some non-intelligent¹ thing.

Now the important question is:—To which of these two the activity belongs,—to that which is seen to possess it or to that in conjunction with which the other possesses it? Can we rightly say that it belongs to that which is seen to possess it, inasmuch as that is what we observe? On the other hand, we never observe mere intelligence to be the seat of any activity. Not only that, but even the existence of mere intelligence in conjunction with a body,—which is the seat

(¹) ननु चेतनस्य अपि प्रवृत्तिः केवलस्य न दृष्टा । सत्यं एतत् । तथापि चेतनसंयुक्तस्य रथादेः अचेतनस्य प्रवृत्तिः दृष्टा । न तु अचेतनसंयुक्तस्य चेतनस्य प्रवृत्तिः दृष्टा ॥ II. 2, 2.

of activity,—is a matter of inference, and not of actual observation ;—the inference being based upon the difference between a living body and a chariot or some other inanimate thing. And it is for this reason, *i. e.*, that intelligence exists only where body exists and does not exist where body is not, that some maintain that intelligence is simply an attribute of the body. The Sankhyas, therefore, conclude that activity belongs to the non-intelligent thing in which it is seen to exist. Shankar says that he does not mean to object to the view, that activity belongs to that in which it is seen to exist. All that he insists upon is that, though it exists in, and belongs to, the non-intelligent thing, still the non-intelligent thing becomes capable of it only when in contact with some intelligent being. This is admitted even by those who say that intelligence is simply an attribute of the body. Thus, concludes Shankar, it is beyond doubt that intelligence is the source or cause of all motive power or activity.¹

(¹) किं पुनः अत्र युक्तं । यस्मिन् प्रवृत्तिः दृष्टा तस्य सा उत यत्प्रयुक्तस्य दृष्टा तस्य सा इति । ननु यस्मिन् दृश्यते प्रवृत्तिः

But the Sankhyas may say that Atma or Brahma, even when in contact with the body, is not capable of originating activity, inasmuch as mere intelligence is itself incapable of activity. Shankar answers this objection by pointing out that there are things which, though themselves free from motion, are capable of putting other things in motion ; as for instance magnet which, though itself unmoving, moves iron, or colour and other objects of sense which, though themselves devoid of motion, are the cause of the activity of the eye and the other organs of sense. In the same way, Shankar concludes, Brahma,—which is omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, the Atma of everything,—though itself

तस्य एव सा इति युक्तं उभयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । न तु प्रवृत्ति-
 आश्रयत्वेन केवलः चेतनः रथादिवत् प्रत्यक्षः । प्रवृत्ति-आश्रय-
 देहादिसंयुक्तस्य एव तु चेतनस्य सद्भावसिद्धिः केवल-अचेतन-
 रथादिवैलक्षण्यं जीवत्-देहस्य दृष्टं इति ! अतः एव च प्रत्यक्षे देहे
 सति चैतन्यदर्शनात् असति च अदर्शनात् देहस्य एव चैतन्य
 अपि इति लोकायतिकाः प्रतिपन्नाः । तस्मात् अचेतनस्य एव
 प्रवृत्तिः इति । तत् अभिधीयते न ब्रूमः यस्मिन् अचेतने प्रवृत्तिः
 दृश्यते न तस्य सा इति । भवतु तस्य एव सा । सा तु चेतनात्
 भवति इति ब्रूमः ! तद्भावे भावात् तत्-अभावे च अभावात् ।...
 लोकायतिकानां अपि चेतनः एव देहः अचेतनानां रथादीनां प्रवर्तकः
 दृष्टः इति अविप्रतिषिद्धं चेतनस्य प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥ II. 2, 2.

without activity, is the source or cause of the activity of the whole universe and of everything that the universe¹ contains.

Now the Sāṃkhyas put forward another argument in the form of a new analogy. They argue that, just as milk, though non-intelligent, serves, on account of its own nature, the purpose of the growth of the calf, just as also water, though non-intelligent, flows, entirely on account of its own nature, for the use of men ; in the same way the Pṛadhana, though non-intelligent, might, out of its own nature, enter into activity for accomplishing the purposes of Puruṣa² or Atma.

(¹) ननु तव देहादित्युक्तस्य अपि आत्मनः विज्ञानस्वरूप-
मात्रव्यतिरेकेण प्रवृत्ति-अनुपपत्तेः अनुपपन्नं प्रवर्तकत्वं इति चेत् ।
न । अयस्कान्तवत् रूपादिवत् च प्रवृत्तिरहितस्य अपि प्रवर्त-
कत्व-उपपत्तेः । यथा अयस्कान्तः मणिः स्वयं प्रवृत्तिरहितः
अपि अयसः प्रवर्तकः भवति । यथा वा रूपादयः विषयाः स्वयं
प्रवृत्तिरहिताः अपि चक्षुरादीनां प्रवर्तकाः भवन्ति । एवं प्रवृत्ति-
रहितः अपि ईश्वरः सर्वगतः सर्वात्मा सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः च सन्
सर्वं प्रवर्तयेत् इति उपपन्नम् ॥ II. 2, 2.

(²) स्यात् एतत् । यथा धीरं अचेतनं स्वभावेन एव वत्सवि-
बृद्धयं प्रवर्तते यथा च जलं अचेतनं स्वभावेन एव लोकोपका-
राय स्यन्दते । एवं प्रधानं अचेतनं स्वभावेन एव पुद्गलार्थ-
सिद्धये प्रवर्तिष्यते इति ॥ II. 2, 3.

Shankar shows the unsoundness of this argument as follows :—This argument does not represent facts as they are, or it is based upon a misinterpretation of facts. For even milk and water can be shown to enter into activity only when they are controlled by intelligence. In the first place, it has been admitted by both parties to the controversy that no non-intelligent thing is seen of itself to possess activity. And if this is the result of experience, Scripture teaches that the activity, belonging to the whole universe and every thing in it, is due to its being under the control of Ishvar. This being the case, it is evident that, since milk and water come under this general principle taught by experience as well as by Scripture, namely, that no non-intelligent thing of itself possesses activity, they cannot be made use of to support the view, that some thing, which is non-intelligent, is yet, out of its own nature, the cause of activity. If it is asked, what is that intelligent being which causes and determines the activity of milk, then Shankar answers that the intelligent being in question is the cow that loves the calf, as well as the calf that sucks the milk ; and that, in the case of water, it is at least

evident that it does not flow simply out of its own nature, but its flowing depends upon other things such as sloping ground. Of course, on the general principle established above, the dependence of milk and water for their activity on an intelligent being, i. e., Brahma or Ishvar, is presupposed and need not be expressly¹ maintained.

Shankar further points out that the Pradhana, as the Sankhyas define it, consists of the three *gunas* in the state of equipoise, and that, on the Sankhya view, nothing exists outside of the Pradhana of such a nature that it can prompt or control the activity of the Pradhana. For the only being that exists besides the Pradhana is Purusha. But Purusha, being indifferent by nature, can neither cause

(¹) न एतत् साधु उच्यते । यतः तत्र अपि पयः-अंशुनोः चेतना-अधिष्ठितयोः एव प्रवृत्तिः इति अनुमिमामहे । उभयवादि-प्रधिद्धे रयादौ अचेतने केवले प्रवृत्ति-अदर्शनात् । शास्त्रं च ... समस्तस्य लोकपरिस्पन्दितस्य ईश्वराधिष्ठिततां श्रावयति । तस्मात् साध्यपक्षनिक्षिप्तत्वात् पयः-अंशुवत् इति अनुपन्यासः । चेतनायाः च धेन्वाः स्नेहेच्छया पयसः प्रवर्तकत्व-उपपत्तेः वत्स-चोषणेन च पयसः आकृष्यमाणत्वात् । न च अंशुनः अपि अत्यन्तं अनपेक्षा निम्नभूम्यादि-अपेक्षत्वात् स्यन्दनस्य । चेतना-पेक्षत्वं तु सर्वत्र उपदर्शनम् ॥ II. 2, 3.

nor restrain the activity of the Pradhana. On the Sankhya theory, therefore, it is not right to say that the Pradhana sometimes modifies itself into the forms of Buddhi, &c. and sometimes does not so modify itself. This is to say, the double fact of the evolution of creation and reabsorption or destruction of the world cannot be accounted for on the Sankhya view about the nature of the Pradhana which, they say, is the cause of this fact. On the Vedanta view, however, this difficulty is easily removed; because Ishvara, being the cause of all, and being possessed of omniscience, omnipotence, and the principle of Maya, can either act or cease to act as occasion requires.¹

The Sankhyas now use yet another analogy to show that it is possible for the non-

(¹) सांख्यानं त्रयः गुणाः साम्येन अवतिष्ठमानाः प्रधानं । न तु तत्-व्यतिरेकेण प्रधानस्य प्रवर्तकं निवर्तकं वा किञ्चित् बाह्यं अपेक्ष्यं अवस्थितं अस्ति । पुरुषः तु उदासीनः न प्रवर्तकः न निवर्तकः । इत्यतः अनपेक्षं प्रधानं अनपेक्षत्वात् च कदाचित् प्रधानं महत्-आदि-आकारेण परिणमते कदाचित् न परिणमते इति एतत् अयुक्तम् । ईश्वरस्य तु सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वशक्तित्वात् महामायत्वात् च प्रवृत्ति-अप्रवृत्तिं न विरुध्येते ॥ II, 2, 4.

intelligent Pradhana to enter into activity independently of any external force :—We know by observation that non-intelligent beings like grass, leaves, water, &c., of themselves, independently of any external instrumental cause, undergo modifications like milk, &c. ; exactly in the same way, the non-intelligent Pradhana also can and does undergo modifications in the forms of Buddhi, &c. If it be asked,—how it is known that grass and other things do not depend upon any external instrumental cause for undergoing transformations,—the evident answer is that no such external instrumental cause has been observed. For, if any such cause were known, we could certainly have obtained, by means of it, milk (*c. g.*) from grass, whenever we liked. But that we are not able to do. It follows, therefore, that no such cause can be said to be required. And hence the transformation of grass, &c., is spontaneous. We may, therefore, infer that the transformations of the Pradhana also are independent of anything¹ else.

(¹) स्यात् एतत् । यथा तृण-पद्म-उदकादि निमित्त-अन्तर-
निरपेक्ष स्वभावात् एव क्षीरादि-आकारेण परिणमते एवं प्रधानं

Shankar disposes of the above argument as follows :—To this argument we have to reply that it would have been right to say that, because the transformations of grass, &c., are quite spontaneous, therefore it is possible that the transformations of the Pradhana also might be wholly spontaneous, if the transformations of grass, &c., were really spontaneous. This, however, is not a fact ; for we are able to discover an instrumental cause in the case of their transformations. If it be asked,—how we know this,—the answer is that we know that grass (*e. g.*) is transformed into milk only when it is eaten by a female animal like a cow, and not if it is not eaten at all or eaten by a male animal like a bull. If no instrumental cause were required in the case, grass should transform itself into milk even though it had not entered the body of a female animal. But this is not possible. Nor has it any value to say that, because we are not able to get milk out

अपि महत्-आदि-आकारेण परिणस्यते इति । कथं च निमित्त-
अन्तरनिरपेक्षं तृणादि इति गम्यते । निमित्तान्तर-अनुपलंभात् ।
यदि हि किञ्चित् निमित्तं उपलभेमहि ततः यथाकामं तेन तृणादि
उपादाय क्षीरं संपादयेमहि न तु संपादयामहे । तस्मात् स्वाभाविकः
तृणादेः परिणामः । तथा प्रधानस्य अपि स्यात् इति ॥ II.2,5.

of grass when we like, therefore there is no instrumental cause required for that transformation. For though there are somethings which it lies in the power of man to accomplish, yet there are others for the accomplishment of which he has to depend on some external mysterious power. And the case under consideration belongs to this latter class. The conclusion is that it is not admissible to say, as the Sankhyas do, that the transformation of the Pradhana is spontaneous like that of grass, &c.¹

By reasons like these Shankar shows that the non-intelligent Pradhana, as the Sankhyas define it, cannot ever enter into any activity, and, therefore, cannot be re-

(¹) अत्र उच्यते । भवेत् तृणादिवत् स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्य अपि परिणामः यदि तृणादेः अपि स्वाभाविकः परिणामः अभ्युपगम्येत । न तु अभ्युपगम्यते निमित्त-अन्तर-उपलब्धेः । कथं निमित्त-अन्तर-उपलब्धेः अन्यत्र अभावान् । धेन्वा एव हि उपभुङ्क्ते तृणादि क्षीरीभवति न प्रदीपमनडुदादि-उपभुङ्क्ते वा । यदि हि निमित्तं एतत् स्यात् धेनुशरीरसंबन्धात् अन्यत्र अपि तृणादि क्षीरीभवेत् । न च यथाकामं मानुषः न सर्वत्र संपादयितुं इति एतावता निमित्तं भवति । भवति हि किञ्चित् कार्यं मानुष-संपादयं किञ्चित् देवसंपादयम् । ...तस्मान् न तृणादिवत् स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्य परिणामः ॥ II. 2, 5.

garded as the cause of the world. In the following passage Shankar points out another reason why the Sankhya view, that the Pradhana is the cause of the world, is wrong:—Even if we admit what is not true, merely for the sake of argument or in order not to displease the Sankhyas, that the Pradhana can enter into activity and transform itself solely out of its own nature, still another difficulty arises. For, consistently with the admission that the activity of the Pradhana does not depend upon anything else but is entirely spontaneous, we shall also have to admit that it does not depend upon any design or motive. For if it did, then the Pradhana being incapable of any design or motive on account of its being non-intelligent, the motive or design must belong to some being other than the non-intelligent Pradhana; and hence, so far as the activity of the Pradhana depends upon this motive or design, its activity must be regarded as being dependent upon some external being as its instrumental cause. If, however, the activity of the Pradhana is not controlled by any design or motive, then it is wrong to hold,—as the Sankhyas do as an essential or indispensable part of their theory,—that the activity of the Pradhana is for the

sake¹ of Purusha. But supposing that we can consistently maintain that, though the activity of the Pradhana does not depend upon any external instrumental cause, still it does depend upon some motive or purpose, we have to answer the question, - what is this motive or purpose? It must be either the happiness of Purusha, or the Mukti of Purusha, or both. It cannot be the happiness of Purusha. Because Purusha is incapable of any pleasure or pain. Besides, on this supposition, it would be impossible for Purusha to attain Mukti. Nor can the motive be the Mukti of Purusha. For Purusha is mukta even previously to the activity of the Pradhana. For the same reasons the motive of the activity of the Pradhana cannot be both the happiness and Mukti of Purusha. Nor can it be said that it is mere curiosity which is the motive of the activity of the Pradhana. For neither the Pradhana nor Purusha is capable of any curiosity, -- the former being non-intelligent, the latter being essentially pure. It is also inadmissible to say that the purpose of the activity of the Pradhana is that otherwise the capacity of

(1) See above, p 201.

cognition possessed by Purusha and the capacity of creation possessed by the Pradhana would have been useless. For, if this were the motive in question, then, as neither of these capacities can ever come to an end, Purusha could never attain Mukti. For these reasons, the activity of the Pradhana cannot, on the Sankhya view, be said to be for the sake of Purusha, even granting that the Pradhana were capable of any activity.¹

(¹) स्वाभाविकी प्रधानप्रवृत्तिः न भवति इति स्थापितम् । अथ अपि नाम भवतः श्रद्धां अनुबध्यमानाः स्वाभाविकी एव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिं अभ्युपगच्छेम ; तथापि दोषः अनुपज्येत एव । कुतः । अर्थ-अभावात् । यदि तावत् स्वाभाविकी प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः न किञ्चित् अन्यत् इह अपेक्षते इति उच्येत । ततः यथा एव सहकारि किञ्चित् न अपेक्षते एवं प्रयोजनं अपि किञ्चित् न अपेक्षेत, इत्यतः प्रधानं पुरुषस्य अर्थं साधयितुं प्रवर्तते इति इयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत । सः यदि ब्रूयात् सहकारि एव केवलं न अपेक्षते, न प्रयोजनं अपि इति । तथापि प्रधानप्रवृत्तेः प्रयोजनं विवेकनव्यम् । भोगः वा स्यात् अपवर्गः वा उभयं वा इति । भोगः चेत् कीदृशः अनाधेय-अतिशयस्य पुरुषस्य भोगः भवेत् अनिमोक्षप्रसंगः च । अपवर्गः चेत् प्राक् अपि प्रवृत्तेः अपवर्गस्य सिद्धत्वात् प्रवृत्तिः अनार्थिका स्यात् । उभयार्थता-अभ्युपगमे अपि भोक्तव्यानां प्रधानमात्राणां आनन्त्यात् अनिमोक्षप्रसंगः एव । न च औत्सुक्यनिवृत्ति-अर्था प्रवृत्तिः । न हि प्रधानस्य अचेतनस्य औत्सुक्यं संभवति । न च पुरुषस्य निर्मलस्य निष्कलस्य औत्सुक्यम् । दृक्-शक्ति-सर्गशक्तिवैयर्थ्यभयात् चेत् प्रवृत्तिः नास्ति ।

As a last argument in support of their view, that the Pradhana is the cause of the world, and that the activity of the Pradhana is for the sake of Purusha, the Sankhyas put forward an analogy of a man, possessing sight but wanting in activity being lame, meeting with another who does not possess sight but has the power walking. They say:—That just as a man, who possesses the power of seeing but is wanting in the power of walking, may proceed by getting himself seated on the shoulders of another who can walk but is blind ; or just as a piece of magnet, though itself unmoving, moves a piece of iron ; in the same way Purusha, though itself incapable of activity, causes and controls the activity of the Pradhana.¹

दृक्-शक्ति-अनुच्छेदवत् सर्गशक्ति-अनुच्छेदात् अनिमोक्षप्रसंगः
एव । तस्मात् प्रधानस्य पुरुषार्था प्रवृत्तिः इति एतत् अयुक्तम् ॥
II. 2, 6.

(¹) स्यात् एतत् । यथा कःचित् पुरुषः दृक्-शक्तिसंपन्नः
प्रवृत्तिशक्तिविहीनः पंगुः अपरं पुष्पं प्रवृत्तिशक्तिसंपन्नं दृक्-
शक्तिविहीनं अन्धं अधिष्टाय प्रवर्तयति । यथा वा अगस्कान्तः
अश्वा स्वयं अप्रवर्तमानः अपि अयः प्रवर्तयति । एवं पुरुषः
प्रधानं प्रवर्तयिष्यति इति दृष्टान्तप्रत्ययेन पुनः प्रत्यवस्थानम् ॥
II. 2, 7.

d for everything that follows from, or is supposed by, this contact, as well as in order to prevent the impossibility of Mukti; what other principle is better fitted to accomplish all this than Ishvar, or Brahma assessed of Maya¹ ?

Shankar further points out that, on the sankhya view, the Pradhana consists of the three *gunas*,—Satva, Rajas, and Tamas,—in the state of equipoise, and that the transformation of the Pradhana begins when these *gunas* pass out of the state of equipoise and attain the state mutual predominance and

(¹) अत्र उच्यते । तथापि न एव दोषात् निर्मोक्षः अस्ति । अभ्युपेतहानं तावत् दोषः आपतति । प्रधानस्य स्वतंत्रस्य प्रवृत्ति-अभ्युपगमात् पुरुषस्य च प्रवर्तकत्व-अभ्युपगमात् । कथं च उदासीनः पुरुषः प्रधानं प्रवर्तयेत् । पंगुः अपि हि अन्धं वागादिभिः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति । न एवं पुरुषस्य कःचित् अपि प्रवर्तन-व्यापारः अस्ति निष्क्रियत्वात् निर्गुणत्वात् च । न अपि अयस्कान्तवत् संनिधिमात्रेण प्रवर्तयेत् । संनिधिनित्यत्वेन प्रवृत्ति-नित्यत्व-प्रसंगात् । अयस्कान्तस्य तु अनित्यसंनिधेः अस्ति स्वव्यापारः संनिधिः परिमार्जनादि-अपेक्षा च अस्य अस्ति इति अनुपन्यासः पुरुष-अश्मवत् इति । तथा प्रधानस्य अचैतन्यात् पुरुषस्य च औदासीन्यात् तृतीयस्य च तयोः संबन्धयितुः अभावात् संबन्ध-अनुपपत्तिः । योग्यतानिमित्ते च संबन्धे योग्यत्व-अनुच्छेदात् अनिमोक्षप्रसंगः । ...परमात्मनः तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयं औदासीन्यं च प्रवर्तकत्वं इति अस्ति अतिशयः ॥ II. 2, 7.

subordination. They cannot, however, possibly attain this new state, and, therefore, the transformations of the Pradhana cannot commence if the Sankhyas regard the three *gunas* to be by nature absolutely independent of one another. unless they admit the existence of some external principle, like Ishvar, to put the three *gunas* into the new position. Of course, the Sankhyas can escape this objection by denying that the three *gunas* are by nature absolutely independent of one another. On the Sankhya view, however, this cannot be denied.² But, even if they can thus possibly escape this

(1) इतः च न प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः अवकल्यते । यत् हि राजस्तमसां अन्योन्यगुणप्रधानभाव उत्सृज्य साम्येन स्वरूप-
पक्षेण अवस्थानं सा प्रधान-अवस्था । तस्यां अवस्थायां अन-
पेक्षस्वरूपाणां स्वरूपप्रणाशभयात् परस्परं प्रत्यंगांगि-भाव-अनुप-
पत्तेः । बाणस्य च कस्यचित् क्षोनवितुः अभावात् गुणवैषम्य-
निमित्तः महत्-आदि-उत्पादः न स्यात् ॥ II. 2, 8.

(2) अपि अपि स्यात् अन्यथा ययं अनुमिमीमहे यथा न
अयं अन्तरः दोषः प्रसज्येत । न हि अनपेक्षस्वभावाः कटस्थाः च
अस्माभिः गुणाः अभ्युपगम्यन्ते प्रमाण-अभावात् । कार्यवशेन तु
गुणानां स्वभावः अभ्युपगम्यते । यथा यथा कार्योत्पादः उपपद्यते,
तथा तथा एषां स्वभावः अभ्युपगम्यते । चलं गुणवृत्तं इति च ।
अस्ति अभ्युपगमः । तस्मात् साम्यावस्थायां अपि वैषम्यउपगम-
योग्याः एव गुणाः अवतिष्ठन्ते इति । ..वैषम्य-उपगमयोग्याः अपि ।

objection, all the previous objections remain as strong as ever, unless the Sankhyas admit that the principle, that originates and controls the activity of the Pradhana, is essentially intelligent. But to admit this is equivalent to admitting the whole of the Vedanta doctrine and to rejecting that portion of the Sankhya doctrine which is inconsistent with the teaching of the Vedanta or Scripture.¹

The final conclusion, therefore, of this rather lengthy discussion, summarized in these two chapters, is that, whether the Sankhyas appeal to Scripture in support of their doctrine or base it on grounds of pure reasoning, that doctrine, according to Shankar, must be wholly rejected ; or if it is to be retained, it must be retained in such a modified form that it becomes exactly equivalent to the teaching of the Vedanta, as expounded by Shankar.

गुणाः साम्यावस्थायां निमित्त-अभावात् न एव वैषम्यं भजेरन् ।
भजमानाः वा निमित्त-अभाव-अविशेषात् सर्वदा एव वैषम्यं
भजेरन् इति प्रसज्यते एव अयं अन्तरः अपि दोषः ॥ II.2,9.

(¹) एवं अपि प्रधानस्य ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् रचना-अनुपपत्ति
आदयः पूर्वोक्ताः दोषाः तदवस्थाः एव । ज्ञशक्ति अपि तु अनु-
भिमानः प्रतिवादित्वात् निवर्तेन । चेतनं एकं अनेकप्रपञ्चस्य
जंगनः उपादानं इति ब्रह्मवादप्रसङ्गः ॥

